Assembly of Western European Union Proceedings Twenty-second Ordinary Session, Second Part. Volume III: Assembly Documents. Paris, November 1976 by unknown
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
PROCEEDINGS 
TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
SECOND PART 
November 1976 
Ill 
Assembly Documents 
WEU 
PARIS 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
43, avenue du President Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16- Tel. 723.54.32 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
PROCEEDINGS 
TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
SECOND PART 
November 1976 
Ill 
Assembly Documents 
WEU 
PARIS 

The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes : 
Volume Ill : Assembly Documents. 
Volume IV: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, 
General Index. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
List of Representatives and Substitutes 8 
Documents: 
713. Agenda of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session, 
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
714. Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary 
Session, Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll 
715. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1975 - The Auditor's Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
715 Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial 
Add. year 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
716. Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly 
- Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur . . . . . 27 
717. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the finan-
cial year 1977 submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur 29 
718. Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee - Text of the Mandate 
approved by the Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on 
31st May 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
719. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems - Report 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Burckel, 
Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
1 Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
720. European union and WEU - Report submitted on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . 65 
721. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies - new sources of energy -
Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Comelissen, Rapporteur . . . . 73 
3 Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
722. European oceanographic activities - Report submitted on behalf of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
by Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
723. Replies of the Council to Recommendations 284 to 290 . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
TABLE OF OONTENTS 
724. Relations with Parliaments - Information Report submitted on behalf 
of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments by Mr. Delorme, 
Page 
Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 
725. Anti-submarine warfare - Report submitted on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur 137 
726. European security and East-West relations - Report submitted on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. 
de Koster, Rapporteur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 
5 Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
727. Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU 
Assembly- Motion for a Resolution tabled by Mr. Burckel and others 
with a request for urgent procedure.............................. 174 
728. Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee - Motion for an 
Order tabled by Mr. Delorme and others......................... 175 
1 Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 
LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY 
BELGIUM MM. du LUART Ladialas RIAS 
MENARD Jacquea Ind. Rep. 
Representatives PIGNION Lu.oien Socialist ROGER Emile Communist 
MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo Socialist SOUSTELLE Jacquea Non-party 
BONNEL Raoul PLP VADEPIED Raoul UCDP 
DEQUAE Andre Chr. Soc. WEBER Pierre Ind. Rep. (App.) 
LEYNEN Hubert Chr. Soc. 
SCHUGENS Willy Socialist 
de STEXHE Paul Chr. Soc. 
TANGHE Francis Chr. Soc. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Substitutes 
MM. BREYNE GuataV6 Socialist Representatives de BRUYNE Hektor Volkaunie 
DUVIEUSART Etienne FDF-RW 
MrB. GODINACHE-LAMBERT MM. AHRENS Karl SPD 
Marie-Tner~e PLP ALBER Siegbert CDU/CSU 
MM. HULPIAU Raplw6l Chr. Soc. AMREHN Franz CDU/CSU 
PLASMAN Marcel Chr. Soc. DREGGER Alfred CDU/CSU 
V AN HOEYLANDT D. Bemard Socialist ENDERS Wendelin SPD 
GESSNER Manfred SPD 
KEMPFLER Friedrich CDU/CSU 
FRANCE LEMMRICH Karl Heinz CDU/CSU MARQUARDT Werner SPD 
MATTICK Kurt SPD 
Representatives MENDE Erich CDU/CSU 
MULLER Giinther CDU/CSU 
MM. BOUCHENY Serge Communist RICHTER Klaus SPD 
BOULLOCHE Andre Socialist SCHMIDT Hansheinrich FDP BRUGNON Maurice Socialist 
BURCKEL Jean-Claude UDR SCHWENCKE Olaf SPD 
CERMOLACCE Paul Communist SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut SPD 
CERNEAU Marcel Centre Union VOHRER Manfred FDP 
DELORME Claude Socialist Mrs. WOLF Erika CDU/CSU 
GRANGIER Edouard Dem. Left 
KAUFFMANN Michel UCDP 
NESSLER Edmond UDR 
President of the Assembly Substitutes 
PERIDIER Jean Socialist 
PERONNET Gabriel Soc. Dem. Ref. 
RADIUS Rene UDR MrB. oon BOTHMER Lenelotte SPD 
RIVIERE Paul UDR MM. BtJCHNER Peter SPD SCHLEITER Fran~ois Ind. Rep. CARSTENS Karl CDU/CSU SCHMITT Robert UDR (App. 
V ALLEIX Jean UDR GOLTER Georg CDUfCSU 
VITTER Pierre lnd. Rep. HAASE HorBt SPD 
HOLTZ Uwe SPD 
Substitutes KLEPSCH Egon CDU/CSU KLIESIN G Georg CDUfCSU 
MM. BEAUGUITTE Andrtl Ind. Rep. LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-HanB CDU/CSU 
BELIN Gilbert Socialist LENZER ChriBtian CDUfCSU 
BIZET Emile UDR (App.) OPITZ Rudolf FDP 
BOURGEOIS GeorgeB UDR PAWELOZYK Al/OnB SPD 
CROZE Pierre Ind. Rep. SCHAUBLE Wolfgang CDU/CSU DAILLET Jean-Marie Soc. Dem. Ref. SCHULTE Manfred SPD DEPIETRI Ct!Bar Communist 
FORNI Raymond Socialist WALTHER Rudi SPD 
GRUSSENMEYER Frant;oiB UDR WENDE Man/red SPD 
JEAMBRUN Pierre Dem. Left WORNER Man/red CDUfCSU 
LA COMBE Rent! UDR WURBS Riclwrd FDP 
8 
ITALY 
RepresentatiTes 
MM. ARFE Gaeta.no 
BERNINI Bruno 
BOLDRINI Arrigo 
BONALUMI Gilberto 
CALAMANDREI Franco 
CORALLO Salvatore 
DE POI Alfredo 
FOSSON Pietro 
GONELLA Guido 
MAGGIONI Desiderio 
MINNOCCI Giacinto 
ORSINI Bruno 
PECCHIOLI U go 
PECORARO Antonio 
ROBERTI Giova.nni 
SARTI Adolfo 
SEGRE Sergio 
TREU Renato 
Substitutes 
Mrs. AGNELLI Suaanna 
MM. ANTONI Vareae 
ARIOSTO Egidio 
A VELLONE Giuaeppe 
BORGHI Luigi 
OA V ALIERE Stefarw 
DEL DUOA Antonio 
Mrs. F AOOIO Adele 
MM. GIUST Bruno 
MARA V ALLE Fabio 
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Oriatina 
MM. PINTO Biagio 
ROMANO Angelo 
ROSSI Raffaele 
RUBBI Antonio 
SGHERRI Evariato 
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko 
URSO Salvatore 
LUXEMBOURG 
Representati-ves 
MM. ABENS Victor 
MARQUE Georges 
MART Rene 
MM. HENGEL Rend 
KONEN Rene 
SPAUTZ Jean 
~~· - Ill 
Substitutes 
Socialist 
Communist 
Communist 
Chr. Dem. 
Communist 
Communist 
Chr. Dem. 
Val d'Aosta 
Union 
Chr. Dem. 
Chr. Dem. 
Socialist 
Chr. Dem. 
Communist 
Chr. Dem. 
MSI-DN 
Chr. Dem. 
Communist 
Chr. Dem. 
Republican 
Communist 
PSDI 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Ohr. Dem. 
Radical 
Ohr. Dem. 
Socialist 
Communist 
Republican 
lnd. Left 
Communist 
Communist 
Communist 
MSI-DN 
Ohr. Dem. 
Soc. Workers 
Chr. Soc. 
Dem. 
Soc. Workers 
Dem. 
Ohr. Soc. 
9 
LIST OF BEPBBSENTATIVES 
NETHERLANDS 
Representati-ves 
MM. CORNELISSEN Pam 
DANKERT Pieter 
de NIET Maarten 
PORTHEINE Frederik 
REIJNEN Johannes 
SCHOLTEN Ja.n Nico 
VOOGD Joop 
Substitutes 
MM. van KLEEF Dik 
de KOSTER Bans 
van OOIJEN David 
PEIJNENBURG Marinua 
PIKET Frederik 
SOHLINGEMANN Johan 
STOFFELEN Pieter 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Representati-ves 
MM. Ala.n BEITH 
Ronald BROWN 
Paul CHANNON 
Julia.n CRITCHLEY 
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH 
MM. John FARR 
Andrew FAULDS 
W. Percy GRIEVE 
Peter HARDY 
John HUNT 
Arthur LEWIS 
John MENDELSON 
John PAGE 
Lord PEDDlE 
Sir John RODGERS 
MM. John ROPER 
Thomas URWIN 
Phillip WHITEHEAD 
Substitutes 
Mr. Gordon BAGIER 
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY 
Sir Frederic BENNETT 
MM. Antony BUOK 
John OORDLE 
Jim ORAIGEN 
Lord DUNOAN-SANDYS 
Sir Harwood HARRISON 
Mr. Paul HA WKINS 
Lord HUGHES 
MM. Toby JESSEL 
Kemn MeNAMARA 
Dr. Oolin PHIPPS 
Lord SELSDON 
Mrs. Ann TAYLOR 
Lord W ALLAOE of OOSLANY 
MM. Kenneth WARREN 
John WATKINSON 
Pop. Oath. 
Labour 
Labour 
Liberal 
Pop. Oath. 
Anti-Revolut. 
Labour 
Radical 
Liberal 
Labour 
Pop. Oath. 
Ohr. Hiat. 
Liberal 
Labour 
Liberal 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Liberal 
Oonaervatwe 
Oonsermtiw 
Conservative 
Labour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
OonservatWe 
Labour 
Conservative 
Labour 
Labour 
Oonaervativs 
Labour 
Labour 
OonservatWIJ 
Labour 
Document 713 8th October 1976 
AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1976 
I. Political Qaeatioas 
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2. Western Europe's policy towards Medi-
terranean problems 
11. Defence Question• 
I. European security and East-West relations 
2. Anti-submarine warfare 
Ill. Technical and Scientific Questions 
I. European oceanographic activities 
2. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies -
new sources of energy 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Qae1tion1 
I. Budget of the Assembly for the financial 
year I977 
2. Accounts of the administrative expendi-
ture of the Assembly for the financial 
year I975 - The Auditor's Report and 
Motion to approve the final accounts 
3. Financial Regulations of the Assembly -
Amendment of Article 9 
V. Relation• with Parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
IO 
Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Craigen on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Cornelissen on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf 
of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
Document 714 25th Novemmber 1976 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1976 
MONDAY, 29th NOVEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meeting of the British Conservatives. 
10 a.m. 
Meeting of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives. 
10.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Socialist Group. 
Meeting of the Liberal Group. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the Session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary 
Session. 
5. Votes on the draft recommendations postponed from the last session: 
(a) Detente and security in Europe: 
Vote on the draft rewmmendation in Document 703 presented by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee. 
(b) Role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today: 
Vote on the draft recommendation in Document 711 presented by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
6. European union and WEU : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft rewmmendation. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
TUESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
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10 a.m. 
I. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 - The 
Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequa.e on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
3. Financial Regulations of the Assembly - Amendment of Article 9: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequa.e on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft texts. 
10.30 a.m. 
4. Address by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic. 
5. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Burckel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
11.30 a.m. 
6. Address by Mr. Stavropoulos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems: 
Resumed debate. 
2. European oceanographic activities: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Craigen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
V pte on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 1st DECEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
10 a.m. 
I. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies - new sources of energy : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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11.30 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg. 
3. Relations with Parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. European security and East-West relations: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Duffy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy 
of the United Kingdom. 
4 p.m. 
3. Address by Mr. Feyzioglu, Minister of State, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey. 
4. Votes on the draft recommendations not already voted upon by the ABBembly. 
THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
I. Anti-submarine warfare : 
11 a.m 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
2. Address by Mr. Wischnewski, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
3. Anti-submarine warfare: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
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(or the Financial Year 1915 
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Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1975 
General 
1. The following financial statements, together 
with an explanatory memorandum, were sub-
mitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1975 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 1975 
(Appendix I). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1975 (showing 
also transfers between sub-heads) 
(Appendix 11). 
14 
(c) Statement of suiDS due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, London, in respect of 
contributions to the Assembly of 
Western European Union budget for 
1975 (Appendix Ill). 
(d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1975 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
Summary of Income and Expenditure 
(Appendix I) 
3. The approved original budget provided for 
expenditure of F 6,100,000 of which F 35,000 
was expected to be covered by miscellaneous 
receipts. 
4. In paragraph 5 of his report on the accounts 
for 1974 my predecessor recorded that, although 
Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the 
Assembly required the surplus of F 161,748 for 
197 4 to be reimbursed to the Council of Western 
European Union, the Council's Budget and 
Organisation Committee were considering 
whether the Assembly should exceptionally be 
allowed to carry forward to 1975 unexpended 
credits which would be required to meet retro-
spective increases in staff salaries and allowances 
relating to 1974. The Council agreed to this pro-
cedure in July 1975 and subsequently approved 
a revised budget for the Assembly of F 6,213,644 
which included F 113,644 to meet the retro-
spective increases in staff salaries and allowances. 
The remainder of the 1974 surplus, F 48,104, 
has been reimbursed to the Council. 
5. In 1975 total income was F 6,268,081 of 
which F 6,065,000 came from contributions 
requested and received, F 113,644 from the 1974 
surplus and F 89,437 from miscellaneous receipts. 
Expenditure amounted to F~ 5,711,267, leaving 
a surplus for the year ofF 556,814 made up of 
a budgetary surplus of F 502,377 (as shown in 
Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts 
ofF 54,437. 
Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure 
and unexpended credits 
(Appendix II) 
6. The transfers between sub-heads within the 
same head of the budget, shown in this statement, 
were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 
of the Financial Regulations. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
7. The assets of the provident fund of the 
Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the 
provident funds of the other organs of Western 
European Union in joint deposits held in a 
number of currencies and administered by the 
Office of the Secretary -General. On the advice 
of an Advisory Panel representing all the 
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interested parties, the number of currencies held 
was reduced during 1975 from six to three. 
8. In accordance with a decision taken in 197 4 
by the Office of the Secretary-General the 
balances on the accounts of staff members of the 
Assembly record the book value of the Assembly's 
share of the joint deposits and do not reflect 
differences between book and market values. At 
31st December 1975 the total book value of the 
balances was F 4,091,098, which includes 
F 130,139 in the accounts of two former mem-
bers of the staff which were awaiting repayment. 
The actual repayments due in these two cases 
to be made in 1976, total F 127,853 and the dif-
ference of F 2,286 between the book and market 
values will be charged in the provident fund 
account for 1976. 
9. I have received from the Office of the 
Secretary-General a certificate by the depositary 
showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 
31st December 1975 and a statement confirming 
the share of those deposits standing to the credit 
of the Assembly's provident fund in the Office's 
books at 31st December 1975. A valuation of the 
currencies held in the joint deposits at that date 
showed a loss on book value of some F 265,000 of 
which F 62,146 related to the accounts of the 
staff of the Assembly. 
10. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the Assem-
bly during my audit. 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
10th June 1976 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the President to the Auditor of 
the Assembly in connection with the financial year 
19'15) 
1. The statements attached hereto refer to : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1975 (Appendix I) ; 
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(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11) ; 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill) ; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 502,377 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure was F 556,814. The difference 
between these two figures, F 54,437, represents: 
F F 
- Bank interest . . . . . . . . 65,878 
- Sundry receipts . . . . . . 10,216 
- Sale of publications . . 13,343 
- Less receipts for 1975 
estimated in the bud-
get ................ . 
89,437 
35,000 
54,437 
3. On 15th October 1975 the Council approved 
the transfer to the budget for 1975 of F 113,644 
relating to unexpended salary credits in the 1974 
accounts of the Assembly 1• This amount related 
to increases in salaries of the permanent staff 
following the 1974 general review of emoluments. 
Transfers 
4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 29,860 
1. See Document CB (75) 6. 
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has been met by transfer between sub-heads 
within heads. 
Contributions 
5. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
I>ecember 1975. 
Provident fund 
6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with 
those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
7. The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in United States dollars, French francs and 
pounds sterling with the International West-
minster Bank Ltd., London. 
8. The balance of the fund on 31st I>ecember 
1975, as shown in Appendix IV, was F 4,091,098. 
Interest was distributed to individual accounts 
on 31st I>eeember 1975. 
9. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expl'essing the appreciation of 
the As.<~embly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United King-
dom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
3rd May 1976 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1915 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member States (see Appendix Ill) ............. . 
Transfer of credits from 197 4 to 197 5 .......................... . 
Miscellaneous 
Bank interest .............................................. . 
Sundry receipts .............................................. . 
Sale of publications .......................................... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II) ....... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Financial position as at 31st December 1915 
Assets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. . 
Accounts receivable ......................................... . 
Less: 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable ............................................ . 
ExceBB of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Certified correct : 
6,065,000 
113,644 
65,878 
10,216 
13,343 
615,848 
73,143 
88,940 
221,117 
556,814 
Andre DEQuAE 
6,178,64--
89,437 
6,268,081 
5,711,267 
F 556,814 
777,931 
F 777,931 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
Francis HUMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing Summary of Income and Expenditure and the Statement of Assets 
and Liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these Statements are correct. 
lOth June 1976 
Signed : Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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DOCUMENT 715 
APPEN 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATfONS, EXPENDITURE AND 
Total budget for 
DETAILS 1975 1 
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-HeaiJ, 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 2,594,078 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
Band C), including travelling expenses and French 
social security 8,000 
Sub-HeaiJ, 2 Allowances, social charges, etc. 
(A) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 90,861 
(b) Children's allowance 122,847 
(c) Expatriation allowance 227,321 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 14,618 
(e) Overtime 18,517 
(/) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-
French staff -
(g) Education allowance 28,990 
(h) Allowance for language courses 2,000 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 164,078 
(b) Supplementary insurance 104,022 
(c) Provident fund 349,312 
(d) Retirement pension 
-
(0) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations 
and interviews, and cost of marking examination 
papers 1,600 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 1,500 
(c) Removal expenses 3,000 
(d) Installation allowance 4,500 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 6,000 
(/) Medical examination 2,400 
Total of Head I 3,743,644 
1. Documents 648, A/WEU JCP (75) 8 revised and CB (75) 6. 
18 
APPENDIX Il 
DIX li 
UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
17,991 2,576,087 2,476,017 100,070 
755 8,755 8,755 -
90,861 85,540 5,321 
4,961 127,808 127,808 -
227,321 208,771 18,550 
14,618 4,347 10,271 
18,517 6,617 11,900 
12,275 41,265 41,265 -
2,000 510 1,490 
164,078 157,396 6,682 
104,022 94,816 9,206 
349,312 334,033 15,279 
29 1,629 1,629 -
29 1,471 252 1,219 
3,000 - 3,000 
4,500 3,549 951 
6,000 4,613 1,387 
2,400 1,763 637 
18,020 18,020 3,743,644 3,557,681 185,963 
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DETAILS 
HEAD ll - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 1. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. Lingui8tic staff 
(A) Interpretation services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Translation services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
3. Insurance for temporary staff 
4. Installation of equipment and hire of offices 
for the sessions 
5. M iBcellaneous expenditure during sessicm8 
Total of Head ll 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 Premises 
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment 
Total of Head Ill 
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Total budget for 
1975 
335,000 
130,000 
120,000 
264,000 
4,000 
70,000 
28,000 
951,000 
143,000 
10,000 
153,000 
APPBNDIX II 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
335,000 271,210 63,790 
130,000 127,341 2,659 
4,978 115,022 88,214 26,808 
4,978 268,978 268,978 
-
4,000 3,415 585 
70,000 68,831 1,169 
28,000 20,906 7,094 
4,978 4,978 951,000 848,895 102,105 
2,793 140,207 100,960 39,247 
2,793 12,793 12,793 -
2,793 2,793 153,000 113,753 39,247 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV • GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Bub-HeoJ, 6 
Bub-HeoJ, 7 
Bub-HeoJ, 8 
Bub-HeoJ, 9 
Bub-HeoJ, 10 
Bub-HeoJ, 11 
Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents 
Paper, stationery and office supplies 
Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official car 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V • OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Bub-HeoJ, 12 
Bub-HeoJ, 13 
Bub-HeoJ, 14 
Bub-HeoJ, 15 
Bub-HeoJ, 16 
Bub-HeoJ, 17 
Bub-HeoJ, 18 
Bub-HeoJ, 19 
Bub-H eoJ, 20 
Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Com-
mittees and Rapporteura 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
I TOTAL 1······· ... 
Total budget for 
1975 
223,000 
118,000 
620,000 
18,500 
20,000 
500 
1,000,000 
55,000 
75,000 
2,000 
161,000 
18,000 
30,000 
15,000 
3,000 
7,000 
366,000 
6,213,644 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and aervices rendered by 31st December 1975, and 
Edmond NESSLER 
PreBident of the Assembly 
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Fra.nois 
Olerlc of ~M 
APPENDIX II 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
223,000 178,968 44,032 
118,000 97,969 20,031 
620,000 596,277 23,723 
18,500 17,891 609 
288 19,712 13,825 5,887 
288 788 788 
-
-
288 288 1,000,000 905,718 94,282 
3,781 51,219 21,837 29,382 
3,781 78,781 78,781 
-
2,000 - 2,000 
161,000 123,876 37,124 
I 18,000 17,600 400 
30,000 24,760 5,240 
15,000 13,988 1,012 
3,000 795 2,205 
7,000 3,583 3,417 
3,781 3,781 366,000 285,220 80,780 
29,860 29,860 6,213,644 5,711,267 502,377 
paid for up to 31st March 1976, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
lJUMBLET 
Assembly 
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Andre D:mQu.a.:m 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Builgelary Affairs and Administration 
DOOUKENT 715 Al'PENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1975 
Budget (surplus) Main budget 2nd revised Net Member States 600ths budget contributions from 1974 (revised) for 1975 for 1975 required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (15,905) 596,392 11,175 591,662 
France 120 (32,350) 1,213,000 22,729 1,203,379 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (32,350) 1,213,000 22,729 1,203,379 
Italy 120 (32,350) 1,213,000 22,729 1,203,379 
Luxembourg 2 (538) 20,216 378 20,056 
Netherlands 59 (15,905) 596,392 11,175 591,662 
United Kingdom 120 (32,350) 1,213,000 22,729 1,203,379 
--
600 (161,748) 6,065,000 113,644 6,016,896 
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APPENDIX IV 
PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1975 
F 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1975 3,317,552 
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Repayments of loans by staff members 
501,049 
138,150 
Withdrawals 
Loans to staff members 
Balances carried forward : 
Accounts of former staff members awaiting settlement 
at 31st December 1975 
Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st 
F 
17,195 
109,000 
130,139 
Interest received during year 260,542 December 1975 3,960,959 
Edmond NESSLER 
PreBident of the Assembly 
I 4,217,293 . 
Francis HuMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly 
4,217,293 
Andre DEQuAE 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the toregoing Statement. I have obtamed all thA information and explanations that 1 have reqmred, and I certify, as the result of 
my audit. t<1at m m) OJ.Hmon this Statem~nt 111 correct. 
lOth June 1976 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller amiJ, Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
Document 715, Addendum 12th July 1976 
Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1975 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 1 
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1975, together with 
the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; 
Lord Selsdon (Vice-Ohairman); MM. Ahrens, Alber, de 
Bruyne (Substitute : Adriaensens), Castellucci, Oroze, 
Depietri, Hengel (Substitute: Margue), Kauffmann, de 
Koster, Lewis, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, MM. Prearo, 
26 
Schleiter (Substitute : Schmitt, Vice-Chairman), Talamona, 
Vohrer, WaJtmans (Substitute: Voogd), Mrs. Wolf (Sub-
stitute : Kempfler). 
Alao prll8ent: Sir John Rodgers. 
N. B. The name8 of Reprll8entativfl8 who took part in the 
vote are printed in italic8. 
Document 716 12th July 1976 
Amendment of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Draft Resolution 
to amend Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES to amend paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly to 
read as follows : 
"If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before lst April, the 
credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up 
in the budget of the current financial year. 
Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for 
approval and then brought to the attention of the Council." 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the 
Assembly lays down that : 
"Credits unexpired at the end of the finan-
cial year shall remain available until 31st 
March of the ensuing year in order to 
discharge liabilities in respect of supplies 
flU'llished, services rendered, or other 
charges incurred up to the previous 31st 
December and for which payment has not 
been made. 
Any such credits remaining unexpended on 
1st April of the ensuing financial year shall 
be cancelled and reimbursed to the Council." 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chairman); 
Lord Belsdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de 
Bruyne (Substitute : Adriaensens), Castellucci, Croze, 
Depietri, Hengel (Substitute : Margue), Kauffmann, de 
Koster, Lewis, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, MM. Prearo, 
27 
During the current financial year, certain 
expenditure relating to increased salaries for 
permanent staff of the Assembly in respect of 
the financial year 1974 could not be made until 
after 1st April 1975. 
For this purpose, the Council had to grant 
the Assembly exceptional authorisation to carry 
over the sums corresponding to these increases 
from one financial year to another. 
Recourse to this procedure could be avoided 
in future if the Assembly's Financial Regulations 
contained a provision similiar to that in the 
Schleiter (Substitute : Bchnnitt, Vice-Chainnan), Talamona, 
Vohrer, Waltmans (Substitute: Voogd), Mrs. Wolf (Sub-
stitute : Kemp{ler). 
Also present: Sir John Rodgers. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in the 
vote are printed in italics. 
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Financial Regulations of the ministerial organs 
of WEU, i.e. : 
"If payment of a commitment for the 
previous year has not been made before 
1st April, the credits concerned shall be 
cancelled automatically and corresponding 
credits will be taken up in the budget of 
the current financial year. Such action shall 
be regularised by notification to the Budget 
Committee." 
The Committee therefore proposes that the 
Assembly include in its Financial Regulations 
a provision based on the above text but adapted 
to the statutes of the parliamentary side of WEU. 
The last sentence of this paragraph should 
thus be worded as follows : 
"Such action shall be submitted to the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
28 
tration for approval and then brought to the 
attention of the Council." 
In conclusion, the Committee proposes that 
Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of the 
Assembly be amended in accordance with the 
following text : 
The first two paragraphs are unchanged. 
Third paragraph : 
"If payment of a commitment for the 
previous year has not been made before 
1st April, the credits concerned shall be 
cancelled automatically and corresponding 
credits will be taken up in the budget of 
the current financial year. 
Such action shall be submitted to the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration for approval and then brought to 
the attention of the Council." 
Document 717 
BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977 1 
21st October 1976 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 11 
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1977 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1911 
Details 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 
Head Il : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ............ . 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ . 
Head I V : General administrative costs ........................... . 
Head V : Other expenditure .................................... . 
Head V I : Pensions ............................................. . 
ToTAL EXPENDITURE •••••••••••••••••••• 
ToTAL RECEIPTS •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
NET TOTAL ••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Estimate for 1977 
F 
4,373,000 
1,205,000 
248,000 
1,107,000 
368,000 
pro mem. 
7,301,000 
65,000 
7,236,000 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration and approved unani-
mously by the Presidential Committee. 
de Koster, LewiB, Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie, MM. Prea.ro, 
Schleiter (Substitute : Schmitt, Vice-Chairman), Talamona, 
Vohrer, Waltma.ns (Substitute: Voogd), Mrs. Wolf (Sub-
stitute : Kemp{ler). 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chairman); 
Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, 
de Bruyne (Substitute : Adriaensens), Castellucci, Oroze, 
Depietri, Hengel (Substitute: Margue), Kauffmann, 
29 
Also present: Sir John Rodgers. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in 
the vote are printed in italics. 
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Allocation of Expenditure under Beads and Sub-Beads 
Details 
HecuJ, J- EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment .............. . 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances ................................ . 
(B) Social charges ............................. . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials ............. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I ...................... . 
HecuJ, JJ - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff ............................. . 
2. Linguistic staff .............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions ......... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions ....... . 
ToTAL OF HEAD II ..................... . 
Head Ill - EXPENDrrURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : Premises ....................................... . 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment .............................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill ................... . 
HecuJ, /V - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents, typewriters, etc. . ................... . 
Sub-Head 7 : Paper, stationery and office supplies ............. . 
Sub-Head 8 : Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ... . 
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc ...... . 
Sub-Head 10 : Official cars .................................... . 
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges .................................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV .......•............. 
Head V - OTHER EXPENDrrURE 
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
Chairmen of Committees, Rapporteurs and Represen-
tatives attending meetings of the Bureau, Presidential 
Committee and joint meetings .................. . 
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions ....................... . 
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information ..................... . 
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for ................................... . 
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes ........................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD V .................•.... 
H ecuJ, V I - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions ................................... . 
(B) Allowances .................................. . 
(C) Severance grant ............................ . 
(D) Payments to member States for validation .... . 
30 
Estimate for 1977 
F 
3,040,000 
565,000 
748,000 
20,000 
4,373,000 
366,000 
636,000 
5,000 
158,000 
40,000 
1,205,000 
165,000 
83,000 
250,000 
135,000 
680,000 
19,500 
22,000 
500 
248,000 
1,107,000 
55,000 
90,000 
3,000 
140,000 
22,000 
33,000 
15,000 
3,000 
7,000 
Pro mem. 
Pro mem. 
Pro mem. 
Pro mem. 
368,000 
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Head I - Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SA.LARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate : F 3,040,000 
Estimate : F 3,030,000 
Rank 
The Clerk ............................................ . 
The Clerk Assistant ................................... . 
Counsellors ............................................. . 
First Secretaries ....................................... . 
Secretary .............................................. . 
Secretaries-Translators /Publications ...................... . 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant ...................................... . 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . 
Switchboard Operator .................................. . 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................ . 
Messengers ............................................ . 
WEU 
Grade 
Hors cadre 
Hors cadre 
A5 
A4 
A3 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C3 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and French social security 
No. 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
6 
1 
1 
2 
28 
Total 
F 
107,000 
191,000 
936,000 
322,000 
136,000 
322,000 
106,000 
312,000 
376,000 
67,000 
63,000 
92,000 
3,030,000 
Estim'lie: F 10,000 
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Sub-HeaJ. 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETO. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate : F 565,000 
Estimate : F 105,000 
Rank WEU No. Grade 
Clerk Assistant ......................................... Hors cadre 1 
Counsellors .............................................• A5 4 
First Secretary ......................................... A4 1 
Secretary ............................................... A3 1 
Personal Assistants ...................................... B4 3 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ...........................•.. B3 3 
Messenger .........................................•..... 03 2 
15 
(b) Children's allowance Estimate: F 145,000 
5,000 F per year per child : 5,000 X 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 145,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance Estimate: F 251,000 
Rank 
Counsellors .............................................. 
First Secretary ....................................... '. 
Secretary ............................................... 
Secretary -Translator/ Publications 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator .............. 
Personal Assistants ...................................... 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .............................. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
32 
WEU No. Grade 
A5 3 
A4 1 
A3 1 
A2 2 
B4 2 
B3 2 
11 
Estimate: F 10,000 
Estimate: F 14,000 
Estimate : F 38,000 
Estimate : F 2,000 
Total 
F 
12,000 
45,000 
9,000 
8,000 
14,000 
11,000 
6,000 
105,000 
Total 
F 
107,000 
32,000 
28,000 
34,000 
29,000 
21,000 
251,000 
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(B) SOOUL ORABGBB 
Estimate: F 748,000 
(a) Social Security Estimate : F 215,000 
27 officials F 215,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate : F 123,000 
3.55% of total emoluments X 3,472,000 F F 123,000 
(c) Provident fund Estimate: F 410,000 
14 % of basic salaries X 2,923,000 F F 410,000 
(0) lDXPBNSES BJIILATING TO THlD REORUITMlDNT, ARRIVAL AND DlDPARTUBlll OF PlDRMA.NlDNT OFFIOIALS 
2 - Ill 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and 
cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure 
of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) lnsta.lla.tion allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medical examination 
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Estimate : F 20,000 
Estimate : F 1,600 
Estimate: F 1,500 
Estimate : F 3,000 
Estimate : F 7,000 
Estimate : F 2,400 
DOOUMENT 717 
Bead 11 - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate: F 1,205,000 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STA.l!'ll' 
Temporary staff required for the Be8Sions of the Assembly 
Paris: 10 days 
Function Daily Total 
remuneration No. 
F F 
Head of the sittings office .............................. . 420 la 6,300 
Heads of sections ...................................... . 320 2a 26,600 
420 4b 
Sergeant-at-Arms ....................................... . 365 1 b 4,400 
Secretaries for the Assembly ............................ . 300 2a 14,600 
365 2b 
Precis writers .......................................... . 300 4a 29,200 
365 4b 
Verbatim reporters ..................................... . 365 14 b 78,500 
465 4c 
Assistants •.•••.••....•.•.••.••....••••.••.•••••.•••.••• 235 4b 100,500 
225 23 b 
175 6a 
160 10 a 
Head ushers ........................................... . 110 2a 2,700 
Ushers ................................................ . 100 16 a 17,600 
Roneo /Assemblers ...................................... . 100 18 a 18,000 
117 298,400 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
c. Recruited as free-lance staff. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 67,600 
366,000 
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2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Servicu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the AssembJy 
10 days 
Function Total 
No. 
F 
Interpreters ............................................ 12 154,000 
12 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . F 11,000 
F 165,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions ...... F 150,000 
(B) Translation Servicu 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Daily Eatimatel 
Function remuneration No. 
F F 
Revisers ................................................ 430 2a 118,000 
668 4b 
Translators .............................................. 333 4a 117,000 
544 4b 
Assistants ..................•....•.............•.......... 175 4a 77,000 
235 3b 
160 3a 
225 2b 
26 312,000 
I. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 9,000 
F 321,000 
3. INSURANCE FOB TEMI'ORA.BY STAFF 
' 
E1limate : F 5,000 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
- Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 128,000 
- Installa.tion of telephone booths .. .. . . . . .. . . .. . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . .. . . F 13,000 
- Insta.llation of tape-recorders and a teleprinter "Fr&nce-Presse" for the 
Press Service .................................•.................. F 10,000 
- Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms ........................... F 7,000 
Eatimak : F 158,000 
5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
- Removal expenses ................................................ F 5,000 
- Medical Service (Doctor a.nd Nurse) ................................. F 5,000 
- Hire of typewriters and technicians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
- Servicing of lifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Cleaning ••......•.•••.•.••...•..•.....................•.......... F 6,000 
- Miscellaneous ...................................•...........•...... F 12,000 
Eatimak: F 40,000 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Eatimate : F 248,000 
Sub-Head 4 
PRBMISBS 
- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the-WEU committee rooms between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
- Joint overheads for the premises ................................... F 145,000 
- Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture F 8,000 
Eatimate: F 165,000 
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Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUll'MENT 
- Replacement of 3 electric typewriters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 12,000 
- Purchase of an assembling machine ....................... F 61,000 
- Replacement of arm chairs and typists' chairs ............. F 10,000 
Estimate : F 83,000 
Head IV - General administrative cosa 
Estimate: F 1,107,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH OHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
- Postage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 150,000 
- Telephone ............................................... F 80,000 
- Telegrams ............................................... F 6,000 
- Transport of documents ................................. F 14,000 
Estimate: F 250,000 
Sub-Head 7 
PAPER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES 
- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, beaded writing paper and other 
office supplies 
EBtimate : F 135,000 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, 
minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda. 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
- Reprints 
-Brochures 
Estimate : F 680,000 
Sub-Head 9 
PUBOHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC. 
Estimate: F 19,500 
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Sub-Head 10 
OFFIOIA.L OARS 
- Hire of official cars 
EBtimate : F 22,000 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK Oli.ARGES 
EBtimale : F 500 
Head V - Other expenditure 
EBtimate : F 368,000 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURA.l!iOE FOB THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, 
OHAIBMEN OF COMMITTEES AND BAPPOBTEUBS 
EBtimate : F 55,000 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOB REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
EBtimate : F 90,000 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
EBtimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OI'J'IOIA.L JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OLEBK 
EBtimate: F 140,000 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR 
EBtimate : F 22,000 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOB GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
EBtimate : F 15,000 
Sub-Head 19 
OONTINGENOIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOB 
EBtimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON·REOOVEBABLB TAXES 
EBtimate : F 7,000 
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Head VI - Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
EBtimwie : pro mem. 
(a) Retirement pension ..................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(b) Invalidity pension ...................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(e) Survivors' pension ...................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(d) Orphans' pension ....................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(B) AllowaneeB 
EBtimate : pro mem. 
(a) Household allowance ................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(b) Dependants' allowance .................................. EBtimate: pro mem. 
(e) Education allowance .................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(d) Relief allowance ........................................ EBtimate: pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
EBtimate : pro mem. 
(D) PaymentB to member StateB for validation 
EBtimate : pro mem. 
Income 
(A) Sundry reeeiptB 
(a) Sale of publications .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . F 15,000 
(b) Bank interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 40,000 
(e) Social security reimbursements .......................... F 10,000 
EBtimate : F 65,000 
(B) Pensions 
(a) Contributions (7 %) .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . .. . . . . . . .. .. . .. . EBtimate: pro mem. 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). EBtimate: pro mem. 
(e) Validation receipts from the provident fund and interest to 
30th June 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate: pro mem. 
(d) Provident fund contributions and interest since 1st July 1974 EBtimate: pro mem. 
39 
DOOUMENT 717 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(aubmitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 7 ,256,000. The budget for 1976 amounted to F 6,559,000. 
The difference is therefore F 697,000, i.e. 10.63 %· 
2. Heo4 I - Expenditure for staff 
The increase (F 434,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of: 
(i) the effect over a. full year of increases granted in 1976 in basic salaries and payments to the 
provident fund, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supple-
mentary insurance ; 
(ii) annual increments; 
(iii) two further increases of 5 %, one in January 1977 and the other in July 1977, i.e. an increase 
of 7.50 % over a. full year. 
3. Heo4 II - Expenditure relating to sessiontJ of the Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1 - Temporary staff 
The estimated increase is F 35,000. 
Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly 
applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied 
by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. 
Sub-head 3.2 (A) - Interpretation services 
The increase (F 34,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in 
the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations in respect of salaries and daily allowances payable to 
interpreters. 
Sub-head 3.2 (B) - Translation services 
The increase (F 45,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the scales applied in the 
Council of Europe and to the fact that the recruitment of translators, revisers and assistants has been 
calculated on a. basis of thirty-two days instead of thirty. 
Sub-head 3.4 - Installation of equipment for the sessions 
The increase (F 11,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increased cost 
of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
Sub-head 3.5 - Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
The increase (F 6,000) in the estimate for this sub-head, covering two part-sessions held in Paris, is 
to meet certain expenses affected by the rise in the cost of living. 
4. Heo4 Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 4 - Premises 
The increase (F 12,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the higher cost of maintenance 
for the premises at 43, avenue du President Wilson. 
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Sub-head 5 - Capital equipment 
The sum of F 26,000 is for the replacement of an assembling machine which the Council had asked 
the Assembly to defer when the 1976 budget was being prepared. It is also planned to replace three type-
writers purchased in 1971 and chairs purchased in 1962 which are now in a very poor condition. 
5. Head IV - General administrative costs 
Sub-head 7 - Paper, stationery and office supplies 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of paper 
and office supplies. 
Sub-head 8 - Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
The increase (F 60,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to increased printing costs. 
Sub-head 9 - Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
The increase (F 1,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increased cost of subscriptions 
to newspapers, periodicals and reference works. 
6. Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-head 13 - Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an increase in travelling 
expenses and daily allowances expected in 1977. 
Sub-head 16 - Expenses of experts and the auditors 
The increase (F 2,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to 
the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of living. 
7. Head VI- Pensions 
This head has been opened pro mem. in order to take account of decisions to be taken in 1977 con-
cerning pensions. 
2* - Ill 
Sundry receipts 
Expected receipts in 1977 include: 
(i) sa.le of publications; 
( ii) bank interest ; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income resulting from the entry into force of the pension scheme in 1977. 
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(a) Basic aalariee 
Head I -Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES 01!' Pl!IRMANBNT BSTA.BLISHMliiNT 
Estimate for 1977 ....................................................... F 3,030,000 
Budget for 1976 ........................................................ F 2,725,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 305,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling 
expenses and French social security 
Estimate for 1977 ....................................................... F 10,000 
Budget for 1976 ........................................................ F 9,000 
----
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff. 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOW ANOES, SOOIA.L OHA.RGBS, BTO. 
(A) A.LLOWANOBS 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1977 ..............................••........................ F 105,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 95,000 
Net increase .................. F 10,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 145,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 132,000 
Net increase.. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . F 13,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 251,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 234,000 
Net increase .................. F 17,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 10,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of 
officials qualifying for an allowance. 
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(e) Overtime 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 14,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 14,000 
Estimate unchanged 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1977 ......................................................... F 38,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 38,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
(k) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 215,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 180,000 
Net increase ................... F 35,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 123,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 112,000 
Net increase . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. F 11,000 
This calculation is based on 3.55% of total emoluments. 
(c) Provident Fund 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 410,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I!' 368,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 42,000 
This calculation is based on 14% of basic salaries. 
(0) EXPENSES RELATING TO TH1II RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFIOIA.LS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened 
for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,600 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,600 
Estimate unchanged 
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(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 1,500 
Budget for 1976 .....................•................................... F 1,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expenses 
Estimate for 1977 ...•................••.....................•.....•..•... F 3,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(d) Insta.llation allowance 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . F 4:,500 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 4:,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1977 .................................................•...... F 7,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 7,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1977. 
(/) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,400 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,400 
Estimate unchanged 
Bead II- Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TlDIPOBABY STA.D 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 366,000 
Budget for 1976 ..................•.........................•............. F 331,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 35,000 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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2. LllfGUISTIO STAB 
(A) lnltrprdalicm Stmcu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the seasions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 165,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 151,000 
Net increase .................. F 14,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between seasions 
Estimate for 1977 ......................••................................ F 150,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 130,000 
Net increase .................. F 20,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(B) Tra1Uilalicm Bmncu 
Temporary translators for the seasions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 321,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 276,000 
Net increase .................. F 45,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSUBANCB FOB TBMPOBABY STAJI'J' 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,500 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOB THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 158,000 
Budget for 1976 ..•....................................................... F 147,000 
Net increa.ae .................. F 11,000 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
5. ~BOUS BXPlmDITUBB DURING TJill SBSSIONS 
Estimate for 1977 . • . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 40,000 
Budget for 1976 • • . • . . • • • • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 34,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
PBBMISES 
Estimate for 1977 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 165,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 153,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 12,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the .Assembly's share in maintenance costs and 
hire of committee rooms. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Sub-Head 5 
OAPITA.L EQUIPMENT 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 83,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 57,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 26,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Head IV - General administrative cosa 
Sub-Heatl 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH OHABGES, TRANSPORT OJ' DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 250,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 250,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 7 
PAPER, STATIONERY A.ND OJ'll'IOE SUPPLIES 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 135,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 125,000 
Net increase .................. F 10,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 8 
PBINTING A.ND PUBLISHING OJ' ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 680,000 
Budget for 1976 ...............................................•.......... F 620,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
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Sub-Head 9 
PUROHA.SJII Oll' DOOUllriJIINTS, BJIIJI'JIIBJIINOJII WORKS, JIITO. 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 19,500 
Budget for 1976 .......................................•.................. F 18,500 
Net increase .................. F 1,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 10 
Oll'li'IOIAL OABS 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 22,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . F 22,000 
Estimate unchanged 
In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur. 
driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk. 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate for 1977 ........................................................ F 500 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TBAVJIIL AND SUBSISTJIINOJII .ALLOWANOJIIS AND INSUBA.NOJII FOB THE PBESIDJIINT OF THJII ASSJIIMBLY, OHA.IBMJIIN 
OF OOMMITTJIIJIIS AND BA.PPOBTJIIUBS 
Estimate for 1977 ....................................................... F 55,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................•• F 55,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Ra.pporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Ra.pporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPJIINSJIIS FOB BJIIPBESJIINTATION AND BEOJIIPTIONS 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 90,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 80,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
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Sub-HeatJ 14 
CJOJDII'l'TBB STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . • • • . • . • • • . F 3,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . • • . • • • • . . . . • • . . • • F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-HeatJ 15 
OFJ'ICJUL JOUB.NBYS OF liDDIBBBS OF THB OFJ'ICJE OF THB OLliiBK 
Estima~ for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . F 140,000 
Budget for 1976 .........................................•......•.••••...• F 125,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-HeatJ 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THB AUDITORS 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . F 22,000 
Budget for 1976 ..........................•..............•................ F 20,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-HeatJ 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFOBMATION 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . F 33,000 
Budget for 1976 .............................•......................•..•.. F 30,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOB GROUPS OF THB A88llliBLY 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • • • • • . • • F 15,000 
Budget for 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • • F 15,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 19 
OONTINGENCJDDS AND OTHBB EXPENDITUB:m NOT ELSliWlDIBB PROVIDED FOB 
Estimate for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1976 .................................••.•.......•.......••••.. F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-BECJOVBBABLB TADS 
Estimate for 1977 .............................••...••.•••..•............. F 7,000 
Budget for 1976 .......................................................... F 7,000 
Estimate unchanged 
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Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee 
TEXT OF THE MANDATE 1 
approved by the Council of Ministers at its 
meeting in Brussels on 31st May 1976 
1. The Standing Armaments Committee is 
instructed to submit to the Permanent Council, 
before the end of 1976, a detailed outline pro-
gramme for a study as set out in the Annex, and 
a description of its proposed method of work ; 
2. The Permanent Council will study carefully 
the outline programme and the proposed method 
of work submitted to them by the SAC, taking 
account of the determination of governments to 
avoid all .duplication and any encroachment on 
work in progress elsewhere. The aim of the 
Council's consideration of the SAC's outline 
programme will be to specify the terms and 
define the scope of the study to be aBSigned to 
it. They will take account, in particular, of the 
tasks undertaken by the European programme 
group at their meeting in the autumn of 1976 ; 
3. The Permanent Council are authorised to 
take decisions on the proposals thus submitted ; 
4. The Permanent Council will fol1low the 
development of the work and will report to 
Ministers at their next meeting ; 
5. The Permanent Council have also been 
authorised to consider at a later stage the pos-
sibility of including the following points in the 
study: 
Inventory of capacities 
Here, the aim would be to identify, by main 
categories, the weak and strong points of the 
European industry, together with the sectors 
where it can compete on favourable terms. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 
1976. 
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Inventory of relations between industries in 
different European countries 
At industrial level, there is already a net-
work of contacts and various forms of occasional 
or systematic co-operation. These experiments 
should be analysed with a view to possible ration-
alisation on a European scale. 
Annex 
The Standing Armaments Commrittee, acting 
under the authority of the Council, is instructed 
to make a descriptive analysis of the situation of 
the armaments industry in member countries. 
The purpose of this analysis is to gain a clearer 
insight into the industrial and economic implica-
tions of the standardisation of armaments. It 
shall be directed to formulating a diagnosis. 
(a) Definition of the armaments sector 
The concept of armaments should be defined 
by distinguishing between armaments as such 
and the production of goods and services for 
national defence. 
(b) Collection of economic data 
One purpose of the study will be to assemble 
figures showing the relative scale of armaments 
production in each of the countries and between 
them, and covering such points as amount of 
investment, research, sources of funds (public 
and private), manpower and exports (divided 
into the European, Atlantic and other areas). 
(c) Legal status of firms and domestic legislation 
The study should also identify the various 
legal statuses of arms firms. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems 
The Assembly, 
Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean to be an essential part of European security ; 
Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters ; 
Welcoming the opening of negotiations for the early accession of Greece to the EEC; 
Recalling that the agreement of association between Turkey and the EEC provides for the 
accession of Turkey after a period of adaptation; 
Considering it essential to associate Greece and Turkey here and now with examination of matters 
affecting the security and the building of Europe ; 
Recalling that paragraph 10 of the decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 setting up a 
Standing Armaments Committee provided that the undertakings of that Committee "would remain open 
to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" ; 
Gratified that the three member countries represented in the Security Council have acted jointly 
to encourage Greece and Turkey to seek together a. solution to the points at issue between them ; 
Deploring the wait-and-see policy pursued by the United Nations towards the Lebanese tragedy 
and the increasingly systematic deviation of worldwide organisations from their original tasks, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Draw up a programme forthwith to strengthen Europe's share in the joint defence of the Eastern 
Mediterranean ; 
2. Invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to be associated with the work of the Standing 
Armaments Committee, including the study on European armaments industries ; 
3. Make every effort for Greece and Turkey to be associated ever more closely with the building 
of Europe; 
4. Continue its work towards settling issues between Greece and Turkey ; 
5. Co-ordinate the efforts of member countries with a view to finding a fair solution to the Lebanese 
conflict; 
6. Invite member States in the United Nations and other worldwide organisations to adhere firmly 
to the commitments they entered into on joining, particularly as regards the Middle East conflict and the 
situation in the Mediterranean. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Burckel, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur was asked to prepare only 
the section on the Eastern Mediterranean of a 
more extensive report on Western Europe's 
policy 'towards Mediterranean problems. For 
various reasons, only the present document will 
be submitted at this session of the Assembly and 
the General Affairs Committee intends to pre-
pare a second report, dealing mainly with the 
Western Mediterranean, for the next session. 
2. This repom owes much to the information 
obtained by the General Affairs Committee 
during its visit to Greece and Turkey from 6th 
to 13th October 1976. Your Rapporteur wishes 
to express his deepest gratitude to the Greek 
and Turkish governmental representatives and 
members of pavliament who expressed their views 
with the utmost clarity and replied in great 
det:Jail to the questions put to them. He realises 
that he will not have satisfied all concerned but 
hopes he has done his best to define the lines of 
a Western European policy which both these 
countries are likely to accept and which should 
help to draw them closer together, this being 
essential for the common security and if they are 
both to take part in the effort to unite Europe, 
where there IS every reason for them to find a 
place in the near future. 
3. Here, your R;apporteur will merely recall 
the problems of the Western Mediterranean for 
the record, the prinoipal one now being the 
progressive re-establishment of a democratic 
regime in Spain. It is quite obvious that, if 
confirmed, this trend will lead in the years ahead 
to a complete reassessment of relations between 
Spain and the rest of Western Europe, and the 
General Affairs Committee must consider the 
implications of this rei!BSe9mlent as soon as cir-
cumstances allow. It is not possible to do so now. 
11. The Eastern Mediterranean and European 
security 
4. Although geographicaMy the Mediterranean 
may be considered as a whole, it is quite evident 
that politically the problems which arise differ 
widely from north to south. Greece and Turkey 
-and probably soon Spain- are mainly con-
cerned with the development of institutionalised 
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relations between each other and with the rest 
of Western Europe, whereas the southern part 
is mainly Arab and has on~y concluded co-
operation agreements with the European Eco-
nomic CommuniJty of limited political effect. 
However, in 1972 the Common Market countries 
decided to implement an "overall Mediterranean 
policy". In this connection, it is evident that any 
action the Community takes in the Mediter-
ranean must be adapted to the different levels 
of development of the States concerned and their 
various requirements. 
5. Second-generation countries (the Mashrek 
countries) seem to be seeking technical, industrial 
and financial co-operation agreements and oil 
agreements. It is no longer a question merely 
of commercial promotion but of estrublishing 
lasting and organised co-operation with these 
States on an equaJl footing. For States with oil 
surpluses, the aim of co-operation might be wider 
than the mere short-term acceptance of orders 
and capital. Europe might propose long-term 
technological and industrial co-operation with 
them, which would provide a laslling guarantee 
of energy supplies. 
6. First-generation countries, particularly 
Greece and Turkey, have problems in terms of 
agricultural concessions - which are probably 
necessary - and also economic integration. 
Candidate countries must therefore make a very 
great effort. Greece in particular seems aware 
of this since it has launched a vigorous reorgan-
isation of its economy in the framework of a 
five-year plan. 
7. These are the lines along which the Com-
munity's Mediterranean policy should be con-
ducted. .At the moment, however, this policy is 
highly diversified and contradictory. Regarding 
the countries wh<ich have applied for member-
ship, for instance, Greece is on the way towards 
integration, but the association agreement with 
Turkey no longer corresponds to reality today 
and a reappraisal tis urgent. Only ambitious 
concrete proposals can re-establish a balance 
between the two States and 'avoid Turkey drift-
ing away from Europe and the W est1 • In general, 
1. Similarly, it is gratifying that Malta has recently 
been able to catch up in implementing its association 
agreement with the EEC which opens the way for accession. 
Community action is over-cautious, due perhaps 
to the lack of a common approach towards 
foreign policy in the Mediterranean area. 
8. The Western European countries now no 
longer play a leading role in the military balance 
in the Eastern Mediterranean where mainly 
American and Soviet air and naval forces are 
stationed. The result is that whereas in economic 
matters Greece and Turkey are striving to 
strengthen their links v..-ith the EEC, their 
defence, even more than other European coun-
tries, is still almost wholly dependent on the 
American military guarantee. Thus, the outcome 
of Greece's decision to withdraw its armed forces 
from NATO following the Cypriot crisis in July 
197 4, although in some ways reminiscent of the 
decision taken by France in 1966, is not the same. 
Greece has also taken the initiative of renegotiat-
ing the terms governing the facilities granted 
to American forces using Greek instailations 
and the conditions in which it will participate in 
the common defence in the event of emergency. 
In the defence fidd, Greece is thus in oo unusual 
position, and attention should be paid to the 
extent to which a European union including 
Greece can take account of this. Similarly, the 
United States Congress embargo on deliveries 
of weapons to Turkey in 197 4 had serious reper-
cussions for the whole western defence system 
in Turkey. This is another fact which Western 
Europe can neither overlook nor neglect. 
9. The two great powers' naval forces in this 
sector have been strengthened considerably in 
the last ten years and may increase as Soviet 
naval strength develops. Whereas the Americans 
have permanent nava;l bases around the Eastern 
Mediterranean the bases established by the 
Soviets for their sizable fleet in these waters 
have proved :rather precarious, particularly in 
Syria and Egypt. According to recent informa-
tion in the 1976-77 edition of Jane's Fighting 
Ships, one of the weak points of the Soviet fleet 
is its logistic infrastructure. 
10. These conside:rations probably explain why 
the Soviet Union wished to develop a naval air 
arm. The first 35,000-ton ship with an aircmft-
carrying capability, the Kiev, was built in the 
Black Sea, passed through the Straits on 18th 
July 1976 and for some time joined the Soviet 
Mediterranean fleet before moving on to the 
Ba:ltic. A second ship of this class, the Minsk is 
navigating in the Black Sea and will probably 
soon be brought in to strengthen the Soviet 
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Mediterranean fleet. Two others are reportedly 
being buriJtl. 
11. A moot point is how far the passage of these 
ships through the Straits, although not officially 
termed aircraft-carriers but "anti-submarine 
cruisers", infringes the Montreux Convention 
governing the passage of warships through the 
Straits and banning the passage of aircraft-
oo.rriers. The United Sta·tes, which has not signed 
the Montreux Convention, is hardly in a position 
to approach the signatories to invite them to 
insist on ·the convention being respected, since 
the matter is a deLicate one in which everything 
depends on the various parties' definition of 
Kiev-class ships, which are not ordinary ruircraft-
carriers but cruisers equipped for the transport 
and launching of very short take-off and landing 
aircraft. The signatories of the Montreux Con-
vention should agree on an interpretation of the 
text where the points now at issue are concerned 
so that an agreement which is as important for 
the security of the Soviet Union as for the Medi-
ter:ranean does not become a dead letter. In any 
event, Turkey cannot be expected to insist on 
a restrictive application of the Montreux Con-
vention at the present juncture. It could perhaps 
do so if the solution of its problems with Greece 
allowed its allies to give it the guarantees which 
it requires. 
12. In fact, as the General Affairs Committee 
well realises, the security of Turkey, Greece and 
the whole of Western Europe has the same basis. 
Should Soviet forces become preponderant in the 
Mediterranean, the whole of Europe would be 
threatened, pavticularly because of its oil sup-
plies. But if the balance were upset anywhere 
at all in Central or Southern Europe this would 
also have disastrous effects on the security of 
Greece . or Turkey which cannot, without enor-
mous risk, consider breaking up this solidarity. 
On the contrary, the present report will be 
devoted to considering ways in which it might be 
strengthened. 
13. To determ~ne the wherewithal, the Western 
European countries must improve the co-ordina-
tion of their defence policies in the Mediter-
ranean at European level. 
14. Although co-operation so far carried out in 
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance has made 
an essential contribution to ElLI'Ope's security in 
1. Cf. Voici le Kiev, Defence Magazine, September 1976, 
pages 67·70. 
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the Eastern Mediterranean, it has proved inade-
quate in certain respects. The NATO integrated 
military structure is now relatively weak and 
most allied forces - e.g. the United States Sixth 
Fleet - are not included. There are threats to 
Britain's installations in M'alta, and soon it may 
also have to reduce its military strength in 
Cyprus. All this indicates that Europe's security 
in the Eastern Mediterranean should be based 
llJt one and the same time on continued Atlantic 
co-operation, stronger united action by the Euro-
pean countries and closer links between Western 
Europe and the States in that region. 
15. Indeed, the progressive economic integra-
tion, llJt different speeds, of Mediterranean and 
Western European States can develop only if 
based on a common defence policy. Europe's 
active economic presence in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean would ultimately be jeopardised if it 
continued to occupy a back seat in diplomatic 
and military matters. 
m. PoUtical instability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean 
16. The economic and strategic importance of 
the Eastern Mediterranean and its position on 
the main oil route from the Middle East to the 
West and on the route through the Straits which 
throughout the year gives the Soviet Union 
access to the sea are sufficierut reason for the 
presen'Ce of Soviet and American fleets and the 
active policy pursued by the two great powers 
in this area in the last twenty years. It would 
certainly be exaggerated to attribute to either 
of these powers responsibility for the crises 
which have occurred in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean countries in recent years. In almost every 
case, these conflicts have been of local origin but, 
because of the interest shown by the two great 
powers in the area, they have assumed such pro-
portions that at times, particularly in the case 
of the three main wars between Israel and some 
of its Arab neighbours, it was feared tha:t world 
peace might be threatened. 
17. The Western European countries cannot 
therefore tackle Eastern Mediterranean problems 
without taking into account the two factors of 
uncertainty constituted by the instability of 
several territories on the one hand and the Soviet 
military presence on the other. These two ele-
ments force them to act with the utmost caution 
and do nothing which might mflame differences 
or make the situation worse. Conversely, Europe's 
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interest in the Eastern Mediterranean is linked 
with detente and the solution of local conflicts. 
18. In recent years, three serious crises have 
shaken the stability of the Middle East : 
19. (i) A crisis in relations between Greece and 
Turkey, which has become considerably worse 
since summer 197 4. 
20. (a) Over Cyprus, where it has never been 
possible to apply sllJtisfa0torily the 1959 and 1960 
London and Zurich Agreements. Cyprus, gov-
erned by a Greek Cypriot Government, had more 
than four hundred Turkish enclaves scattered 
throughout the territory in continual conflict 
with the Greek majority. Only the presence of 
a United Nations force prevented them from 
coming to grips. 
21. However, when in July 1974 the Greek 
Government - then the colonels' junta - tried 
to terminate this situation by a coup d'Etat 
against Archbishop Makarios, Turkey reacted by 
sending armed forces which took up positions in 
the north-east of the island in order to protect 
the Turkish minority. Despite the collapse of the 
colonels' regime in Athens and orders from the 
Security Council, Turkish forces again took the 
offensive on 14th August and extended their 
control to almost 40 % of the island, regrouping 
the Turkish Cypriot population in the richest 
part. After bitter fighting, the Greek element, 
representing more than 80 % of the population 
of Cyprus, was relegated to 60 to 65 % of the 
island in the south-west, a mountainous and poor 
area. 
22. United Nations intervention allowed a pro-
visional cease-fire line to be determined. Almost 
all Turkish Cypriots have been evacuated from 
the southern part of the island and there are 
hardly more than 6,000 Greek Cypriots in the 
nol"th. According to Le Monde of 3rd and 4th 
September 1976 the Turkish authorities are 
bringing Turkish citizens from Anatolia to 
replace them. There are believed to be about 
125,000 Turks lriving in this part of the island 
at present. Finally, it should be noted that Mr. 
Waldheim, United Nations Secretary-General, 
looked for a settlement through new inter-
community talks, but this initiative encountered 
difficulties which it has not yet been possible to 
overcome. 
23. lt is not for your Rapporteur to take stock 
of the rights claimed by one or other party. He 
felt that both sides were prepared to open nego-
tillJtions and had abandoned their extreme posi-
tions. Enosis is no longer Greooe's political aim 
and Turkey is no longer calling for partition of 
the island ; everyrth<ing thus seems to be leading 
towards the reconstitution of a Cypriot State 
federalising the two communities, but on a dif-
ferent territorial basis from 1960. It is logical 
that Greece should st~ the problem of the 
demarcation line ·and that Turkey, since it has 
secured a major territorial gain, should refuse 
to negotiwte the matter unless both parties 
manage to open parallel negotiations on the 
status of the island in the fra;mework of inter-
community negotiations. 
24. The elections he1d in May 1976 in the Tur-
kish..occupied sector and on 5th September 1976 
in the Greek sector allowed the two communities 
to appoint their representatives. These two elec-
tions were not acts of appeasement and those in 
favour of a compromise did not win. The Turkish 
intervention in 1974 left deep scars and Turkey 
apparently feels that Archbishop Makacios, who 
won the elections in the Greek sector of the 
island, is not likely to offer the Turkish com-
munity the guarantees which it expects from the 
constitutional stwtus of Cyprus. In short, there 
is a risk that suspicion and strong feelings may 
make the negotiations long and difficult, 
although the outcome is fairly clear : indepen-
dence for the island, a federal constitution 
guaranteeing protection of the two communities 
and a change in the demarcation line in favour 
of the Greek majority. 
25. (b) Over the continental shelf in the Aegean 
Sea. Under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the 
1947 peace trea:ty w:ith Itruy, Greece obtll!ined 
sovereignty over v:irtually all of the some three 
thousand islands in the Aegean and the Dode-
canese, only 354 of which are irnhabited, the vast 
majority of the population being Greek. 
26. However, several of these islands are just 
off the coast of Turkey. For instance, Rhodes, 
Chios and Lesbos are less than fifteen kilometres 
from the Turkish coast, Samos less than two 
kilometres and other islands even closer. 
27. The Greek Government therefore considers 
thwt as each Aegean .island has a continental shelf 
the Greek continental shelf in fact covers a very 
vast part of the Aegean. The Turkish Govern-
ment for its part considers that the Aegean is a 
case apart which should not be covered by the 
usual law. This point of view was underlined 
by Mr. Demirel, the Prime Minister, on 22nd 
August 1976 in a speech in which he stated that 
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the Aegean islands should not be called Greek 
but Aegean so as to indicate their spooial status. 
28. The conflict assumed new dimensions in 
recent years : 
(1) Greece has acceded to the Geneva Conven-
tion on corntinental shelves of 29th April 1958 
but Turkey has refused to do so. Greece contends 
that this convention, which merely codifies cur-
rent international law, is a,lso binding on non-
signatory countries, but Turkey, arguing the 
special nature of the Aegean, calls for the 
continental shelf to be divided in such a way as 
to take account of its position as an Aegean power. 
(2) Turkey criticised Greece for not respecting 
the 1923 and 19471 treaties on demHitarising the 
Aegean islands and uses this as an argument for 
the treaties to be interpreted in accordance with 
its views. Greece, for its part, considers that the 
mea;sures it has taken are purely security ones 
imposed by necessity and underlines that the 
Lausanne Treruty provides for the demilitarisa-
tion of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Nikaria only in 
order to maintain peace, which would not prevent 
it ensuring their defence if they we·re threatened. 
(3) In 1974, Turkey formed an "Aegean army" 
opposite the Greek islands well equipped with 
landing craft. This army does not come under 
NATO command. 
(4) During the crisis in summer 1974, when 
Turkey insisted on taking over air traffic control 
from the half-way line in the Aegean, air traffic 
between Greece and Turkey came to a halt. 
(5) Geological formrutions favourable for oil 
prospecting have been found in the Aegean and 
in 197 4 Turkey launched a succession of pros-
pecting campaigns. In summer 1976 further 
oompaigns were carried out in the eastern half 
of the Aegean with the ocean research ship 
Sismik I. Turkey has already granted prospect-
ing licences for the eastern half of the Aegean 
sea bed. 
(6) The Greek Government appealed to the 
Security Council and on lOth August called upon 
the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
to set the l:i.mits of sovereignty over the con-
tinental shelf and insist that Turkey cease its 
prospecting campaign in the meantime. The 
International Court of Justice subsequently 
I. Turkey has not signed the 1947 Paris Treaty on the 
demilitarisation of the Dodecanese. 
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refused to take provisional measures although 
reserving the right to consider its competence 
on the substance of the matter. Greece wants the 
matter to be solved by the Court whereas Turkey 
wants prior bilateral negotiations. But the mat-
ter is further complicated by the fact that the 
law of the sea is a;t present the subject of negotia-
tions at world level seeking to lay down princi-
ples meeting present~day economic requirements, 
which leaves scope for speculation, particularly 
about the role of islands in determining under-
water prospecting areas. 
(7) In the United Nations, the four members of 
the Atlantic Alliance which are on the Security 
Council - the United States, the United King-
dom, France and Italy - tried to obtain the 
agreement of the two parti€8 to a draft resolu-
tion asking them to avoid hostile action, to do 
nothing which might aggravate the situBJtion and 
to settle their differences by negotiations, under-
lining that the International Court of Justice 
should consider the matter only from a purely 
legal standpoint. This resolution was adopted by 
consensus of the Security Council on 25th August 
1976. It led the Greek and Turkish Governments 
to consider step-by-step negotliations on the 
vlllrious aspects of their dispute. On 2nd Novem-
ber, negotiations at the level of experts were 
started in Paris on air space and in Bern on the 
continental shelf. Your Rapporteur is gratified 
thaJt the two parties have managed to agree to 
start these negotiaJtions. 
(8) Finally, the present tendency to extend ter-
ritorial waters from six to twelve miles would 
mean a very large part of the territorial waters 
of the Aegean would become Greek. This too is 
making Turkey call for the special situation of 
the Aegean to be taken into BJCoount and oppose 
any extension of Greek territorial waters in the 
area. 
29. There can be no question of the WEU 
Assembly taking sides in two such delicaJte mat-
ters as those of Cyprus and the Aegean. But it 
cannot ovedook the gmvity of these problems for 
Greece and Turkey, nor, consequently, the need 
to solve them with an eye to safeguarding the 
legitimaJte interests of the two sides. Even if 
account is <taken of the tension necessarily created 
by the prospect of early negotiations, it would 
appear that fears and suspicion on both sides 
mr surpru;;s whaJt is really at stake in the two 
affairs. 
30. In the case of Cyprus, the Greek side 
remembers above all the Turkish intervention of 
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July 1974 whose violence brought a;bout a fait 
accompli, and there is fear of further action of 
this kind in Cyprus or elsewhere. The fBJCt that 
following the intervention on 20th July the 
Turkish forces took the offensive again on 14th 
August 1974 is interpreted in Greece as proof 
of a Turkish desire for conquest, and it believes 
that Turkey prepared the Cyprus intervention 
a long time beforehand. The Greek view is that 
Turkish actions in the Aegean and in Cyprus are 
breaches of interna1tionallaw and call in question 
the treaties on which the country's sovereignty 
and security are based. The Greeks are inclined 
to think thaJt, over and a;bove the problem of the 
seabed, theM is a Turkish threat to Greek sover-
eignty over the Aegean islands. 
31. In Turkey, it is feared that renunciation of 
Enosis in Cyprus may be merely a tactical move 
and that Greece may isolate Turkey from its 
western partners through its control of the 
Aegean. This is not without consequences even 
for Turkey's relaJtions with Western Europe 
since it appears afraid thaJt once Greece has 
joined the EEC it may keep the doors firmly 
closed to Turkey. 
32. Thus, it is the underlyting reservations of 
both sides which ·are involved, and this may make 
the negotiations most difficult. At first sight, the 
stlllrting positions are clear and should allow 
agreement to be reBJChed on the main points at 
issue. But there seems to be so much reciprocal 
mistrust that it may be wondered whether such 
agreement can really be reached in the near 
future. An open dialogue, away from inter-
governmental negotiations, in the framework 
inter alia of the European parliamentary assemb-
lies, should help to dispel such mistrust and 
ulterior motives. 
33. (ii) The Lebanese affair started with the 
arrival of some 300,000 Palestinian refugees, 
whose presence tipped in favour of the Moslem 
element the delicaJte and already threatened reli-
gious and political balance on whlch the Lebanese 
constitution and political customs were based, 
and its sovereignty was sert.iously jeopardised. 
34. It would be pointless to try to attribute 
prime responsibility for the fighting which has 
become particularly bitter since the summer of 
1975. But the fact rtha.t the Lebanese people, 
often Christian, had to endure reprisals by 
Israeli forces ag.aJinst Palestinian armed elements 
which had settled in F~ Land in the south 
of Lebanon, whence they carried out deadly raids 
on Israeli territory (Maalot, Qiryat-Shemona, 
etc.), made the presence of Palestinian forces 
over which the Lebanese Government had no 
control increasingly intolerable for a large part 
of the population. In Beirut itself or in the 
southern mountains, many bloody incidents 
occurred between Christ:i:an Phalangists and 
Palestinian guerrilleros. The presence of armed 
Palestinians became ·an increasing source of divi-
sion between Christians and Moslems, left and 
right, and confrontations led to the outright mas-
sacre of inhabitants of Christian villages, Moslem 
areas of Beirut and Palestinian refugee camps. 
35. When all offers of mediation from outside 
the Arab world proved fruitless and the Arab 
States themselves, un.iJted against such mediation, 
failed to agree on joint action, Syria took mili-
tary action in June 1976. But although the 
Syrian forces have reversed the situation they 
have not yet mamged to stop the fighting and 
it has been thought that the war would end only 
if there were a de facto partition of the territory 
between Christians and Moslems. The Israeli 
authorities, for their part, announced a long time 
ago that they would not tolerate the establish-
meDJt of a Palestinian State in Fatah Land, on 
Israel's frontiers, but have pursued an open-
frontier policy with Southern Lebanon in order 
to assist, in Israel itself, the thousands of Leba-
nese refugees seeking hospital treatment or 
merely employmeDJt, thus creating a unique 
situation demonstraJting the p<Jflsibilities of trans-
frontier understanding. It is quite obviously in 
Europe's interests for the Israeli-Arab conflict 
to be contained and brought to an end through 
direct negotiations and probably too for the ter-
ritorial integrity of Lebanon to be maintained, 
even at the price of a federal status. 
36. Where Lebanon is concerned, it is impos-
sible aJt present to foresee the possible outcome 
of the peace plan proposed by the Arab League 
and even less the grand scheme for a federation 
of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. There is appa-
rently little chanee of this being agreed to by 
the Palestinians or by the Lebanese Christians 
and the Israelis will probably do their utmost to 
avoid whaJt they might call encirclement. Simi-
larly, Soviet warnings to Syria arouse fears that 
if the Lebanese affair is not settled quickly it 
may escalate to iDJternational level which would 
make iJt difficult for the West to remain on the 
sidelines. 
37. While the Lebanese tragedy is unfolding 
before the eyes of a powerless United Nations, 
certain groups of oouDJtries are systemBJtically 
diverting this organisation and its specialised 
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agencies from their statutory tasks although 
much store had been set by them initially. This 
is illustrated by the unilateral approach to the 
problem of international terrorism and racism 
which the western community can but condemn 
and fight. 
38. (iii) There has been a marked deterioration 
in relations between Egypt and Libya since the 
death of President Nasser and particularly since 
the 1973 war and the subsequent improvement 
in relaJtions between Egypt and Israel. The situa-
tion became even worse in August 1976 when 
Egypt said Libya was implicated in the hijack-
ing of an aircra:fit on an internal Egyptian flight 
and had organised or encouraged a series of 
attempts on the life of President SadaJt. 
39. Colonel Kadhafi said the Egyptian Govern-
ment was trying 1Jo stir up trouble ri.n Libya, and 
at the beginning of September 1976 it was 
announced that the forces of both countries were 
being mobilised. 
40. It is still dif:tiicult to assess what is really 
at stake here and foresee the consequences since 
Libya is one of the few Eastern Mediterranean 
powers to be on good terms with the Soviet Union 
on which it would be compelled to rely in the 
event of hostilities with Egypt. 
* 
** 
41. It is evident that Western Europe has every 
interest in peace being restored in the Eastern 
Mediterranean because, although the great 
powers were not responsible for the latest con-
frontations, they cannot remain indefinitely on 
the sidelines. For instance, through an article in 
Pravda at the end of August 1976, the Soviet 
Government informed the Syrian Government 
that it should stop supporting the Lebanese 
Christians. Similarly, the Soviet Urmon has 
publicly promised assistance to Colonel Kadhafi 
in his dispute with Egypt. 
42. Western Europe imports a large proportion 
of its oil requiremenrts from the Eastern Medi-
terranean area. It has a direct interest in main-
mining a Lebanese State which is an essential 
centre for its trade with the Arab world. Finally, 
it is interested to the highest degree in maintain-
'ing the cohesion of the Atlarutic .Alliance, which 
has been constantly threatened since July 1974 
by differences between Greece and Turkey. 
43. However, Western Europe must take full 
account of the constantly expressed desire of the 
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Arab world as a whole to settle matters con-
cerning Arab countries among themselves. Any 
European intervention in the internal affairs 
of Arab countries or in confrontations between 
them might be viewed by a world opinion as neo-
coloniallism and should consequently be avoided 
as long as all concerned have not clearly expres-
sed their desire to seek European mediation. 
44. Furthermore, in differences such as exist 
between Greece and Turkey, it is extremely dif-
ficult for Western European countries to rally 
one way or the other because of the danger of 
diverting one of these countries towards internal 
revolution or a foreign policy which would take 
it away from the Atlantic Alliance and Europe. 
The policy defined by Britain, the United States, 
France and Italy in August 1976 is to encourage 
those conce:rned to agree among themselves. This 
policy seems far more in the interests of Europe 
and the West than any attempt to bring useless 
pressure to bear, p•articularly through embargos 
on weapons, which might break up the Atlantic 
Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, as was 
to be feared when the United States took 
measures against Turkey in February 1975. At 
the same time, the development of political and 
economic links between Western Europe and 
Greece and Turkey can but help tc convince these 
countries thaJt they should settle their differences 
by direct negotiations. 
IV. Greece and Western Europe 
45. On 9th July 1961, Greece concluded an 
association agreement with the EEC which came 
into force on 1st November 1962. Based on 
Article 238 of the Rome Treaty, this agreement 
provided for reciprocal rights and obligations 
between the contracting parties, economic co-
ordination in fields covered by the 8890Ciation 
agreemenJt and the creaJtion of special organs, 
separate from those of the Communirty, to run 
the association. 
46. The association agreement dmplied that 
improved economic relati'Ons between the EEC 
and Greece and the rising standard of living and 
level of employment in Greece would lead the 
Community to consider the possibility of Greece 
becoming a member of the EEC. An Association 
Council and a Joint Parliamentary Committee 
were set up to administer the association. 
47. However, following the coup d'Etat on 21st 
April 1967, the European Community decided 
to freeze its relations with Greece, i.e. to limit 
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application of the •association agreement to cur-
rent transactioll!S, until a democratic regime was 
re-established. Harmonisation of agricultural and 
financial policies was abandoned and the nego-
tiations on ha:rmo:rrising economic pol.Iicies were 
not even started. Loans from the European 
Investment Bank were suspended. 
48. The last twenty years were a period of 
remarkable expansion in the Greek economy, 
bringing it closer to thaJt of the EEC countries, 
although this was accompanied by an extremely 
high rate of inflation which made it more diffi-
cult for Greece to take its place in a European 
monetary system. 
49. However, on 22nd August 1974, almost a 
month after the fall of the military regime and 
the restoration of democracy, the Greek Govern-
ment sent an aide..iffiemoire to the President of 
the EEC Council requesting the reactivation of 
the association. This was fo1lowed by a request 
for exceptional aid of ·$800 million. On a pro-
posal by the Commission, the Council decided 
on 17th September 197 4 to revive the process 
of association and on 25th June 1975, after the 
Greek elections, the EEC-Greece Parliamentary 
Committee resumed its activities. But the new 
Greek Government had already informed the 
Commission that it intended to request acceler-
ated integration of Greece into the Community. 
50. The Greek Government probably had 
several reasons for this : 
(a) In the economic field, the increase from six 
to nine members of the European Community 
meant that the EEC was more than ever Greece's 
principal trading partner. In 1973, 55 % of 
Greece's exports were to the EEC and 50 % of 
its imports from the EEC. 
(b) The development of Greece's economy and 
particularly its ·industry now made it a possible 
partner for the EEC. 
(c) Insofar as membership of the European Com-
munities was still its aim, the Greek Government 
felt it was in its interests to play ran early role 
in the process leading to the establishment of the 
future European union. 
(d) The Greek Government had no objection of 
principle to Turkey joining the European Com-
munity and thought the integration of both 
countries in the Community would help to solve 
their differences. Your Rapporteur learnt from 
the Greek authorities that the Greek Prime 
Minister and Minister for Economic Co-ordina-
tion had frequently said that Greece would raise 
no objections to Turkey's accession to the Euro-
pean Communities when the question arose. 
Greece had no reason to impede Turkey's econo-
mic and social progress. Not a full EEC member 
itself, Greece was not in a positi'Oll to determine 
the positions of member Stwtes of the Community 
towards Turkey and had never presUJilled to 
influence them in any way whatsoever. 
(e) The fact that NATO had not managed to 
prevent Turkish military action in Cyprus 
therefore led Greece ·to seek a framework more 
likely to shield it from Turkey's military 
strength. 
(j) Finally, the democratic parties considered 
that accession to the European Communities 
would help to strengthen democracy in Greece 
itself. 
51. The request for accession was made in 
Brussels on 12th June 1975, when Mr. Kara-
man1is, the Prime Minister, said that : 
"The Greek Government believes thrut the 
membership agreement should foresee a 
five-year adaptation period, proportional to 
that foreseen for the aooessi.on of Great 
Britain and Ireland." 
He added: 
"I wish to stress, however, thart Greece does 
not desire to become a member of the EEC 
solely for economic reasons. She mainly 
desires so for reasons which are political 
and concern the stabilisation of democracy 
and the future of the m:vtion. The Greeks 
believe in the destiny of Europe, whose 
fulfilment presupposes the acceleration of 
the procedure £or unifroation at present 
under development. Greece believes she can 
contribute to these procedures of the uni-
fication of Europe." 
52. On 29th January 1976, the Commission 
adopted a recommendation which W8S !in favour 
of the Greek application but oovocating a tran-
sirtlional period of unspecified duration during 
which Greece would pa:rrticipate in the various 
Community bodies and bring its economic system 
into line with that of the Community. But the 
Council of Ministers did not endorse the Com-
mission's reservations about the Greek proposal 
and asked the permanent representatives to pre-
pare to start negotiations as soon as possible 
in a positive spirit. These negotiations have just 
begun and since the essential political decisions 
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have been taken the problem of Greece's acces-
sion to the Communities can now only be a 
question of time. 
53. In economic terms, the gross national pro-
duct per capita in Greece is almost the same as 
in Ireiand, but the annual increase is far greater 
in Greece than in the EEC member countries. 
For the Nine as a whole, the average increase 
in the gross national product between 1963 and 
1972 was 4.5% per year compared with 7.4% 
in Greece. In 1974, ·the gross national product 
per capita was $4,486 for the EEC as a whole 
and $2,140 for Greece. 
54. Moreover, a comparison of the various sec-
tors in Greece shows a considerable increase in 
the industrial sector, which employed only 18.4% 
of the labour force in 1961 compared with 
25.7% in 1974. It represented 14% of the gross 
national product in 1961 and 21.4% in 1974. 
Manufactured products accounted for 3.4% of 
Greece's exports in 1961 and 53.2% in 1974. 
In less than fifteen years, Greece has therefore 
become a highly industrialised country and is 
wpparently well on the way to catching up with 
the EEC countries. 
55. However, there are still some weak points 
in the Greek economy which call for early 
action. 
56. The first stems from unemployment. The 
rnte was particularly high in 1974 but improved 
considerably in 1975. 
57. The second is the trade balance, which is 
in constant deficit. In 1974, exporrtls represented 
only $1,774 million, whereas imports amounted 
to $4,659 million, i.e. a deficit of $2,885 mil-
lion. There is nothing abnormal about this situa-
tion in a country in the process of equipping 
itself and in fact capital goods accounted for 
33.7% of imports in 1974. Moreover, large invi-
sible resources left only a small deficit of $87 
million in the balance of paymeTIJts in 1974, 
account being taken of net imports of capital 
to the sum of $1,151 million. 
58. Finally, the problem of the extremely high 
rate of inflation seems to have been more or 
less 'solved since estimates for 1976 give a figure 
of between 10 and 12%, equivalerut to that of 
several EEC member countries, whereas in 1974 
it was 26.9%. 
59. Thus, although Greece's application for 
membership of the EEC raises problems, the~ 
are limited and now seem to be in the process 
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of being solved. The Nine and Greece are cer-
tainly intent on finding a solution and the 
prospoot of Greece's accession to the EEC can 
be viewed with optimism. 
60. Greece's application also raises political 
problems which must not be taken lightly. 
61. Greece can naturally not consider mobilis-
ing its European partners against Turkey ; it 
has confirmed that two considerations carried 
weight: 
(1) Turkish territory is an essential part of the 
western defence system in which the Turkish 
army plays an important role. Greece's security 
is very largely ensured by Turkey's participation 
in the system. It must therefore aim not at dis-
arming Turkey but at finding a solution to its 
problems with that country and ensuring its 
long-term security with regard to Turkey. 
Attempts made inter alia by Mr. Max van der 
Stoel, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
President of the EEC Council, at the begin-
ning of September 1976 to reconcile Greek and 
Turkish views therefore received a warm wel-
come in Athens. However, considering that for 
its security Turkey also needs Greece to take 
part in the western defence system, the Greek 
Government wishes to be reassured that Turkey's 
military effol'lts cannat be dire~ against 
Greece. 
(2) The best guarantee for Greece would 
obviously be for Turkey to join the European 
Community too. If only because of its size and 
geogrnphical position, the defence of Turkey 
goes hand in hand with thart of Greece. Even 
if accession were to be delayed for economic 
reasons, it would probably be in Greece's interest 
for Turkey to take part in building the Euro-
pean union, particuLarly in foreign policy and 
defence matters. 
62. However, although Greece's special position 
towards NATO does nat raise any economic 
problems, it will neverthelesg have to say what 
part it intends to play in a European union 
whose activities will one day include foreign 
policy and defence matters. Greece's decision 
to review its relations wiJth NATO stemmed 
from the Turkish intervention of 14th August 
1974 against Greek forces stationed in Cyprus: 
the Greek Governmelllt considered this to be 
an attack on a member of NATO by another 
member, armed by NATO. Greece noted that 
NATO had been una:ble to handle the situation 
and decided, while remaaning a member of the 
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Alliance's political organisation, to resume full 
command of its Il!ational forces in peacetime 
and ho1d negotiations on means of changing over 
from this peacetime situation to a wartime situa-
tion, when Greek forces would be assigned to 
NATO commands. These negatiations seem to be 
progressing satisfactorily. 
63. But apparently this in no way implies that 
Greece intends to remain outside a European 
defence policy, partieularly in the field of arma-
ments. The Greek Ministers who addressed the 
General Affairs Committee showed they were 
amxious to tighten links between Greece and 
WEU, particularly by appointing a permanent 
Greek delegation of observers to the WEU 
Assembly, and stressed their interest in the 
enquiry undertaken by the Standing Armaments 
Committee on European armaments industries 
from the point of view of developing joint pro-
duction. Your Rapporteur considers that it is 
of the utmost importance for the WEU Assembly 
and Council to consider these openings. 
64. Furthermore, the Greek Government atta-
ches great importance to ~bilities of Balkan 
co-operntion which it has been endeavouring to 
develop since the return to democracy. Yugosla-
via, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have res-
ponded favourably to the Greek proposals, and 
experts from the five countries met in Athens 
in 1976 to work out a series of specific points 
for co-operation. Moreover, this can but improve 
the application of the final act signed in Hel-
sinki. 
65. This step, far from separating Greece from 
·western Europe, can on the contrary only 
increaae the latter's interest in havring Greece 
take part in its work in the foreign policy field, 
since it aims at consolidating detente, associat-
ing neutral and eastern countries with Europe's 
economic organisation and - an essential aspect 
-bringing Greece and Turkey closer together. 
66. In view of the essentia;l position of the 
Eastern Mediterranean in the European security 
system and the leading role played by Greece -
and Turkey - your Rapporteur considers it 
essential that Greek - and Turkish - parlia-
mentarians be invited to participate regularly 
in the Assembly's debates. He therefore submitted 
a draft resolution to the General Affairs Com.-
mi1Jtee calling on the Assembly to ask the Greek 
and Turkish parliaments each to appoint a 
delegation of observers with a statutory place 
in the Assembly. 
V. Turkey and the EEC 
67. Relations between Turkey and the EEC 
have largely run parallel to those with Greece. 
However, although relations with Turkey have 
not encountered such ups and downs as the 
Greek coup d'Etat, the economic gap is far wider 
than in the case of Greece. 
68. An associ~ion agreement between the EEC 
and Turkey WM signed on 12th September 1963 
and caane into force on 1st December 1964. The 
implications of the agreement were similar to 
those of the agreement with Greece. But pro-
vision was not made in the treaty for every 
aspect of the harmonisation of economic policies 
and it was left to the associaltion institutions 
to work them out during the transitional period. 
Association with Turkey is therefore still art the 
development stage with many difficulties stand-
ing in the way of accession which could only 
take pla~e after a particularly long transitional 
period of adaptation. 
69. Turkey has at one and the same time good 
reasons for wishing to draw closer to the EEC 
and special problems which slow down this pro-
cess. ~avourable factors include : 
70. (a) The policy deliberately adopted by 
Kemal Ataturk and constantly followed by all 
subsequent Heads of the Turkish State which 
aims at making Turkey a western-type ~ational 
State as opposed to the theocratic cosmopolitism 
of the Ottoman Empire. 
71. (b) Turkey's special position with about 
500 km. of frontiers with the Soviet Union and 
about the same with Iran in areas where the 
ethnic division of the population on either side 
of the frontier is far from clear and unchal-
lenged. Turkey is therefore obliged to give prio-
rity to ensuring its security with regard to 
these two powers, the latter now being in the 
process of buiLding up a first-cla~ military 
force, mainly thanks to large-scale arms deli-
veries recently agreed to by the United States. 
Although Turkey hM so far sought security 
solely in close associaltion with the West in the 
framework of NATO, it is still afraid of its 
links wirth the West being cut off. 
72. There appear to be three reasons for this 
fear: 
(1) Because of the independence of Cyprus and 
developments in the law of the sea, Turkey is 
afraid its links with the rest of the western 
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world may be controlled by Greece. This is prob-
ably the main reason for its claims on air 
traffic control in the Aegean and exploitation 
of the seabed, its rubsolute refusrul to allow Greece 
~o extend its territorial waters round the Aegean 
Islands to twelve miles and its intervention in 
Cyprus in 197 4. From this point of view, 
Greece's acce~on to the EEC, :if not accom-
panied by measures to reassure Turkey, may 
make the latter afraid that it will be isolated 
on the edge of the western wor Id by a power 
whose hostility it fears. 
(2) The evolution of public opinion in the 
United States since the Vietnam war and the 
improvement in American-Soviet relations make 
Turkey fear a weakening in the American gua-
l'lantee and encourage it to seek other means 
of ensuring its security. 
.(3) The embargo on d~liveries of arms to Turkey 
Imposed by the Uruted States Congress in 
February 1975 and the halt to American mili-
tary assistance have been attributed to the 
strength of the "Greek l()bby" in the United 
Srtates. They gave rise to the decision to open 
talks with the United States on co-operation 
in the defence field, place American bases in 
Turkey under Turkish control and make air 
traffic movements subject to prior authorisation. 
On 26th March 1976, the talks led to an agree-
ment providing for the embargo to be lifted, 
bases to be reactivated and military assistance 
to be resumed, but relations between Turkey 
and the United Staltes definitely suffered a set-
back from the crisis. 
73. These considerations led Turkey to envisage 
a policy of continuing loyalty to the Atlantic 
Alliance but grealter independence of the United 
States, particularly where arms were concerned. 
Mr. Kosygin's visit ena!bled Turkey to improve 
its relations with its Soviet neighbour. It has 
taken part in Balkan co-'OperaJtive projoots which 
in themselves, are not liable to call in questio~ 
Turkey's wish to prepare for accession to the 
EEC. However, it would appear earential for 
the members of the European Community to 
reassure Turkey, partticularly a:bout the possible 
consequences of Greece's accession, and streng-
then their links with a country which has not 
always had cause to be satisfied with its relations 
with Western Europe. 
74. (c) In the economic field, Turkey can hardly 
hope to develop its trade and industry outside 
the EEC, which accounts for 45 % of its exports 
and 50 % of its imports, employs 1,500,000 Tur-
DOCUMENT 719 
kish workers and provides about 50 % of the 
investments made in Turkey. 
75. There has certainly been a large increase 
in Turkey's gross national product in recent 
years and at ,a time when all the western coun-
tries are facing a serious crisis resulting in an 
overall drop of 1.75% in the gross national 
product of the OECD conntries, Turkey's gross 
national product is increasing at an ever-faster 
rate: 7.9% in 1975. Despite an average annual 
increase of 10 % in its industrial production 
since 1970, Turkey is still an essentially agri-
cultural country. Moreover, a very high birth 
rate (25 per thousand), high unemployment and 
a constantly rising trade deficit mean that this 
remarkable increase in the gross national product 
has not had the effect that might have been 
hoped. In 1975, the per capita GNP was still 
only about $875. 
76. In 1975, exports amounted to only $1,600 
million compared with $4,600 million for 
imports, i.e. a trade deficit of $3,000 million 
(of which $1,720 million in trade with the EEC), 
which means that only 30.4 % of impol"':8 were 
covered by exports. Turkey does not have such 
high invisible resources as Greece. The main 
one is its manpower, for which there are not 
enough jobs in Turkey, and in principle there 
were 1,500,000 unemployed in 1975, although 
the figure in fact is probably over 2,000,000. 
Furthermore, Turkish workers abroad repatri-
ruted $1,476 million in 1976, i.e. almost half the 
deficit in the balance of trade. For the Turkish 
authorities, it is therefore ett>ential to retain 
and improve outlets for Turkish workers in the 
EEC countries and from this point of view 
Turkey's association should provide guaranteed 
employment and satisfactory conditions of work 
for Turkish workers. But the economic crisis 
which has been rife in European countries since 
1973 has led 'to a reduction in the number of 
jobs open to Turkish workers and quotas for the 
number who may 'be employed, particularly in 
the Federal Republic. Turkey, associated with 
the EEC, is claiming trewtment in this respect 
on at least an equal footing with countries which 
do not have aaJOCiate status, and this seems 
perfectly justified. 
77. It is not therefore surprising that Mr. 
Qaglayangil, Turkish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, should have been di!till.tjsfied with the 
way Turkey's ~iation with the EEC was 
working in September 1976. The development 
of a global approach by the EEC to Mediter-
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ranean mattevs has led to a marked reduction 
in imports of Turkish agricultural products in 
favour of products from other Mediterranean 
countries, plhl'ticularly Israel. This has increased 
Turkey's deficit in the balance of trade, which 
was intensified because at the same time open-
ings for Turkish workers were closing, parti-
cu1arly in Germany and the Netherlands, the 
main employer countries. There is every reason 
to take seriously Turkey's threat to review its 
links with the EEC if its European partners 
do not show more good will towards it. 
78. In view of the difficulties which the crisis 
might stir up in Turkey, the EEC Commission 
recently suggested new methods of industrial and 
technological co-operation involving greruter free-
dom of investment for foreign capital in Turkey 
to induce the EEC countries to export capital 
rather than import manpower. They would be 
encouraged by the proximity of the Middle 
East oilfields, the :flact tha;t the industrial popu-
lation in Western Europe is reaching an often 
intolerable degree of density and diminishing 
possibilities of profitable investme111t in Western 
Europe, compared with widespread and parti-
cularly profitable possibilities in Turkey. 
79. These proposals and all the work done since 
Turkey booame associated with the European 
Community are being discussed in Turkey. A 
subject of discussion is the fear that Turkey 
might be colonised by foreign capital integrating 
it into an economic system in which the Turkish 
State would have no part in the decision-taking 
procedure. Both Mr. Demirel's government 
majority and the opposition are divided over 
this matter. 
80. It is therefore particularly regrettable that 
the Council of AssociaJtion between the EEC 
and Turkey should have had to postpone its 
July meeting and subsequently the one which 
should have been held on 16th October 1976. 
These decisions taken by the Nine appear to 
show unwillingness to give serious considera;tion 
to the progressive establishment of a customs 
union with Turkey, a necessary basis for Tur-
key's aooession to the EE,C. Such last-minute 
postponements can but strengthen the position 
of those in Turkey who are in favour of chang-
ing the country's external policy, which would 
be neither in the interests of the West nor of 
Turkey, the country of Ataturk. 
81. But apart from fears of an economic nature 
there are major political reactions against Tur-
key joining the European Communities which 
have been exacerbalted since July 1974. Turkey 
found there w&S a lack of understanding and 
suppont from its western partners in its dif-
ferences with Greece and is afraid they may 
bring pressure to bear for it to abandon its very 
finm stand over Cyprus and in respect of the 
situation on the Aegean continental shelf. 
82. Here again, the situation must be viewed 
as a whole : in the long run, differences between 
Greece and Turkey are about matters on which 
a compromise might be found if both sides really 
wished, as now seems to be the case. Insofar as 
Turkey fears being isolated from the West, it 
may be tempted to use force or seek support 
elsewhere. It is therefore essential for Greece's 
accession to the EEC not to be considered as 
support or the beginning of future support for 
the Greek oouse, which implies that if Turkey 
so wishes it must be associated, at the same time 
as Greece, with those elements of the future 
European union in which it is possible for it to 
participate and particularly in fore·ign policy 
and defence matters. This leads your Rapporteur 
to propose that the Assembly approach Turkish 
observers, parallel with the course proposed for 
Greek observers, and that in general Turkey be 
associated as soon as possible and to the same 
extent as Greece with European foreign policy 
and defence consultations, even if Turkey's acces-
sion to the EEC cannot be achieved as quickly 
as that of Greece. 
83. Similarly, your Rapporteur considers that 
Turkey can and should, on the same basis as 
Greece, be invited to take part in any of WEU's 
activities which might interest it, particularly 
those relating to the joint production of arma-
ments. 
VI. Conclusions 
84. A1though WEU is not the appropriate 
frnmework in which to consider matters dividing 
Greece and Turkey or to study the evolution of 
economic relatioll'S between the EEC and these 
two countries, it seemed essential to mention 
these matters in the better interests of Europe. 
85. The state of Greek-Turkish relations at pre-
sent prevents either of these countries acceding 
to the modified Brussels Treaty because the 
WEU countries cannot take the risk implied by 
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Article V of the Treaty as regards possible 
disturbances between Greece and Turkey. On 
the other hand, a settlement of such matters 
by means which could be ·accepted by both 
countries would open up new prospects. 
86. At the present juncture, it is essential to 
endeavour to develop rekvtions between Western 
Europe and Greece and Turkey in parallel and 
on an equal basis. Although the two countries' 
economic positions do not allow them to advance 
aJt the same ~~ate, there is nothing to prevent 
them doing so in the foreli.gn policy and defence 
fields. Tt would in any event be extremely dan-
gerous for all concerned ·and for western defence 
as a whole to associate one of the two partners 
with a joint policy but not the other. 
87. Finally, since any real progress depends 
closely on the re-establishment of confidence 
in relatioll'S between Greece and Turkey, it seems 
necessary not only to encourage both countries 
to find a way of agrooing on the points at issue 
but also to promote an atmosphere of under-
standing, as far as circumstances allow, by asso-
ciruting one with the other and both with the 
creation of a European union in which differ-
ences would lose most of their substance. 
88. For all these reaJSOns, your Rapporteur con-
cludes that, where WEU is concerned, an imme-
diate attempt should be made to associa.te Greece 
and Turkey with ·those activities of WEU which 
do not imply accession to the modified Brussels 
Treaty, i.e. those aiming at the joint production 
of armaments, and with the work of the Assem-
bly. 
89. If consideraltion is now given to the Eastern 
Mediterranean as a whole, it is evident that for 
military reasons Western Europe's position must 
be relatively reserved. But the foreseeable acces-
sion of Greece and Turkey to the EEC ood the 
future European union will not allow it to 
maintain this attitude indefinitely and it will 
have to envisage playing a larger part in the 
defence of the Eastern Meditermnean in the 
future. This would imply directing its military 
effort - particularly where air forces and 
navies are concerned - along lines which would 
allow it to assist its allies effectively if need be. 
This a1so means that Western European coun-
tries must consider the requirements of such a 
policy :in terms of forces and armaments here 
and now. 
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Amendment No. 1 
3~ Novemmber 1976 
Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Urwin 
Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper. 
1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment negatived). 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on European union and WEU 
Welcoming the decision taken by the European Council to elect the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage as from 1978; 
Regretting the European Council's slowness in considering and implementing the Tindemans report ; 
Recalling its Resolution 59 ; 
Considering that the decision taken by the WEU Council on 31st May 1976 can help to develop 
the activities of the future European union in the field of armaments industries ; 
Noting that this undertaking requires close co-operation between WEU and the European programme 
group; 
Considering that the co-ordination of European armaments industries can produce satisfactory 
results for the European economy and for the common defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance 
only if started without delay, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
l. Study at an early date the outline programme which is to be submitted to it by the Standing 
Armaments Committee in order to be able to determine that body's new tasks as soon as possible and 
at the latest at its ministerial meeting in 1977; 
2. Pay close attention to co-ordinating this undertaking with the work of the European programme 
group and have the latter's decisions communicated to it or be kept informed, through the international 
secretariat of the SAC, of the activities of that body in matters affecting the mandate of the SAC; 
3. Report to the Assembly in the appropriate manner on the results of the studies conducted by the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the decisions it takes in pursuit thereof ; 
4. Invite the signatory countries of the North Atlantic Treaty who are members of the EEC or 
associated with it under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty to take part in the study to be undertaken by the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Following the publication of the Tindemans 
report your Rapporteur was instructed to submit 
a rep~rt on the future European union at the 
June 1976 session. In view of the fact that the 
Tindem.ans report seemed to call m question 
the very existence of the WEU AssembLy the 
Presidential Committee had alrearly adopted on 
1st March a resolution addressed to the European 
Council recal:ling the need "to m.ain.tam at all 
events a parliamentary assembly with statutory 
competence for all aspects of the BJJ?Plication. of 
the modified BI'US'ie1s Treaty". ThiS resolutiOn 
was adiopted by the Assembly last June. 
2. The .Assembly obviously decided to include a 
report on European union ood: WEU in its 
agenda for the December session ~ecause ~t 
expected the nine governments to oontmue their 
study of the Tindemans report during the year 
and because it must voice its opinions on any 
decisions the Ministers may have !'leached already. 
There is every indication however that the 
report has not yet been studied in much detail 
and so far few decisions have been taken. The 
Tindemans report is admittedly still on the 
agenda of the forthcoming meetings, of the Eur?-
pean Council, but the governments. slm:vness. m 
tackling the joint study ood their discretiOn 
about their work give the impression that they 
are in no hurry to reach conclusions, nor per-
haps do they even wish to. 
3. Only one real decision has been taken by 
the rune Ministers, and that was on 20th Sep-
tember 1976. It was the decision to elect the 
members of the European Parliament by uni-
versal suffrage at one and the same time during 
the period May-June 1978. This decision was 
accompanied by a bill which it recommends 
the parliaments of the member States to adopt. 
4. Conversely, the Tindemans report was only 
given a first reading by the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs of the Nine at an informal meeting 
in Beetsterwaag, NetherLands, on 11th and 12th 
September. Obviously sm~h a meeting onJ.y served 
to prepare the next official meeting of the Min-
isters on 29th and 30th November 1976. 
5. Finally, on the WEU side the Coul!lcil acted 
on 31st May 1976 : it entrusted the Standing 
Armaments Committee with the task of working 
out an outline programme for a study on Huro-
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pean armaments industries. This is a very modest 
step, but an assessment must be ~e ?f it;s 
politicail. rrepercussions and the p0881ble unpii-
cations for the future European union. 
6. The fact that progress towards greater 
cohesion in the political and defence fields in 
Western Europe has been very limited is not 
surprising in view of the difficulties encountered 
by the European Community in the economic 
field. The acute recession throughout the West 
in 1974 and 1975 slowed down the Community's 
progress and in many respects even reversed the 
process. The proopoots of economic and monetary 
union which seemed to be taking shape before 
the crisis are now becoming blrrm-red. The decision 
to link the currencies of the various Community 
countries has beoo respected by only haJf of 
them and in view of the magnitude of the prob-
lem now facing both strong and weak currencies 
alike, the outlook is not very promising for the 
immediate future. 
7. Monetary tension has been largely respon-
sible for making the settlement of economic prob-
lems even more difficult. At present, the Nine 
are having a hard task reaching agreement on 
fishing zones and the agrioulitural common market 
is being constantly disturbed by variations in 
currency rates. Some of the association agree-
ments signed by the European Communities are 
not working properly, particuJ.arly the one with 
Turkey, because of tlle employment crisis and 
the difficulty experienced by the Western Euro-
pean countries in finding the investment fun.ds 
necessary for the Turkish economy. 
8. In short, your Rapporteur feels that the 
difficulties encountered by governments in the 
political and defence fields in their efforts to 
establish real European co-operation cannot be 
attributed solely to ill will. Today, therefore, 
attention must be paid to what might be done 
to maintain and develop such co-operation, albeit 
at a modest ·level at the present jun0tme. 
11. Election of the European Parliament by 
universal suffrage 
9. The decision taken by the Nine to elect 
the European ParLiament by universal suffrage 
as from 1978 meets a wish constantly expressed 
by the European ·assemblies and particularly in 
a report by Mr. Patijn adopted by the European 
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Pariliamen.t in 1974 which appears to have pro-
vided the basis for intergovernmental discussions 
on this matter. 
10. Very serious obstacles stood in the way of 
this decision since the number of seats and thedr 
aJttr:ibution between the various member countries 
had to be recalculated. Secondly, it meant decid-
ing· whether the members of the European Par-
liament would necessarily continrue to be national 
parliamentarians or whether a specifically Euro-
pean parliamentary system should be set up 
arongside the national parliamentary system. It 
is easy to imagine the difficulties raised by such 
a question in v,iew of the risk of increasing the 
number of clashes between national a;nd Euro-
pean parliaments. Finally, the elections them-
selves raised problems because of wide differ-
ences between legislation and electoral tradition 
in the various member countries. 
11. The European Council took a bold step in 
deciding that elections by universal suffrage 
would be held as from 1978 without having 
reached agreement on the method of election. It 
was in faJCt left to the European Parliament 
which will be elected in 1978 to determine 
procedure governing its renewal. 
12. It should be noted, however, that ratification 
of the agreement reached by the nine govern-
ments might encounter difficulties and opposi-
tion in some of the national par>liaments. It is 
not so much the actual principle of e1ecting the 
parliament of the European Communities by 
universal suffrage which raises problems, since 
this was written into the Rome Treaty ratified 
long ago by the parliaments of the signatory 
conntries, as the fact that an elected parliament 
is intrinsioo1ly destined to have alJL..rormd res-
ponsibilities. Indeed, in several countries, fears 
have been expressed that the European Parlia-
ment may seriously impinge upon and acquire 
a legislative role in fields not covered by the 
Rome Treaty or the ECSC and Euratom Treaties, 
at the expense of the au.thority of the national 
parliaments or govermnenrt:s. These countries 
mu:st therefore be expected to surround them-
selves with every precaution to ward off what 
they consider to be possible encroochment on 
their national prerogatives. 
13. If we now turn to the coruJequences which 
these elections may have for the WEU .Assembly, 
two aspects may be discerned. 
14. First, the composition of the WEU Assembly 
wi1l be very different from the European Par-
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liament. It will continue to represent the national 
parliaments whereas the European Parliament 
will represent the electorate of the various coun-
tries. It will. be possible for members of the 
European Parliament to be concurrently mem-
bers of a national parl,iament but not necessarily. 
15. Compared with the new European Parlia-
ment, the WEU Assembly will probably have 
less authority but it will have the advantage of 
continuing to ensure a close link between national 
and European parliamentary fnnetions, which, in 
fields where member Smtes retain fulil sover-
eignty, should provide a better outlet for its 
work on the foreign and defence policies of WEU 
member countries. Its role will obviou&y depend 
on the extent of the rights attributed to the 
European Parliament in terms of rune-power 
political co-operation. But in any evenJt the 
Assembly will stiH retain its eEOOntial role of 
ensuring the application of the modified Brussels 
TreaJty. 
16. Your RaJpporteur believes that this consider-
ation largely meeta the note in Mr. Tindemans' 
report where he mentioned the possible disap-
pearance of the Assembly. At the present j'IIDC-
ture, there is in fact no indication that another 
European assembly could take :irt:s place in the 
near future. 
17. However, insofar as there are gronnds for 
anticipating that Europe wihl. in the future 
shoUJlder a larger share of the problems of its 
own defence in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance, the way shoUJld now be paved for 
co-operation between the member countries of 
WEU and any members of the EEC in the 
Atlantic Alliance but not WEU who wish to take 
part in preparing this policy. Enquiries by the 
General Affairs Committee in Norway and Den-
mark in 1975 showed that neither seemed pre-
pared to be permanently associated with the work 
of the Aa<;;embly. Enquiries in Greece and Turkey 
in 1976 were more rewarding since authorities 
in both cauntries stated their interest in Euro-
pean co-operation in the fields of foreign policy, 
defence and armaments production and announ-
ced their intention of examining the p<>Eiriibilities 
offered by WEU in these fields and playing a 
greater role than heretofore in the work of the 
Assembly. 
Ill. European union 
18. Information obtaJined about the informal 
meeting of the nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
in Brussels on 20th September 1976 showed that 
no decisive progress was made in considering the 
Tindemans report on that oooasion. The most 
detailed discussions appear to have been on the 
chapter of the report dealing with foreign 
policy and the conclusion BJPpears to have been 
reached that the work of the European Coun-
cil should be extended further in this field. 
But the governments were not at all inclined 
to give the Commission any right of initiative 
in this connection. Moreover, the idea of for-
eign policy decisions being taken by majority 
vote seems to be e;x;cluded, at least in the 
near future. The Council whll therefore con-
tinue to seek a conseru;us and it is quite evi-
dent that it will be far eaBier to reach agree-
ment on specific issues than on more general 
definitions of European policy. 
19. The Nine are reported to have agreed at that 
meeting to support the German proposal in the 
United Nations concerning international meas-
ures to combat the taking of hostages, providing 
inter alia for the extradition of guilty parties 
and the creation of an international human rights 
tribunal. But this is a very limirt:.ed step and there 
is no hlope of much progress being made with 
political union in the immedia;te future. 
20. A second informal meeting was to be held 
to study the Tindemans report on 30th October. 
It is understood that most of the Ministers' 
time was taken up with other matters but 
aJ1though they were prepared to stop differenti-
Biting between meetings on the application of the 
treaties and meetings on political subjects not 
now covered by the treaties, they nevertheless 
have not changed the procedure for taking deci-
sions by oonsensus on political questions. More-
over, they are believed to have discussed the 
European Parlilament's "right of initiative", but 
no agreement was reached. 
21. The indications are therefore tha.t the Nine 
are sti1l a long way from poLitical union and 
that their progress may be very slow in the 
coming years in view of the rate at which they 
ruppear to be advancing with their study of the 
Tindemans report and with structurwl decisions. 
This means that although several governments 
agree with Mr. Tindemans that it is E'l1l"Ope's 
duty to organise its defence, it wiN be a Long 
time before anything definiJte is done since they 
all appear to agree with Mr. Destremau and 
Mr. van der Stoel, who both told the Assembly 
last June that there could be no European 
defence policy without a common foreign policy. 
69 
DOCUMENT 720 
22. Realism compels the Assembly to be very 
modest in its requests to the govel'llllllents and 
WEU in defence matters. Measures which can 
be envisaged now are mainly concerned with 
conserving and applying what exists, i.e. the 
modified Brussels Treaty, without trying to 
establish a true European defence system which 
no one now seems to want. It may at least be 
wondered to what extent WEU is adapting itself 
to this situation. 
IV. The activities of WEU 
23. Only at its meeting on 20th October did 
the WEU Council consent to communicate to 
the Assembly the terms of the mandate given 
to the Standing Armaments Committee on 31st 
May 1976. 
24. A perusal of the text leaves one perplexed 
that anything so innocuous, whose tenor was 
well known, could not have been published ear-
lier. The delay obviously makes ooe wonder 
about the validity of the Council's o£t-repeated 
affirmation of its eagerness to maintain good 
relations with the Assembl~. So far, the indica-
tions already available 1Jo the parliamentarians 
had been gleaned mainly from speeches to the 
Assembly at its session in June 1976 by Ministers 
from three member COUJltries and in particular 
by the French Secretary of State for Foreign 
Af:llalirrs, Mr. Destremau, who presented the 
twenty-first annual report of the Conncil to the 
.Assembly, and from replies to Recommendation 
281 and Written Question 167. 
25. Mr. Destremau spoke a;s follows: 
" ... bearing in mind the need to avoid 
any danger of duplication of effort or any 
illlterfe11ence with the work now being done 
in other organisations, the Council instructed 
the Standing Armaments Committee, as an 
immediate task, to submit a detailed plan 
for a study which, in the form of a descrip-
tive analysis of the situation of the aTma-
ments industries in the member countries, 
would contribute to a better knowledge of 
the industrial and eoonomic implications of 
the standardisation of armMil.ents. 
The COUillcil will monitor the progress of 
work and instruct 1ihe Standing Armaments 
Committee, a;s may be appropmate." 
26. Speaking subsequently on behalf of the 
French Governrmem.t and not the Council, Mr. 
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Destremau explained his country's view of this 
mandate: 
"Although in sound logic., there cannot be 
a unified European operational defence with-
out there being a unified European polit-
ical power, there is no reaaon why, to save 
time, we should not oonceptu.allise here and 
now the conditions for establishing such 
a defence. In this area and until such time 
as the strategic ooncept takes shape, the 
setting up of a programme group for the 
standardisation of armame:ruts designed and 
manufactured by Europeans might prove 
the desired trigger for developing a Euro-
pean armamen1:8 industry. In the same pros-
pect may be viewed the Council of Ministers' 
remit to the Stam<ding Armaments Com-
mittee of WEU to conduct an in-depth sur-
vey of our countries' armaments industries. 
This is being done at Belgium's instigation, 
firmly backed by ourselves. Moreover it was 
your Assembly which, on a report I had 
the honour to submit to it on 8th November 
1972, advocated reactivating the Standing 
Armaments Committee." 
27. Similarly, Mr. van der Stoel, Netherlands 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave his country's 
views: 
"I can very well imagine thrut rut a certain 
pdint in time the whole complex of existing 
relations between the member countries of 
the Community will be translated into what 
will then be called a union, but that then 
at a later stage this union will be given 
powers that it did not posse9!J rut the time it 
came into being. 
It does, indeed, seem to me to be a logical 
sequel to a constanitly advancing process of 
European integration that uiltimately de-
fence, too, should be a matter for the UIIlion. 
I have come across a nlllmber of comments 
on this in the report by the Belgian Prime 
Minister, Mr. Tindemans. In answering Mr. 
Leynen my view was, indood, that I could 
not imagine how the European Communities 
could succeed, inside the union, in reaching 
a common defence policy so long as there 
was no common foreign poliicy. The common 
defence policy must, in the end, be based 
on a common foreign policy. 
I think it would be interesting if we could, 
at the end of the year, and .in the light 
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of the progress made in the European 
programme group, show it to have given 
particularly valuable services, while the 
Standing Armaments Committee in the 
WEU sphere made an invenltory of indus-
tries dealing with armaments. I believe 
that these analyses and studies might con-
tribute usefuLly to the continuing discussion 
on the building of European union." 
28. Finally, Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secre-
tary of State for Defence of the Federa1 Repub-
lic of Germany, said in reply to a question by 
Mr. Riviere on his government's attitude towards 
the mandate : 
"I did not mention (the Siand!ing Arma-
ments Committee) since in my address I was 
dealing primarily with the political matters 
that affect us in the Federal Republic in 
relation to the Alliance as a whole." 
29. The difference between these four replies, 
one given on behalf of the Council hy Mr. Des-
tremau and the others by three Mi.Iristers on 
behaLf of their countries, ca11 for some comment. 
30. First, the decision to give a mandate to the 
Standing Armame:ruts Committee is not based 
on the same concepts in the various countries. 
31. Only Mr. Destremau, speaking of French 
pol,icy, placed the Council's move in the context 
of a European defence policy, whicll implies 
that he considered its effect wouild be quite 
considerable, whereas the German Secretary of 
Srtate clearly ~ed that the reactivation of 
the Standing Armaments Committee was not 
among "the political matters that affect us in 
the Federal Repuhlic in relation to the Alliance 
as a whole". 
32. Mr. van der Stoel's position does not link 
European union, which he admits will one day 
have responsibilities in the foreigm. poLicy and 
defence fields, with reactivation of the WEU 
Standing Armamenta Committee. The Seven have 
therefore agreed on technical measures without, 
apparently, being clear about their scope. 
33. The nature of the mandate in the 1ight of 
statements made by the Council or by its mem-
bers shou1d therefore be examined. First of all, 
it was a Council decision taken in the frame-
work of its organic decision of 7th May 1955 in 
application of Article VIII of the Brussels 
Treaty and setting out the role of the Standing 
Armaments Committee. This role would thus not 
be in any way changed or curtaililed by the Corm-
cil's new decision which is merely to be seen as 
a measure in implementation of the 1955 deci-
sion. 
34. Second, at the moment it only seems to be 
of limited scope. The Standing A:rmaments 
Committee has merely been asked to prepare an 
outline progranrme for a study and the Council 
has yet to decide whether it should lead to the 
study itself. 
35. Third, it would appear that the governments 
intend to avoid overlapping between the Stand-
ing Al'IlUIJIIlents Committee and the European 
programme group, but at the same time they 
aLlowed for oo organic link between the two 
bodies. Consequently, it is for the governments 
to ensure co-ordination between the two bodies, 
one of which is permanent whereas the second 
is only an ad hoc group with no legal status. 
lt might however seem rea.sonruble for the Euro-
pean programme group, to which all. the WEU 
members belong, to be asked to report in one 
form or another to the WEU Council in order 
to ensure co-ordination or for a system of reci-
procal information to be established, in partic-
ul1ar through the international secretariat of 
the SAC. This would be nothing new since 
NATO oommunicates to the Agency for the Con-
trol of Armaments the information it needs to 
fulfil its role, sends observers to meetings of 
the SAC and receives observers from the SAC 
at the conference of national armaments direc-
tors. 
36. Finalily, it should be pointed out that 
although the Standing Armaments Committee 
is ·to submit its outLine programme for a study 
to the Cooocil before the end of 1976, no time 
limit is given in the Council's decision for the 
possible implementation of the outline pro. 
gramme, which considerably restricts the scope 
of the Council's initiative. 
37. Regarding the political aspect of the Coun-
cil's decision, at lea.st two courses emerge. 
38. Mr. Van Elslande's speeches to the Assembly 
in December 1974 and May 1975, the press 
conference given by Mr. V an E·lslande at the 
close of the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
on 31st May 1975, Mr. Destremau's speech to 
the Assembly in June 1976 and the Council's 
reply to Recommendation 281 seem to indicate 
that at least two member governments were con-
cerned about organisii11g European defence and 
that they intended to lieave open the possibility 
of the organs of WEU playing a role in this 
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field sooner or later. Their view seems to be 
that WEU might provide the defence elemoot of 
a future European union. 
39. This view does oot emerge from the state-
ments by Mr. van der Stool and Mr. Schmidt 
in June 1976. 
40. The nine Ministers will inevitably have to 
discuss this matter during their study of the 
Van Els1ande plan. While at the present juooture 
defence questions are to be ex-cluded from the 
European union, the study undertaken by the 
Standing Armaments Committee consists of "a 
descriptive analysis of the situatioo of the arma-
ments industry in member countries" to "gain 
a cLear insight into the industrial and ooonomic 
implications of the standarddsation of arma-
ments", i.e. it comes under the heading of eco-
nomic activities of member countries and conse-
quently concerns the European Eoonomic Com-
IIliiiDity. 
41. The study which the Standing Armaments 
Committee is to prepare does not in fact appear 
to concern the equipment of rurmed forces but 
the armaments industry rather. It is thus far 
more economic than military and 1s a matter 
of drawing up an inventory of such industries 
and considering their struJCture a:n:d links, which 
probably implies that it will not be able to 
overlook commercial matters. It therefore differs 
fundamentally from the work of the European 
programme group which deals with the require-
ments of the armed forces and is, so to speak, 
the second part of a task which is quite obviously 
aimed at preparing a European armame:nJts 
po1icy based on the now very widely shared 
view that standardisation is necessary and ration-
aJlisation of European ·production essential if 
Europe wishes to maintain an indrustry in this 
sector capable of holding its own in the world 
market. 
42. Considering the size of the armaments in-
dustry in several member countries, its share 
in e~ports and the jobs it provides, its survival 
seems essential in a period of economic ~ion 
with empLoyment in jeopardy everywhere and 
the trade balances of many European cOU!Il.tries 
seriously in deficit. There must be lower cost 
prices for military equipment if Europe is to 
maintain and improve its defence capability 
without too heavy a burden being imposed upon 
the countries' finances. 
43. There is therefore every justification for 
making an analysis of the particuLar position 
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of each oounltry's industry since, in this field, 
legal status, economic capability, the prroportion 
of State orders, the role of .international co-
operation and technical capa:bilities vary con-
siderably. This study wi1l probaibly bring out the 
weak points of the various industries and show 
in which fieLds real European oo-operaJtion, or 
even European organisation of industries and 
markets, is necessary, desirab1e or possilble. But 
first and foremost a diagnosis of the European 
armaments industry must be expected. 
44. The fuct that the Council made the Standing 
Armaments Committee responsilble for a study of 
imdustries shows that it realised that defence 
matters alone were not the on1y basis for a 
European armaments policy and that acoount 
had to be taken of economic, iegal and industrial 
aspects. Thus, if it so wishes it can pursue 
the movement it has started by i'llStrwcting the 
Standing Armaments Committee to effect the 
study for which it is preparing the outline 
programme with an eye to oo-ordiOOJtion, co-
operation and distribution of production, failing 
which the Limited outlets offered by Western 
Europe's national armed forces would quickcy 
result in the European firms no longer being 
capable of competing on the worLd market and 
in the long run they wouJ,d be swaJlowed up. 
45. Evidently there was no need for the Seven 
to agree on the prospects of a European defence 
policy before contemplating this study in the 
industrial field. Nor is such IRgl'OOment necessary 
for starting it, nor is there any need for su.pra-
national terms of reference ·before conducting 
it. The Standing Armaments Committee, com-
posed of government representatives assisted by 
an international secretariaJt, wiLl be able to carry 
out its task on the basis of information provided 
by governments. 
46. Thus, the undertaking is a modest one in-
voking none of the principles which might aJI"'use 
differences •between member countries. It sets 
up no new institutions but ha:s the merit of 
using am existing body whose raison d'etre was 
being ooll·ed in question by the formation of the 
European programme group. Nevertheless, it 
Illl1l8t be carried through to a oondusion and this 
d~ends essentialJ.y on the Council : in view of 
Europe's present economic diffroulties and what 
is to be expected of the European programme 
group in the standardisation of arma:menlts, 
WEU must act without delay, i.e. the outline 
programme which the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee is soon to submit must be studied im.me-
d:iiatezy and the decision to earry oult the study 
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p•roper must be taken forthwith sinoo, as the 
CoUlil.Cil said in ilts reply to Written Question 
167, "this study could also be useful for the 
work to be done by the European programme 
group". Whether this is a serious move or merely 
a limited step to allay the .AssembLy's cozooern 
about the Council's inaction will be demonstraJted 
by the Council's willingness to act without delay. 
The time-limit for the Council's decision should 
nomna11y be its next ministerial meeting rut the 
beginning of SUIIOOler 1977. 
47. Finally, it is to be hoped that the Council 
will be more diligent i.n informing the Assembly 
of its decisions than it wa:s in informing it of 
the May 1976 mandate. 
V. Conclusions 
48. To be real.iBtic, it must be admitted that the 
eoonomic recession in the West since 1973 raises 
new and serious obstacles to the estalilishment 
of the European union sought by the Nine and 
has made governments cling more firnrly to their 
sovereignty than heretofore. Sinrlil.arly, no spec-
tacular progress can be expooted in the near 
fUJture. It is some consolation to note that the 
governments have agreed on a not too remote 
date forr electing the Europe1a11 Parliament by 
universaJ. suffrage, but the full consequences of 
this decision must not be drawn until it is 
seen what reservations the parliaments of cer-
tain countries may make in aJdopting 1egislation 
to implement this decision. Lik~, further 
progress must be made in the European COUillcil's 
stmdy of the Tindemans report before assessing 
its impact. 
49. The fact that during this period of waiting 
the WEU Council has taken a step which might 
lead to an undertaking of concern to the Euro-
pean arma:ments industry and, perhaps, a future 
European defence policy seems to indicate tha:t 
the gQvernments, like the .AssembLy, believe that 
WEU should pursue its activities until sueh time 
as it can be included in a European union with 
responsibilities in defence matters. This is a 
we1come step, but attention should be paid to 
ensure that the Council does not just stop there. 
The first indication of the meaningfuLness of the 
decision taken in May 1976 wihl be given when it 
is time to pass from the first stage - the out-
line programme for a study being prepared by 
the SAC - to the study prroper. The scope of the 
study will then have to be assessed and con-
sideration given to the decisions it aeads up to. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies 
- new sources of energy 
Considering that there is a. close link between Europe's security and safeguarding its energy supplies ; 
Aware that even so the Western European governments are unwilling to establish a common 
energy supply policy within a. European framework ; 
Considering that no nuclear programme on a large scale is acceptable without a. solution being 
found for the hazards posed by nuclear power, stringent safety measures being established to eliminate 
these hazards and special attention being paid to the problems of the disposal of radioactive waste ; 
Acknowledging the need to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by using them more efficiently 
and thereby lessening the need to resort to nuclear power ; 
Convinced that alternative sources of energy, especially solar energy, could be used more widely 
instead of nuclear means, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
1. To promote a worldwide convention on both primary and energy resources during which equal 
consideration should be given to the interests of the developing and developed countries ; 
2. To establish a. common strategy here and now since oil prices will increase by 10 or 15% by the 
end of this year ; 
3. To accept joint planning for the improved use of energy resources, increase"investments, particularly 
in coal production including the gasification process, and promote action by industry by guaranteeing 
long-term security for the development of coal power; 
4. To accord greater attention and financial means to research and development of alternative sources 
of energy in general, and to solar energy in particular, at both national and European Community levels; 
5. To hold a. wide-ranging conference in the framework of the OECD covering all aspects of energy-
saving through oil conservation programmes, invitations also being extended to parliamentarians and 
representatives of employers' and employees' organisations and other civic groups such a.s consumers' 
and women's organisations in order to elaborate a common energy-saving strategy. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur) 
lnt roduction 
1. When the Committee decided to report on 
alternative sources of energy, the then Chairman, 
Mr. de Montesquiou, remarked that he had 
received from Senator Bonnefous his book Sauver 
l'humain in which the author pointed out that 
alternative sources of energy should be devel-
oped since conventional sources of energy 
were becoming increasingly scarce and nuclear 
energy was not yet sufficiently developed to be 
used on a large scale without dangers for 
humanity. 
2. Nobody can be quite sure how the energy 
demand will have increased by the end of the 
century. It will depend on many factors subject 
to considerable uncertainty, two of the more 
important being the rate of economic growth and 
the success of energy conservation measures taken 
in response to the very probable increase in 
energy prices. However, in the next two decades 
it is probable that in W estem Europe the demand 
for energy will almost dowble, in which case a 
tight reim. on consumption will be essential. A 
tight rein will also be reqUJired in the light of 
increased dependence on oil resources and the 
increased danger of .pollution. Furthermore 
governments will have to make major changes in 
their energy policy, reduce consumption of 
energy and find means of making this policy 
acceptable to the people. 
3. More efficient use of energy resources is 
most necessary and research and development 
projects must be undertaken with this in view. 
Until 1973 the cost of energy from existing 
sources did not include a charge to cover the 
cost of seeking alternative sources to take over 
when existing means were dep·leted. Future prices 
will have to allow for this and it is therefore 
very unlikely that there will be a return to low 
energy prices in the near future. 
4. An examination of the present situation 
reveals that apart from nuclear fiarion there are 
no real short-term alternatives to oil, gas and 
coal. It would appear that until 1990 the world 
will be as dependent as always on existing energy 
resources. However, this does not mean that one 
day there will be an acute crisis. Coal is in 
abundant supply everywhere in the world and 
a shortage is therefore unlikelry in the coming 
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century. Australia, South Africa, Indonesia and 
Alaska, for instance, have enormous coalfields 
which could be developed, but the extraction of 
this coal would mean building a vast infra-
structure of roads, canals and harbours. Research 
and development is also being conducted on the 
gasification of coal which will be in commercial 
use by the mid-1980s, but a real impact on the 
energy market is not expected until after the 
year 2000. Much of the present infrastructure -
installations and methods of production and con-
sumption - is st:iJJl based on rather low oil prices. 
In housing, for instance, insulation could be 
greatly improved without much extra research 
and development but building regulations and 
measures have to be adapted on a municipal, 
regional and national scale. 
5. Liquified natural gas is already being ship-
ped from the Middle East to European harbours 
but much remains to be done concerning better 
freezing procedures and ensur.ilng security against 
explosions which, if they occurred in a harbour, 
would be catastrophic. Nearly all of this natural 
gas is now burned off at the oilfields. In the 
future it should be utilised. 
6. It is also pDSSible to explore the continental 
shelf of many countries for oil and gas, and 
modern technology provides the means of exploit-
ing reserves at great depths and in adverse con-
ditions. 
7. The questions now are: How should Western 
Europe ensure its energy supplies ? Should it 
organise collaboration on a Europeran, Atlantic 
or worldwide scale ? Are there any alternatives 
to nuclear energy ? 
8. Your Rapporteur believes that in the short 
term Western Europe, the United States, Canada 
and Japan will have to collaborate and set up 
machinery for crisis management. He feels a 
purely European or even Atlantic policy is not 
enough to deal with the worldwide problem of 
energy supplies for sustaining the industrial 
growth of the western world. 
9. At the same time yow Rapporteur wishes 
to stress the need for joint action by the oil-
producing and oil-consuming countries as he con-
siders that a solution which takes account of the 
interests of all countries concerned can be found 
only through a joint approach. 
DOCUMENT 721 
10. This is the Committee's first report on new 
sources of energy and it has been decided that 
in a further report special attention will be paid 
to tidal and wave power as well as special 
measures to economise on energy consumption. 
I. The International Energy Agency 
11. As early as 1957, leading European politi-
cians and experts began discussing the unhealthy 
situation of European energy supplies. But in 
spite of this not one western government was 
prepared when, in October 1973, earlier pro-
phesies became true, and prices took a sharp 
upward turn because of the oil crisis. In the 
United States, pvice increases led immediately to 
sharp political reactions, whereas in Western 
Europe each country began to seek solutions on 
its own in order to ensure its oil supplies. 
12. In the Community, eight of the member 
States - France excepted - became members 
of the International Energy Agency which, 
closely linked to the OECD, was estabLished on an 
American initiative. France preferred to go its 
own way, apprehending the consequences for its 
relations with countries in the Middle East if it 
became identified with the American policy of 
confrontation. The French Government, followed 
by the governments of other EEC countries, tried 
to establish bilateral col1laboration projects with 
the Middle East oil suppUers. On a diplomatic 
level contracts were concluded which even the 
national industries were not able to execute. 
13. In the meantime it became clear that Europe 
did not have the same interests as the United 
States : Western Europe depended for more than 
60 % on Middle East oil imports whereas the 
United States impollted 30-40 % of its consump-
tion from the Middle East. Moreover, the United 
States had large energy resources- oil and gas 
- whereas Western Europe had only small 
resources. However, President Nixon's goal, that 
the United States would be independent of 
foreign energy resources by 1980, will not and 
probab1y cannot be achieved - even by 1990. 
14. Some of the tasks of the International 
Energy Agency are to find a means of distribut-
ing oil equally i:n tilm.es of crises, to establish 
measures to economise energy resources and to 
develop alternative energy resources. The Agency 
has established an emergency sharing plan which 
is now operational and which should help the 
participating countries to overcome an energy 
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crisis of short duration. Two main measures have 
been taken, the first being concerned with saving 
energy and curtailing consumption and the 
second with the use of each other's stocks and 
production in the participating countries. Statis-
tically the emergeillCy plan has been tested twice 
and aLthough there were difficulties in com-
municati<>n the results were positive. Even when 
statistical exercises are successful, there can be 
no guarantee that, in the event of another oil 
boycott by the OPEC countries, the economies 
of western industrialised countries would not be 
greatly disrupted. 
15. The Agency1 has also proposed a financial 
support plan which should protect the industrial 
world against a financial cl'lisis caused by rising 
oil prices. The plan would enable industrial oil-
importing nations to borrow up to $25 billion in 
a financial emergency to continue paying for 
imported oil and thus to maintain high levels 
of economic activity and employment. The pro-
posed new fund has found widespread support 
in Europe and Japan, but the American Senate 
Banking Committee did not wish to commit itself 
since it thought such a fund was unnecessary as 
the industrialised countries have been able to 
finance their oil bills by borrowing back petro-
d<>llars from OPEC members, either through the 
private market or through the International 
Monetary Fund. 
16. The Federal Republic of Germany which, 
together with the United States, wou:ld have to 
guarantee most of the borrowing, has made its 
participation dependent on United States 
membership. 
17. During the 1973 oil crisis the industrialised 
countries were spared the most serious conse-
quences of the oil boycott imposed by the OPEC 
countries thanks to the international oil com-
panies which were able to direct oil supplies to 
the countries subject to boycott. However, the 
western countries cannot continue to rely only 
on the international oil companies; they must 
establish crisis management machinery to handle 
another crisis shouLd it arise. Apart from action 
by the Agency, a common policy in a European 
framework is a necessity, but all proposals made 
by the European Commission during the past 
three years have come to naught. The conclusions 
of the European Commission have been attacked 
time and again on technical points with the result 
1. See Appendix I. 
that no common energy policy has been estab-
lished. On the other hand, none of the European 
governments has established an acceptable 
national policy which couJd operate effectively 
should the energy crisis of 1973 be repeated. A 
very serious situation would arise if the OPEC 
countries again decided to take joint action 
against the western industrialised world. The 
latter's security would be jeopardised. 
11. The position of Western Europe 
18. The position of Western Europe has been 
weaker than it might have been since it failed 
to establish a common energy policy. Of course 
it has to be acknowledged that in the Com-
munities the situation varies from country to 
country, some countries having a favourable and 
others an unfavourable energy balance. The dif-
ferences are accentuated by the balance of pay-
ments situations in the member countries. An 
attempt will have to be made to improve their 
policies towards energy matters and first and 
foremost governments will have to co-ordinate 
their fiscal and price policies for energy pro-
ducts. Co-ordination of measures to economise on 
the use of energy resources also remains a neces-
sity. The lack of energy resources, instead of 
inspiring unification has, in fact, reduced the 
possibilities of European collaboration. As a 
guaranteed supply of energy is one of the essen-
tial bases for sound industrial, economic and 
social development, governments are showing a 
growing tendency to try first to find national 
solutions to this international problem. 
19. Norway and the United Kingdom have often 
indicated that the exploitation of oil and gas in 
their parts of the continental shelf wiLl primarily 
be conducted in accordance with their own 
national interests. When the oil crisis started, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
opened bilateral discussions with oil-producing 
countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia and the 
European Communities were unable to counter 
these national approaches. 
20. One reason for this lack of collaboration is 
perhaps the close link between security and 
energy SUtpplies. The unwillingness of the Euro-
pean governments to discuss questions of security 
within a European framerwork automatically 
produces difficulties in establishing a common 
energy supply policy. 
21. Another reason is that many consider 
Western Europe too smaJ.l to handle this world-
77 
DOCUMENT 721 
wide problem of energy resources. In Europe 
there is clearly a will to co11aborate as long as 
it is a matter of basic research. Within the Com-
munity the JET (Joint European Torus) is the 
masterpiece in the research plans elaborated by 
the Communities in order to try a new source of 
energy - fusion. However, once basic research is 
completed and the stage of applied research and 
industrial development reached, each country 
wants to have a say in the trend of development 
and how their mooey should be spent. The C()llll-
munity approach means decisions being taken 
by the Commission in Brussels whereas the 
International Energy Agency approach leaves 
decision-making in the hands of the governments 
of the participating countries. Another disadvan-
tage of the Community approach is that coHabor-
ation is between nine countries and it is extreme-
ly difficult to organise collaboration between 
more than three or four. In the International 
Energy Agency work is conducted by working 
groups in the same way as in the NATO Com-
mittee on the Challenges of Modern Society. In 
this way fourteen working groups of national 
experts - with one or two lead countries doing 
the main research and development assisted by 
participating countries which have a real interest 
in the subject - prepare reports which are sub-
mitted to the plenary committee on energy 
research and development, which in turn submits 
them to the Agency authorities for implementa-
tion. 
22. To his regret, your Rapporteur has to point 
out that the failure of Euratom has proved that 
no Community approach to energy is acceptable 
to the governments of the member countries and 
that only intergovernmental action can produce 
results. 
23. Participating in the Agency are the United 
States, Japan and other countries outside Europe 
-in fact the whole western industrialised world. 
The European Cmnmulllities however are at the 
same time too large and too small : too large to 
organise detailed research and development and 
too small as the energy problem requires collabor-
ation between Western Europe, the United States, 
Canada and Japan, and so the Agency was set up. 
24. For theoretical subjects such as energy 
analysis a systematic study of the energy systems 
in different countries couil.d be conducted in the 
framework of international co-operatioo, in the 
Community, for instance. It is therefore regret-
table that offioial government representatives 
originally attributed a low priority to this type 
of international collaboration. 
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Ill. The North-South dialogue 
25. The so-caLled North-South dialogue was 
established on the initiative of the French Presi-
dent. Twice the representatives of the West, 
OPEC and the third world have met in Paris to 
discuss a fair distribution of the earth's resources. 
At the first meeting the United States Govern-
ment abandoned its policy of trying to break the 
OPEC cartel and was even prepared to act on 
OPEC demands to link talks about oil prices 
with discussions on the future of other raw 
materials. The third world, however, called for 
a new economic world order, but this was not 
acted upon as the West had to turn its full 
attention to its own recession and inflation prob-
lems, which caused commodity prices upon which 
many poor countries depend for foreign exchange 
to drop sharply in 1974-75, and increased the 
prices of manufactured goods. The debt burden 
that the third world now carries also makes it 
difficult for them to press too strongly for a new 
economic world order. The recession and con-
sequently the reduction in oil consumption and 
the diminishing revenue of the OPEC countries 
also reduced the negotiating power of these 
countries. For the time being the North-South 
dialogue is at a standstill and not much is likely 
to change until the new United States, German 
and Japanese governments have been formed and 
the present economic recovery more firmly 
established. 
26. The interests of the third world, the OPEC 
countries and the industrialised world neverthe-
less converge in the desirability of achieving 
positive results in this dialogue. There is there-
fore general willingness to work towards this 
objective. 
27. The OPEC countries are aware that one day 
their oil reserves will be exhausted and therefore 
they need western technology to he1p build up a 
new infrastructure in their countries and thereby 
continue the industrial development started with 
oil revenues. 
28. Already the third world countries, unable 
to pay their oil bills, want higher and fixed 
prices for their own primary resources, but for 
reasons of recession and inflation the industria-
lised countries are very reluctant to agree. 
29. There is general agreement that new sources 
of energy should be developed and existing 
resources used as economicaLly as possible in 
order to postpone the post-oil era, even though 
this may mean industry having to adapt itself 
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to new energy prices and high-energy-consuming 
machinery being replaced. An example might be 
to consider reintroducing propeller aircraft 
which, in terms of energy, are much cheaper to 
run than jet aircraft. Your Rapporteur always 
had doubts about the decision to build supersonic 
aircraft and these are now stronger than ever. 
The changeover from an econoony of cheap energy 
to more expensive energy resources is however a 
long-term process. 
30. Conservation of energy was a sadly neglected 
subject until two years ago and much certainly 
remains to be done. A good start has been made 
in countries like Sweden and the United King-
dom which have established quite v,igorous con-
servation policies. Within the International 
Energy Agency national programmes are being 
confronted, experiences exchanged and detailed 
examination made of the efficiency of energy 
utilisation in particular sectors such as transport. 
But not all countries want rigorous conservation 
policies and there is hardly any willingness to 
pursue energy conservation if there is any risk 
for employment or lifestyle. 
IV. Nuclear energy 
31. The present situation cal1s for further 
research into nuclear energy. It seems impossible 
to dispense with this type of energy although its 
disadvantages have to be acknowledged. 
32. Immediately after the oil crisis there was an 
even greater interest in nuclear power than 
before since it is almost the only promising means 
available to many countries with few energy 
resources for diversifying their supplies. The lack 
of a doonestic market large enough to justify a 
nuclear industry may precLude use of this option 
by some countries, but even a country as small 
as Luxembourg is planning to build a nuclear 
power station. 
33. By 1980 the OECD could have 180 gigawatts 
of nu~1ear capacity, and by 1985, 375 gigawatts, 
and nuclear energy's contribution to the increase 
in OECD energy production between 1974 and 
1985 coulid be 415 Mtoe, which is substantially 
greater than the contribution of any other single 
form of energy. Given the technical complexity 
and very large capital investment associated with 
nuclear power, increases of such magnitude would 
be a major achievement. Nevertheless, these 
estimates are considerably lower than the targets 
adopted by governments after the OPEC oil 
price increases, indeed they are 1ower than predic-
tions made before 1974. The project of 474 Mtoe 
for 1985 is not only much less than the OECD 
"Energy Prospects" $9 projection of 756 Mtoe, it 
is much less than the base case level of 657 Mtoe. 
Furthermore, in order to achieve the 1985 targets 
the current lead times of ten years imply that 
it will be necessary to establish the required sites 
by the end of 1976, but it is highly unlikely that 
this can be done. 
34. One of the most important reasons for 
reducing nuclear forecasts has nothing whatever 
to do with difficulties of building nuclear power 
plants. It is that the need for nuclear power will 
be less because of the expectation that the growth 
in energy consumption of the industrialised coun-
tries will be slower, and therefore also the 
growth in their electricity consumption. Since 
most of the new electrical capacity is planned 
to be nuclear, reduced growth in the demand for 
electricity automatically implies a reduced 
demand for nuclear power pLants. 
35. Other constraints to rapid nuclear expansion 
include financial difficulties, since nuclear power 
plants are very capital intensive, technical dif-
ficulties, and strong general opposition on 
grounds of health and safety. 
36. There is a direct link between zero growth 
and reduced growth on the one hand and use of 
energy resources and nuclear energy on the other 
hand. It might be a good idea if Western Euro-
pean governments were to consider holding a 
broad-based international conference at which all 
aspects of nuclear energy would be discussed by 
the utilities, employers' and employees' unions, 
parliamentary representatives and representa-
tives of other groups of the population. 
37. Your Rapporteur is happy to note that in 
many OECD countries there is now a trend 
towards separating institutions concerned with 
the promotion of nuelear technology from those 
entrusted with ensuring its safety through appro-
priate regulations and controls. The worldwide 
issue of nuclear pollution is extremely worrying 
as it might lead to the spread of plutonium 
among the nations of the world. Proliferation of 
atomic wastes is another aspect to which no solu-
tion has yet been found. Light-water reactor 
safety, safety aspects of steel components in 
power reactors, protection of installations against 
external impacts such as crashing aircraft, pro-
tection against terrorism : all these require 
national and international action. 
38. So far nuclear fuel has been plentiful in 
supply and low in cost. However, there may soon 
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be problems. Due to the tripling of the price of 
natural uranium over the last three years and 
the prospect of steep rises in the cost of enrich-
ment facilities- hitherto subsidised by national 
governments - nuclear fuel costs may in future 
not be a negligible component of cost as they have 
been in the past. Furthel"'Ilore, present reserves 
of low-cost uranium correspond to only about 
thirteen years of forward requirements, and 
there are not yet enough enrichment facilities 
under contract to provide adequate fuel supplies 
over the lifetime of nuclear plants now being 
planned. 
39. Because of the steep increase in capital costs 
(partly due to expenses needed to meet new safety 
requirements) and in fuel costs, it is not certain 
that nuclear power will continue to be cheaper 
than electricity generated by fossil fuels. 
40. While these problems are serious and will 
require close attention, it stilL seems inevitable 
that nuclear power will have to make a major 
contribution towards increasing energy supplies 
in the next ten years, and that by the end of 
that period it will represent a significant pro-
portion of total energy production in the indus-
trialised countries. However, safety requirements 
should have higher priority than the building of 
nuclear reactors to meet energy requirements. 
41. In the past it has taken some sixty years 
from the time at which a transition to a new 
energy resource was first discernible until that 
resource, in turn, reached i,ts peak use and began 
to decline in favour of other sources. Supplies of 
oil and gas appear to have reached their sixty-
year peak and their respective shares in the 
energy market are expected to decrease with time. 
It now seems impossible to wait another sixty 
years to complete the next transition ; a major 
technological development programme should 
expedite this process. 
42. For nuclear energy this means that special 
attention should be paid now to the fast-breeder 
reactors which should become economically opera-
tional within fifteen years. The management of 
plutonium should be made the responsibility of 
an international organisation as proposed by the 
United States President. 
43. Of special importance is the need to curb 
the proliferation of nuclear materials and espe-
cially spent fuel from ci~l reactors. On 3rd 
October 1976, President Ford approved an anti-
proliferation programme which involves both 
domestic and international decisions. The United 
States will seek to renegotiate existing agree-
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ments for nuclear co-operation with some thirty 
other nations in order to exercise tighter control 
of the use of nuclear mll!terials ; it will propose 
an international moratorium of at least three 
years on the export of nuclear enrichment plants 
to nations that do not have them and will propose 
that spent nuclear fuel and non-military pluto-
nium of the United States as well as of other 
countries be placed under the control of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Finally, it 
will offer to purchase the spent nuclear fuel of 
other nations to reduce the rusk of misuse. your 
Rapporteur is convinced thll!t in the security 
aspoots Euratom could play a grefl!ter role than 
at present. 
44. Although the present safety record for 
existing nuclear power progrnmmes in Europe 
and America is good, many problems, especially 
safety problems, will have to be solved if nuclear 
energy is to attain the proportions necessary to 
fill the gap between the oil-based economy and 
new sources of energy which are now being 
developed. 
45. Your Rapporteur fully approves the United 
Kingdom report on nuclear energy, drafted by 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollu-
tion under the chairmanship of Sir Brian Flowers 
and dated 22nd September 1976, which stated 
that there should be no commitment to a large 
programme of nuclear fission power until it has 
been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that 
a method exists to ensure the safe containment of 
long-life highly radioactive WMte for the inde-
finite future. The Royal Commission therefore 
recommended that research be dirooted towards 
other sources of energy such as coal wind solar 
tide and wave-generated energy. ' ' ' 
V. Development of alternative energy 
resources 
46. Since the 1950s the evolution of energy has 
been characterised by access to low-cost resources. 
As a result there has been no great research and 
development on alternative energy resources 
e:x;cept .nuclear f~ion. and no new technologies 
With high economic risks have been taken into 
serious oonsideraJtion. Nevertheless other sources 
of energy, such as solar, wind power, methanol 
and breeder reactors, have promising prospects 
and much research should be condooted to over-
come t~hnical problems. Wave power, biomass 
conversiOn and thermonuclear flliSion are less 
promising. 
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Solar energy 
47. One of the fie1ds in which this research and 
development should now be concentrated is solar 
energy which, together with geothermal energy, 
is one of the most promising. Although solar 
energy is called a new energy source, it has 
always been used by mankind. The sun was a 
major source of energy until the advent of the 
industrial revolution. The problem in exploiting 
solar energy is not one of developing from first 
principles an unfamiliar, novel resource, but 
rather of intercepting and converting to useful 
localised forms even a very small frootion before 
it is degraded to heat near the temperature of 
the earth's surface. 
48. Water heating by means of roof collectors 
is the most deveLoped system among the uses of 
solar energy for thermal applications in build-
ings. These colJ.ootors are commeroially manu-
factured and used in countries like Australia, 
Israel, the United States, the USSR and Japan. 
One of the most interesting experiments was a 
house in New Mexico, designed to conserve heat, 
water and electricity so effectively that its heat-
ing and electrical needs could be supplied by the 
sun and wind. In summer the heating system 
could be converted into a cooling system. 
49. ~o~ever, present commercial developments 
a~e hnnted to smaH-.scale applications and speci-
f~caii:y to w~ter heatmg. The potential for expan-
Sion IS considerable, especial!ly in countries which 
have more than a hundred days' sunshine per 
year. Even in countries like the Netherlands ~olar ene.rgy for domestic heating might result 
m a oonsiderable reduction in the demands made 
on conventional sources of energy, especially 
naturllil gas. An energy research study group 
from the Netherlands Ministries of Economic 
Affairs and of Scientific Policy considers that 
some 20 % of existing houses could be partially 
heated by solar energy if equipped with solar 
panels and adapted for a conversion installation. 
These installations could become generally accept-
able between 1985 and 2000. 
50. The absence of environmental nuisances from 
these applications provides a strong incentive to 
further development. Government-subsidised 
experimental studies are now taking place. 
51. Much more research and development would 
be needed to develop a system whereby solar 
energy could be transformed into fueL Several 
methods are now being studied : biochemical 
chemical, electrochemical and agricultural. ' 
52. The technological problems and obstacles 
standing in the way of a large-scale application 
such as electricity generation are quite different 
from those referred to above and a more cautious 
approach is essential. Both terrestrial and space 
power generation have been envisaged and there 
are possibilities of establishing solar power sta-
tions in space after the space shuttle has become 
operational. The most cautious estimates never-
theless show that such power planJts would be 
five to ten times more costly than conventional 
thermal power plants. 
Wind energy 
53. Wind could produce sufficient energy 
to find application in, for instance, electricity 
generllJtion. Research and development on this 
source of energy has started seriously and experi-
ments are taking place on a small scale. However 
if used on a large scale, environmental problem~ 
could become serious. For instance, if 20 % of 
electricity generated in the Netherlands came 
from wind energy, 5,000 mills of about sixty 
metres high would have to be built. Although 
technologically possible, fU!I'ther study of the 
environmental aspects is necessary, especially if 
groups of such mills were to be built in special 
lots near the coast. 
54. Major wind projects are also under way in 
Japan, Canada, Israel, West Germany and 
America. Present windmill technology - or other 
rotary ~ystems. usi~g wind for small electricity 
productwn - lS vmble for household elootricity 
or heating, specifically in agriculture. In Britain 
it is estimated that 12 % of electricity demand 
could be met with wind power, if some way 
could be found to feed it into the power grid. 
55. Most of the wind power devices at experi-
mental stage are geared to improving the effi-
ciency of the windmill. Even the newest American 
design cannot hope to bring large-scale electrical 
generation. 
56. Unfortunately, wind power, like solar power, 
runs up against the obstacle of storage. Moreover 
wind is come-and-go, and thus not as reliable fo; 
electricity. Alternate, usuaLly fossil-fuelled, 
stand-by systems would have to be kept on hand 
for windless spel.JB. 
Geothermal energy 
57. Aft~r solar and wind energy, geothermal 
energy 1s the next m.ost important of the non-
convenJtional natural sources, which are virtually 
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inexhaustible. Natural underground reservoirs of 
steam and hot water are now being tapped on 
a small scale, and by the end of this decade the 
production of electric power from steam fields 
will probably be quadrupled. 
58. Basically there are two sources of geothermal 
energy: 
(i) Deposits of hot water associated with a 
volcanic environment. These so-called "hot 
springs" have been used since Roman times and 
have been developed in Italy, the United States, 
Iceland, Japan, the USSR and New Zealand. In 
1960, in the United States a small geothermal 
power plant of 12,500 kilowatts capacity was 
established in Northern California - the so-
called "Geysers" field. 
(ii) Hot rocks. Research workers at the energy 
technology support unit at Harwell are urging 
the Department of Energy to invest £250,000 
a year for the next two or three years to 
study in detail the viability of drilling for 
heat. Energy is obtained from hot rocks by bor-
ing down to their level, pumping in cold water, 
and extracting hot water. However, the technical 
difficulties of this method are such that it has 
not yet proved practical. Experiments are being 
carried out in New Mexico. 
59. The EEC has 5.4 m.u.a. to spend on research 
and development on geothermal energy. The 
money will be spent in two phases - the first 
phase, worth just over 1 m.u.a., will cover work 
to the end of 1976, and the second phase wi.ll 
run from 1977 to the middle of 1979. 
~0. The Commission wants to encourage work 
m all areas of geothermal energy - from infor-
mation gathering (which covers Britain's posi-
tion on the subject) to the exploitation of hot 
rock geothermal energy, and the use of hot water 
from geothermal sources. 
61. A major factor standing in the way of the 
exploitation of geothermal energy is the high cost 
of transmitting the energy over any distance. 
Another technical problem is that of extracting 
energy from hot rock reservoirs, where there is 
no water underground to bring the heat to the 
surface. 
Energy through bioconversion 
62. Scientists from many countries met in Wash-
ington on 17th and 18th March 1976 to study 
on a large scale the means of converting waste 
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into useful products. A rough definition of 
bioconversion is the conversion of the earth's 
unused organic matter into combustible or edible 
matter. Waste from cities, industries, farms and 
forests can be burned and used as a source of 
energy. New forms of food and fuel can be 
grown on farms either on land or sea. 
63. During the two-day conference in Washing-
ton, it was pointed out thwt organic waste alone 
represents in energy terms the equivalent of over 
1,000 million barrels of oil. 
VI. Conclusions 
64. There is no doubt whatsoever that there is 
a close link between the security of Western 
Europe and the safeguarding of its energy sup-
plies. The immediate reaction of the United States 
Secretary of State on the oil boycott of the OPEC 
countries and his threat to send in American 
troops to occupy the oilfields of the Middle East 
make it more than clear how closely western 
defence is linked to a steady oil supply. The 
reverse side of this close link is that the Western 
European governments are extremely reluctant 
to hand over any decision-making in the field of 
energy supplies to a common authority 1 • One 
reason is that national governments will do any-
thing they can to assure their countries' needs 
even to the detriment of their neighbours. 
Secondly, as the defence of Western Europe is 
assured in an Atlantic and not a European frame-
work all Western European CQuntries, except 
France, wish to discuss oil supplies in this type 
of framework and accepted the American pro-
posal to establish an international energy agency 
accessible to all OECD member countries. Fur-
ther, of the NATO countries, Norway did not 
agree to be a full member because of its own oil 
resources. The result of this state of .affairs was 
that the Western European governments did not 
wish to establish a common energy supply policy 
within a European framework. This is the more 
regrettable because a consequence was that no 
common policy could be adopted on alternative 
sources of energy either. 
65. Most of our present energy is obtained by 
depleting irreplaceable fossil fuels - coal, oil 
I. See Document 626 on oil and energy problems 
submitted by Mr. Krieg, and Document 656 on the energy 
crisis and European security submitted by Sir John 
Rodgers. 
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and natural gas. It took hundreds of millions of 
years to accumulate these resources of the earth 
and with the exception of coal they are due to 
run out in a relatively short time at the present 
rate of consumption. In the long term other 
sources of energy must be found and it is impor-
tant to examine the practical options that tech-
nology may offer in solar and nuclear energy in 
relation to the economic, environmental and social 
consequences of these choices. 
66. At the same time it is absolutely necessary 
to reduce consumption of all forms of energy by 
using them more efficiently. A recent study by 
the International Energy Agency has shown that 
at least 20 % more energy C\luld be gained on 
present consumption if more efficient use were 
made of existing resources and with only minor 
alterations in the equipment in service. The 
Agency is very concerned about the meagre 
results of the oil conservation programmes and 
the dangerous complacency in the public mind 
about the problem of future supplies and prices. 
Three years after prices were quadrupled, at a 
moment when the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) is considering yet 
another increase in prices, the general public 
believes that the energy crisis is behind us, 
although this could not be further from the truth. 
67. The consumer countries are less than a 
decade away from the point at which their 
demand will reach the maximum levels the pro-
ducing nations are willing to supply. The impli-
cations are an ever-greater price pressure and 
further interruptions in supplies. Given the long 
lead times of energy research and development 
and energy investment, Western Europe cannot 
rely on the early availability of energy altern-
atives on a commercial basis. Oil remains today 
the dominant source of energy. Last year it 
provided half the total primary energy require-
ments of the industrial democracies. More than 
two-thirds of their oil requirements were met by 
imports. In several member countries of the 
International Energy Agency, such as the United 
States, Canada and New Zealand, fuel prices 
remain well below world levels which does not 
encourage fuel-saving measures. Increased energy 
saving requires measures such- as prices raised 
to world market levels, the introduction of effec-
tive motor and other transportation efficiency 
standards, the monitoring of energy conservation 
in industry, the application of insulation stan-
dards and energy-saving building codes. 
68. The Agency sees as measures required to 
stimulate energy production outside the OPEC 
States : more investment in oil and gas explora-
tion and development, larger private sector finan-
cing and involvement in alternative energy 
resources with particular attention to the pro-
duction of energy from coal, and research into 
the gasification process. 
69. Public opposition to nuclear power in West-
ern Europe is gathering the kind of impetus that 
has already slowed down reactor building in 
many parts of the United States. There, oppo-
nents of nuclear power have managed to have 
proposals to limit its development diseussed in 
the 2nd November 1976 elections in the States 
of Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, 
Montana and Ohio, as earlier on in California, 
but they were defeated in all these States. 
70. In the Netherlands, a decision to build more 
than the two existing nuclear facilities has been 
postponed until next year. In Norway and Den-
mark, plans to build the first atomic power plant 
have been put off. This development brings logi-
cally with it a programme of research directed 
towards the most effective use of coal and alter-
native energy resources such as solar energy, 
whose large-scale use it is believed would have a 
minimal effect on the environment. 
71. For several decades the needs for electrical 
energy in Western Europe will be met mainly 
from coal or oil-fired stations. The possible use 
of nuclear fission energy from uranium as an 
alternative depends upon economic viability, 
which in its turn wilJ be governed by safety 
factors. The cost of fusion energy cannot be asses-
sed until its scientific and engineering feasibility 
is established and this may require two decades of 
research. Solar energy has the potential, as yet 
unproven, to supplement resources but extensive 
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research will be required to identify appropriate 
means of solar energy conversion. 
72. Solar energy research is being undertaken in 
countries such as the United States, the USSR, 
India, Japan and Israel and, in Western Europe, 
in France and Italy. Close collaboration within 
a European framework as well as with other 
countries will provide more rapid progress than 
going it alone. However, the financial means 
should be placed at the disposal of the experts. 
An impediment to establishing a common energy 
strategy within the European framework is that 
no common bottom price for North Sea oil has 
been adopted although the latest European Coun-
cil meeting of Heads of State and Government 
gave its approval to such a decision. 
73. In its recommendation the Committee warns 
the Council of Ministers that a common strategy 
on energy should be established since oil prices 
will certainly be increased by 10 or 15 % before 
the end of this year. A worldwide convention on 
primary and energy resources should be promoted, 
the interests of both the developing and indus-
trialised countries being safeguarded. 
74. Finally, the Committee proposes a wide-
ranging conference covering all aspects of energy 
saving. Representatives of parliaments, of em-
ployers' and employees' organisations and other 
civic groups such as consumers' and women's 
organisations should be invited together with 
e:x'perts from national and international institu-
tions and organisations. Only then will it be 
possible to adopt a sensible attitude towards 
energy-saving measures, which are in the short 
term the only alternative to a more serious 
energy crisis than in 1973, and to elaborate a 
common energy-saving strategy. 
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International Energy Agency stresses need for 
continued efforts to save energy 1 
The member countries of the International 
Energy Agency have achieved substantial results 
as regards energy saving. They could, however, 
considerably reduce demand, but the prospects of 
the conservation drive being maintained are 
uncertain. 
These are among the summary conclusions of 
the report on energy conservation which the 
International Energy Agency has just published. 
It appears that in 1975, total energy consumption 
was reduced by 14.3% compared to the expected 
consumption had the average 1968-73 energy 
consumption growth rate held through 1975. The 
1975 consumption was 4.8 % below actual 1973 
figures, though a portion of these savings was 
attributable to an exceptionally mild winter in 
many lEA regions, and the general world econo-
mic slowdown. However, even with the cyclical 
slowdown which caused a drop in industry's out-
put (because it was operating at a level much 
lower than its full capacity), most countries 
reduced the amount of energy consumed for every 
unit of gdp produced. 
Furthermore, many countries have adopted 
vigorous measures and have implemented pro-
grammes to increase energy yields. The majority 
have considerably increased energy priiCes or 
energy taxes, in order to stimul·ate energy con-
servation, and nearly all have adopted new insu-
lation standards for new buildings and measures 
to encourage the renovation of old buildings. 
Finally, all the lEA countries are trying to bring 
home to their citizens the principles of the 
rational use of energy resources. 
The authors of the lEA report note however 
that the majority of the countries are not devoting 
as much determination and effort to conserving 
energy as they are to increasing their own 
energy supply. This is decidedly regrettable, 
since one barrel of oil saved is as useful as a 
barrel of oil produced, and it is even more useful 
in many respects. However, in many countries 
the increase in the supply of energy is considered 
I. See" Europe", No. 2058 (new series), 24th September 
1976. 
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from the investment angle, with a1l the advan-
tages that this is supposed to bring in the form 
of increased employment and gdp growth. On 
the other hand, conservation expenditure is dis-
cussed in terms of costs and is assumed to reduce 
gdp growth. Most careful studies show that this 
conclusion is wrong, stresses the lEA in its 
report, since, because of their better economic 
returns, investments aimed at conserving energy 
are less expensive than the development of 
internal energy sources. Moreover most invest-
ments for conserving energy have positive side-
effects on the environment. 
The report makes very precise criticism with 
respect to the member countries of the Agency 
whose energy conservation programmes are con-
sidered insufficient, and for future development 
it believes that the main countries of the lEA 
should insist on conservation programmes being 
adopted. In fact, it is very worrying to note that 
certain member States are sti1l. fixing energy 
prices ·at a level which is lower than prices on 
the world market, which in coming years might 
lead to a decrease in the investments set aside 
for improving energy efficiency and cause energy 
consumers to lose interest in the rational use of 
energy. 
Amongst the countries whose effective 
results of energy conservation are higher than 
average, the report above all mentions Germany, 
where the programme is based on fixing energy 
prices to correspond to world market levels, 
except in the case of coal whose price is kept 
above international levels ; moreover, petrol and 
heating oil are heavily taxed ; Belgium which has 
a very full programme, providing loans with 
interest subsidies and subsidies for industry and 
the construction industry, but strict measures are 
perhaps necessary to impLement a system of private 
car sharing, to improve public transport and to 
cut down the use of cars by one person; Denmark 
which ranks among the leading lEA countries for 
the results it has effectively achieved in energy 
conservation by means of a tariff and taxation 
system which is one of the most stringent in the 
lEA countries ; Italy is also above the average 
and has recorded very high specific efficiency 
results in the transport sector and in industry 
APPENDIX I 
where a fairly full programme has been adopted ; 
the Netherlands - excellent results on the basis 
of prices which are higher than or equal to world 
prices, despite the fact that specific measures are 
not fully in place; the United Kingdom where 
results are higher than average, particularly in 
the transport sphere, though specific efficiency is 
fairly low in industry. In this sector a programme 
has been adopted which includes some very posi-
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tive aspects, but which could also be greatly 
improved. 
If nearly all the member States of the Com-
munity have results which are higher than the 
average recorded by the whole of the lEA coun-
tries (this is also true of Japan), the United 
States, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland and Sweden 
recorded results which were lower than average. 
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APPENDIX II 
Energy consumption in WEU countries 
The development of total primary commercial consumption of energy from 1960 to 1973 was from 
487.3 million tons of oil, or equivalent, to 870.1 million tons of oil, or equivalent, i.e. a. yearly increase 
of 4.56 %-For the years 1974 and 1975 the figures were 856.2 and 816 million tons of oil or equivalent 
respectively. 
1960 487.3 
1961 500.9 
1962 530.8 
1963 573.2 
1964 586.5 
1965 605.2 
1966 615.7 
1967 627.6 
1968 664.7 
1969 714.5 Projection from 1975 onwards 
1970 771.0 
1971 788.2 
1972 815.1 On the basis of the On the basis of EEC If consumption doubled 
average annual increase forecasts : 1975-80 a 4 % from 1975 to 2000 and 
1973 870.1 of 4.56% from 1960-73 annual increase ; 1980-85 the annual growth rate 
1974 856.2 a 3.5 % annual increase were 2.81% 
1975 816.0 
1980 1020 993 937 
1985 1275 1179 1077 
1990 1593 - 1237 
1995 1991 - 1421 
2000 2488 - 1632 
Source: Statistical office of the Netherlands Ministry for Economic Affairs, Directorate-General for Energy. 
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Amendment No. 1 
30th November 1976 
Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies -new sources of energy 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Comelissen 
In paragraph l of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "during which equal consideration 
should be" and insert "equal consideration being". 
Signed : Gornelissen 
1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment adopted). 
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Amendment No. 2 
1st December 1976 
Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies - new sources of energy 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the framework of the OECD" 
and insert "with the concurrence of the OECD and in the framework of the EEC". 
Signed : V alleix 
1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment adopted). 
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Amendment No. 3 
1st December 1976 
Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies -new sources of energy 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Vohrer 
Mter paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph: 
"To draft further safety regulations for nuclear energy production, harmonised at Western Euro-
pean level, which should allow any population concerned, especially in frontier regions, to be 
involved in a democratic decision on the siting of nuclear plants;" 
Signed : Vohrer 
1. See 11th Sitting, 1st December 1976 (Amendment adopted). 
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Fourth and fifth sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference, United Nations 
Headquarters, New York City - 15th March-17th May and 2nd August-
17th September 1976 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of th6 Committee: Mr. Warren (Chairman); 
MM. Valleiz, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, 
Boucheny (Substitute : Bizet), Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini, MM. 
Oornelissen, Oraigen, Golter, Lewis, Mammi, Mart (Substi-
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tute : Spautz), van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Phipps (Substitute : 
Hawkins), Richter, Schmitt, Schwencke (Substitute : 
Enders), de Stexhe (Substitute : de Bruyne), Treu, Oerneau. 
N. B. The names of RepresentatitJeB who took part in 
the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European oceanographic activities 
The Assembly, 
Noting the Council's reply to Recommendation 275 that no European oceanographic authority 
should be set up, even in the framework of an existing European organisation ; 
Noting also the total absence of a common overall European policy with respect to mining seabed 
minerals, prospecting for and exploitation of other marine resources, marine pollution and scientific 
oceanographic research ; 
Expressing satisfaction however with European co-operation during the negotiations of the Law 
of the Sea Conference in New York ; 
Aware of the existence of numerous oceanographic organisations and ad hoc bodies in worldwide, 
Atlantic, Western European and smaller regional frameworks; 
Aware of the defence aspects of many oceanographic activities, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNOIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To define their own national maritime policies ; 
2. To try to work out a general European strategy while at the same time proceeding with co-operation 
in practical and specific oceanographic subjects and to consider setting up a standing steering committee 
of national authorities for this purpose ; 
3. To study possible means of co-operation in a regional framework, such as the North Sea area, 
between all countries interested in : 
(a) the defence by national coastguard forces or navies of oil rigs and other installations which 
come within that area but which are outside territorial waters ; 
(b) the establishment of a common programme and strategy for policing the 200-mile economic zone; 
(c) reaching agreement on the joint implementation of all conventions on pollution; 
(d) collaboration on basic maritime research and development. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Craigen, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The purpose of this report is to focus the 
attention of parliamentarians in WEU member 
countries on some, though by no means all, of the 
political, strategic, economic and ecological 
questions which will have to be considered by 
electorates in the member States and decided 
upon by their respective governments. 
I. United Nations Law of the Sea Conference 
2. The third United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conference has set itself an ambitious set of tasks 
in its aim of attaining international agreement 
on a comprehensive treaty to cover all aspects 
of ocean use and management. The forthcoming 
session next spring will be a make or break affair 
in establishing an international regime for the 
world's oceans which cover seven-tenths of the 
surface of the globe. Although the fifth session 
ended at New York in September 1976 with no 
agreement in sight, national governments have 
been required to think more about the problems 
of oceanography and the need for international 
solutions. 
3. The third Law of the Sea Conference has 
gone further than its two predecessors in the 
fifties and sixties. But then nations have been 
thinking more about the treasures of the seas in 
the last decade. They may also have to think 
more about the dangers of uncontrolled exploita-
tion of these resources. "People must under-
stand that their fate is at stake" warned Com-
mander Jacques Cousteau of the Oceanic Insti-
tute of Monaco when speaking on 24th April 
1976 about the conference, for "ecologists know 
very well that the human species cannot survive 
if the oceans die". 
4. Dr. Kurt W aldheim emphasised the global 
significance of the Law of the Sea Conference 
when at Caracas on 20th June 1976 he said the 
deliberations "must succeed lest old quarrels on 
land be replaced by new quarrels at sea". There 
has been a growing consciousness of the economic 
potential of the seas since the second world war 
and President Truman's declaration of a 200-
mile economic zone round the coast of the United 
States back in 1945 foreshadowed the United 
States hegemony in the field of ocean technology 
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which has developed. Speaking for the United 
States on 8th April 1976, the Secretary of State, 
Dr. Henry Kissinger, highlighted the importance 
of what is at stake in the law of the sea delibera-
tions when he said "the world was facing the 
prospect of mounting conflict" and the current 
negotiations might be "the world's last chance to 
avoid such a conflict". 
5. The work of the Law of the Sea Conference 
has been developed by three principal commit-
tees: 
( i) the proposed international seabed 
authority and the exploration and 
exploitation of the deep seabed ; 
( ii) the extent of the territorial jurisdic-
tion of States and the proposed 200-
mile economic zone, including the 
problems of fishing rights and the pas-
sage through straits ; and 
( iii) the protection of the marine environ-
ment, scientific research and techno-
logy. 
There was also a working group on the settle-
ment of disputes dealing with the principle of 
compulsory settlement procedure. 
D. Western European union 
6. Even if international agreement is beyond 
reach at the moment through the Law of the 
Sea Conference, there are compelling reasons 
why some form of regime within the European 
continent may be necessary. Europe is enveloped 
by a coastline of some 36,000 miles stretching 
from the Norwegian and Soviet border in the 
north to the Dardanelles in the south. The 
British Isles alone have a coastline of about 
8,600 miles. AH but Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
Austrja, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Holy See 
and San Marino are littoral States. WEU has 
long since recognised the importance of oceano-
graphy. Mr. Schloesing's report on European 
policy in the field of technology - oceanography 
(Document 496) was presented at the fifteenth 
ordinary session in 1969, and the juridical prob-
lems of oceanography today (Document 523) was 
presented by Mr. La Loggia at the sixteenth 
ordinary session in 1970. 
7. Within the past five years the demand for 
new sources of energy and the potential of North 
Sea oil and natural gas deposits has coloured 
public thinking about ooeanography in Western 
Europe. It has possibly distracted public atten-
tion away from the ecological and military 
implications of the use and management of the 
waters around our shores. Growing conflict may 
develop between fishing interests in meeting our 
demands for food supplies and the economic 
interests in the race for energy and mineral 
resources. To some extent space exploration has 
an attraction for the public which the explora-
tion of our seas or inner depths does not hold. 
8. Two recent studies by the Council of Europe 
may be related to oceanographic matters for they 
touch respectively on the distribution of the 
potential wealth of the world's oceans and on the 
technological exploitation of those resources. 
North-South dialogue (Document 3763) by Mr. 
Vedovato deals with the question of industrial-
ised nations assisting the developing countries. 
The other report by Mr. Holtz on multinational 
corporations has a bearing on the exploitation 
of seabed resources. 
9. Many of today's developing countries had 
not yet emerged in 1958 when the first United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference reached 
agreement on the continental shelf. The group of 
seventy-seven would like a moratorium on the 
exploitation of seabed mineral resources until an 
international regime can be established and 
agreement reached on the distribution of 
resources. They would like ooean resources to be 
developed for the benefit of the world commun-
ity and especially the underdeveloped nations. 
Natural self-interest rather than ecological con-
siderations are uppermost in their minds. How-
ever, it is doubtful if the forces of technology 
can be held back until such international agree-
ments are concluded. 
10. Friction between the developed and under-
developed nations will grow if ooeanic resources 
are to be gained only by the advanced industrial 
nations. President Giscard d'Estaing pointed out 
at the Franco-African Conference in Paris in 
May 1976 that 45 % of the world's mineral pro-
duction is controlled by the industrialised 
nations. With 70 % of the world's population 
the non-industrialised nations have a mere 7 % 
of world industrial production. But the develop-
ing countries export about one-half of the 
requirements of the industrialised countries for 
some products. The price of certain commodities 
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may already be forcing the industrialised nations 
to look for alternative sources of supply if not 
on grounds of cost then on strategic considera-
tions. Since technological resources are largely 
in the hands of the advanced industrial nations 
they monopolise the means of exploiting and 
developing seabed resources. It is here that the 
importance of multinational corporations operat-
ing on the basis of a global strategy is discern-
ible. The OECD has al·ready found it necessary 
to draw up guidelines for multinational com-
panies and some form of oversight of multi-
national corporations may be even more neces-
sary in the future in respect of their oceano-
graphic activities. 
m. Territorial jurisdiction and economic zones 
11. All but one member of WEU is a coastal 
State and Belgium with 60 km has the smallest 
coastline. However, all depend on the free pas-
sage of their imports and exports. Western 
Europe's prosperity has been largely developed 
through international trade and the manu-
factures of its people. The EEC is the largest 
trading bloc in the world with one-quarter of 
world imports and one-fifth of world exports. 
Free passage on the high seas is therefore essen-
tial to its lifelines. The extension of the limits 
of territorial waters throughout the world from 
three miles to twelve miles is the equivalent of 
something like five times the land area of WEU 
member States. The recognition of economic 
zones of 200 miles around the world's ldttoral 
States will mean that two-fifths of the ocean 
surface lies within the grasp of the coastal 
States. Russia has accepted a 12-mile limit for 
about seventy years and will accept a 200-mile 
economic zone. The Soviet Government was 
critical of the Chinese for supporting the idea 
of a 200-mile territorial area. The Pacific States 
of Latin America proolaimed sovereignty over a 
200-mile area of sea in 1954 under the Santiago 
Conference in order to safeguard natural 
resources. More recently Iceland has declared 
unilaterally a 200-mile fishing zone. 
12. Western Europe is likely to come under 
increasing pressure in its domestic politics as 
the developing nations seek to exercise new forms 
of collective bargaining in the world's com-
modity markets. The 1973 oil crisis was a fore-
taste of what is happening and did not exactly 
demonstrate cohesion within the EEC against 
the pull of national self-interest within the Com-
munity's membership. The European Community 
is not rich in raw materials and in 1974 some 
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60 % of its imports were raw materials and 
unprocessed goods. In that same year mineral 
fuels represented about one-third of the total 
imports. It is known that the world's seabeds 
cover greater mineral deposits than exist under 
land. When the mineral deposits on land become 
scarce or strategically beyond reach, national 
governments will be under pressure to encourage 
the exploration and exploitation of underwater 
deposits. Whether the costs of extraction will be 
calculated on the basis of including the social 
and ecological factors involved remains to be 
seen. 
13. The EEC is generally approaching the 
extension of limits within a Community frame-
work. However, conflicting national interests are 
not going to be easily reconciled. Negotiations 
over a common fisheries policy indicate only too 
well the difficulties of obtaining a settlement 
within a Community of Nine. A 200-mile Com-
munity fishing zone which keeps out non-
Community members is one matter, but the 
problems of catches, conservation and competi-
tion represent a real obstacle to agreement. 
United Kingdom fishermen want an exclusive 
preference zone of fifty miles and see their 
industry's economic future at stake. Since more 
than half of Europe's fish are caught within 
fifty miles of the British coastline there is real 
concern over unfair competition and the 
dangerous depletion of stocks. Lack of trust and 
suspicion over the operation of quotas will not 
make for easy agreement. 
14. The Treaty of Rome clearly specifies the 
sovereign rights of member States over economic 
activities on the continental shelf. As recently 
as April 1975 the Commission made it clear that 
the Community's energy policy would not affect 
the United Kingdom's control of North Sea oil 
and gas because the United Kingdom Govern-
ment enjoyed "complete sovereignty over these 
resources". There would certainly be ruptions 
within the Community if it were otherwise. It 
is difficult to envisage national governments in 
Europe, whether in NATO, COMECON or 
neutral, being willing to surrender their 
sovereignty when it comes to the extraction of 
economic resources off their coasts. The pressures 
are already in the opposite direction. The eco-
nomies of nations may increasingly depend upon 
success in underwater mining. This independent 
compulsion towards sea mining will however 
demand greater interdependence of action in 
terms of civil co-operation and changing defence 
strategies. 
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15. The policing of extended territorial waters 
and of the economic zone limits beyond will not 
be without cost. National governments will 
require to strengthen their civil police and coast-
guard authorities to meet these additional 
responsibilities. Navies which have the natural 
role of defence may well be somewhat reluctant 
to become police authorities as well. Moreover, 
internal security is a factor which cannot be 
ignored as the Dutch discovered recently in 
respect of the number of Palestinians employed 
on oil rig developments. The problems of sea 
traffic management are also likely to increase. 
It may be imperative before long to establish a 
navigational regime in the North Sea. Experi-
ence has already been gained from the Dover 
Strait traffic separation scheme. There will 
certainly be a need for more hydrographic 
information. With the use of larger vessels there 
is the constant danger of vessels, particularly 
oil tankers, running aground in _waters which 
may not have been properly charted. Last year 
the United Kingdom hydrographic service earned 
£3 million in foreign exchange from sales of 
charts and other publications. Although operat-
ing within the United Kingdom Ministry of 
Defence, the hydrographic school at Plymouth 
has an international reputation and attendance 
and an important civil function. 
IV. Protecting marine environment 
16. It is optimistic to believe that ecological 
imperatives will lead to a common approach 
towards the use and management of the seas 
and the control and prevention of pollution. In 
the short term, financial considerations, resource 
factors and defence strategies are bound to out-
weigh marine pollution in importance. Yet closed 
seas like the Mediterranean present the problems 
which arise when ecological considerations are 
not given their proper importance. Beaches have 
already been closed to tourists on certain parts 
of the Mediterranean and it should be remem-
bered that both the North Sea and Mediter-
ranean are considerable recreational resources. 
Commander Cousteau has warned that the oceans 
could be "dead in less than fifty years" unless 
drastic action is taken. There may be no long 
term for the world community unless our 
priorities alter. But efforts to achieve inter-
national agreement will not be easy. There is 
the polarisation between the developed and 
developing nations, between the coastal and 
landlocked countries and there is the ideological 
divide between East and West. Agreement even 
within the European region of the globe will 
have to overcome these factors. 
17. Much of the pollution of sea water comes 
from land-based sources and particularly in 
estuaries and ports. The EEC approach to 
legislation on pollution is generally founded on 
the need to prevent the distortion of competition 
among member States. This requires member 
States to adopt similar measures although their 
geography varies considerably. United Kingdom 
rivers are generally shorter than many of those 
on the European continent and the United King-
dom Government has taken the view that the 
anti-pollution measures required on the Humber 
or Thames are often different from those needed 
for the Rhine. Although there is a pollution 
problem on Britain's shores its impact is les-
sened by the turbulence of the North Sea and 
Atlantic waters which partly clean themselves. 
Anti-pollution measures cost money and there is 
a disinclination among industrial nations to meet 
these costs. But there is equally no great interest 
evident among the developing countries in their 
desire for economic growth to lose investment 
by imposing off-putting anti-pollution restric-
tions on industrialists. Yet the experience of 
industrial countries in river purification mea-
sures must suggest ~that the cost of undoing the 
damage done is greater than the short-term cost 
of initial control of pollution. 
18. The activities of the oil companies in the 
North Sea has naturally centred attention in that 
area. The United Kingdom Government has 
recently published a report on accidental oil 
pollution of the sea. The repont covers most risks, 
including spills from oil tankers. The Torrey 
Canyon disaster probably resulted in more 
ecological damage from detergents used to 
disperse the oil. The Norwegians have been con-
sidering a mechanical recovery clean-up system 
with inflatable booms to contain the spillage 
until the oil can be scooped up. This would avoid 
the expense of detergents, but there are doubts 
about the viability of mechanical systems in 
North Sea conditions. 
19. Anti-pollution conventions necessitate polit-
ical will on the part of their signatories if they 
are to be effective. On 4th May 1976 the Council 
of Ministers of the EEC adopted a directive on 
dangerous substances in the marine environment 
which should eventually lead to an oversight at 
Community level of marine pollution originating 
from land-based sources. The European Com-
mission has introduced a draft directive on 
dumping at sea and has intimated its intention 
95 
DOCUMENT 722 
of preparing a draft directive on marine pol-
lution originating from shipping. The practice of 
shunting waste products may be more serious 
than is generally admitted, and the decision, for 
example, of the Finns in May 1975 not to allow 
the Finnish tanker to dump 100 tons of arsenic 
waste in the South Atlantic serves to highlight 
the dilemmas involved and the need for firm 
governmental action in such situations. 
V. A European maritime regime 
20. The first question is whether most countries 
are clear on their own maritime policies before 
any realistic attempts can be made to achieve 
the kind of co-operation necessary to safeguard 
the life of our seas whilst responding to national 
resource needs. The existence of Western Euro-
pean Union is in itself recognition of a common 
interest. So too are many of the other treaties 
to which European nations are signatories. But 
tidal movements are no respecters of national 
boundaries and one nation's sewage can easily 
be washed onto another nation's coastline. WEU 
represents only seven of the nine member States 
of the EEC, and Ireland and Denmark, with its 
interest in the Faroes and Greenland, are 
important maritime States. The Council of 
Europe contains only nineteen member States 
with varying interests in maritime matters. 
21. It has been suggested that a European 
maritime regime is urgently required. However, 
an essential precondition for this will be the 
need for WEU member governments to define 
their own national maritime policies. Moreover, 
even with detente the potentiaL for confliet in 
Europe is ever present. The lack of entente on 
oceanographic matters could have its dangers 
too. Collective inaction over the use and manage-
ment of European waters is unlikely to happen 
because the dangers of doing nothing are too 
great. COST (European co-operation in scientific 
and technological research) is an example of co-
operation over the establishment of a European 
network of ocean data stations. This should 
provide a good deal of data ·about meteorological 
and oceanographic conditions. CREST (Euro-
pean co-operation in scientific and technological 
research committee) currently has a working 
group looking at the calibration and inter-
calibration of oceanographic instruments in the 
European Community. 
22. European waters are bound to hold an 
increasing economic importance for littoral 
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States. The balance of economies as well as the 
balance of sea power may depend upon their 
effective policing. To what extent there could be 
a pooling of the policing arrangements in the 
areas outwith territorial waters is something 
which national governments may have to con-
sider. The need for more adequate charting will 
grow as policing arrangements gain in import-
ance. Moreover, in the North Sea, with the 
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operation of oil rigs and laying of pipelines and 
cables, the movement of shipping and sub-
marines will come up against added hazards. The 
effectiveness of the submarine as a strike force 
cannot be ignored in terms of defence st.rategies 
in normal times. But as more of the littoral 
States find their economies becoming orientated 
to seabed mining they will have more at stake 
in the protection of coastal waters. 
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APPENDIX 
Fourth and fifth sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference 
United Nations Headquarters, New York City 
15th nfarch-7th nfay 1976 
and 
2nd August-17th September 1976 
Attendance 
About 5,000 participants representing about 
150 member countries of the United Nations and 
twelve other countries that are members of one 
or more of the United Nations specialised 
agencies. The conference is the largest inter-
nationllil• gathering of States ever held. 
Previous sessions 
These are the fourth and fifth sessions of 
the conference. The conference opened on 
3rd December 1973 with an organisational ses-
sion in New York City. The first substantiv·e 
session was from 20th June to 29th August 1974 
in Caracas. The second substantive session was 
from 26th March to lOth May 1975 in Geneva. 
Objective 
The goal of the conference is to draw up a 
single international treaty covering all aspects of 
ocean use. Some of the issues before the con-
ference are provided for in four Geneva con-
ventions on the law of the sea that are in effect 1 • 
The conference also is considering issues that are 
new concepts in international maritime l·aw. 
Previous conference 
The first United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea met art; Geneva in 1958, with 
eighty-six States participating. It produced four 
international conventions : the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone, the high seas, fishing and con-
servation of the living resources of the high seas, 
the continental shelf. The number of parties to 
these conventions ranges from thirty-five to 
fifty-five. 
A second conference met in Geneva in 1960 
to resolve disagreements over fishery limits and 
the breadth of the territorial sea. However, the 
1. See Mr. Schloesing's report, Document 496. 
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eighty-two States represented were unable to 
adopt any substantive proposals. 
Method of operation 
The work of the third United Nations Law 
of the Sea Conference has been organised into 
the following committee structure: 
- Committee One handles all issues relat-
ing to the exploration for and exploita-
tion of deep sea resources, particularly 
the establishment of an international 
authority to regulate such activity. 
- Committee Two deals with the territorial 
sea, zones of jurisdiction adjacent to the 
territorial sea (economic zone), straits 
used for international navigation, the 
continental shelf, maritime boundaries of 
archipelagic States and islands, and all 
aspects of national jurisdiction. 
- Committee Three deals with marine pol-
lution and scientific research. 
- In addition, there is a General Commit-
tee, which makes procedural decisions, a 
Credentials Committee (nine members), 
a Drafting Committee (twenty-three 
members) and a Working Group on the 
settlement of disputes. 
Rules 
So far the conference has proceeded on the 
basis of consensus reached through negotiations, 
without formal voting. The rules, adopted at 
OaraclliS in 1974, require a two-thirds majority 
of those present and voting in plenary session 
for adoption of a substantive decision, and a 
simple majority of those present and voting for 
a substantive decision by a committee. In 1974, 
the conference endorsed a statement by the 
President that it should make every effort to 
reach agreement on substantive matters by way 
of consensus and there should be no voting on 
such matters until all efforts of consensus had 
been exhausted. 
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Position of the European Community 
On 27th Ju1y 1976, the Ministerial Council 
of the Communities defined joint positions to be 
submitted by the Community representatives at 
the Law of the Sea Conference which was to 
reconvene in New York on 2nd August and last 
until 17th September 1976. The joint positions 
related in particular to the following matters : 
establishment of a 200-mile economic zone, 
extension of the continental shelf and exploita-
tion of the seabed. 
The Community representatives were also 
briefed on the negotiation of a dause allowing 
the Community as such to participate in the 
future Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Also on 27th July, the Ministerial Council 
adopted the following declaration of intent 
regarding the problems raised for the Com-
munity fishing industry by the establishment of 
a 200-mi1e economic zone: 
"The Council notes an increasing trend 
amongst countries with large-scale sea 
fishing industries to extend unilaterally 
their fishing zones to 200 miles, without 
awaiting the outcome of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. Certain 
countries which have been very active in 
fishing in coastal zones, particularly in the 
North Atlantic, have already extended the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction or taken a 
decision to do so as from 1st January 1977. 
This trend is bound to result in over-
exploitation of the fish stocks, thus jeo-
pardising the maintenance of the Commun-
ity's fishing resources. 
The Council expresses its resolve to protect 
the legitimate rights of Community fisher-
men. 
The Council, convinced of the necessity for 
the member States to act jointly : 
- considers that measures must be adopted 
in order to deal with this situation and 
that they must be taken in accordance 
with the conclusions of the third Con-
ference of the United Nations on the Law 
of the Sea: it is aware however that the 
trend referred to above could force the 
member States to act as soon as circum-
stances render action necessary, i.e. 
before the proceedings of the conference 
are brought to a conclusion ; 
- to this end, adopts the principle of con-
certed action under which member States 
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would be led to extend the limits of 
fishing zones to 200 miles, fishing within 
these limits being subject to the common 
fisheries policy of the Community ; 
- agrees to decide on the ways of imple-
menting such action in the light of the 
outcome of the next meeting of the 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and 
not later than 1st October 1976." 
It should be noted that Canada, Iceland, 
Mexico and the United States had already pre-
pared or adopted the necessary legislation for a 
200-mile fishing zone. France, too, is preparing 
legislation to create along its coast an economic 
zone of 200 miles. 
The conference issues 
Mining of the seabed 
Before the conference opened many people 
were of the opinion that it would be concluded 
successfully, although a number of problems still 
had to be solved. The most serious problems con-
cerned control of the seabed. The United States 
and other industrialised nations want free and 
orderly, non-discriminatory access on the part of 
individual countries to deep-sea raw materials 
beyond the 200-mile limit or, if the case arises, 
the periphery of the continental shelf. This is 
the basic principle put forward by the industri-
alised nations with the necessary marine technol-
ogy at their disposal'. The United States in 
particular opposed any State-by-State quota or 
similar provisions which would arbitrarily 
restrict access to the ocean floor. 
The opposing view was put forward by the 
group of seventy-seven which favoured the set-
ting up of an international seabed authority with 
a monopoly status to protect the interest of land 
producers. This group fears an exploitation of 
the seabed before the developing countries are 
in a position to do so. It is known that seabed 
deposits include fifteen times more copper, 1,500 
times more nickel and 4,000 times more man-
ganese than those on l<and. 
The discussions on this subject took place 
in Committee One. 
In an opening statement on 2nd August 
1976, the United States Ambassador declared 
that he understood the dissatisfaction of a num-
ber of developing countries with regard to the 
powers of the seabed authority and the function-
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ing of the so-called "enterprise" which would be 
the executive arm of this authority. The question 
of voting and composition of the seabed council 
should reflect the economic interest of major 
consumers and producers ; both States and 
private companies should have access to the deep 
seabed minerals. He warned that unless political 
decisions were made at this conference there 
would be unilateral action involving seabed 
resources such as fish, oil and minerals. 
The American point of view 
This issue in Committee One remained the 
most difficult of the conference, and when the 
United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, 
addressed the conference on 5th August he made 
special reference to this issue. 
Before explaining the United States attitude, 
he said that no current matter on the inter-
national agenda was more vital for the long-term 
stability and prosperity of our planet. Unless 
the competitive practices and claims of nations 
were harmonised the world might well face the 
prospect of mounting contention or even conflict. 
He warned that the United States had 
drawn a limit beyond which it would not go in 
negotiating an international oceans treaty. He 
emphasised the need to move as quickly as pos-
sible towards a final consensus acceptable to all 
major groups of States. If there were delays, the 
pressure of events and contention would place 
international consensus irretrievably beyond the 
grasp of the nations of the world. One of the 
most complex and contentious issues was that of 
deep-sea mining - who should do it and under 
what conditions ; the United States would agree 
to an "enterprise" representing the seabed 
authority which would be able to mine, on its 
own, seabed minerals. Revenue sharing from all 
mining would go to the world community to be 
used primarily for economic development of the 
poor countries. No other solution would be fair 
to the developing countries who desire to have 
an enterprise which can exploit seabed resources 
and who want revenues from mining for neces-
sary economic growth. 
In a further statement on this issue on 
1st September 1976, the Secretary of State stres-
sed that there was no need to disregard the basic 
interests of industrialised States in ensuring a 
non-discriminatory non-discretionary access sys-
tem in order to solve these problems. He said 
that the United States Delegation would make 
a major effort to break the impasse in the 
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negotiations. He indicated that, as a part of that 
effort, the United States would make a contribu-
tion to the international authority so that it 
would have the financial resources and means 
to function. If a compromise agreement was 
reached which was acceptable to both the indus-
trialised nations and the group of seventy-seven, 
then "dual track" mining could be undertaken 
by both an international agency and individual 
nations and their private firms. Seabed mining 
would then not be reserved exclusively for an 
international authority with strict limits on pro-
duction for the protection of land-based pro-
ducers - which is what the group of seventy-
seven wishes and which is unacceptable to the 
industrialised countries. 
The United States also agreed to periodic 
reviews of the working of the enterprise. How-
ever, it was pointed out that deep-sea mining 
could not start for another ten years, which 
meant a review of the exploitation system should 
take place in twenty-five years' time. 
In respect of the voting and composition of 
the council of the seabed authority (which has 
not yet been negotiated), Mr. Kissinger said that 
a satisfactory package on deep seabed mining 
had to contain assurances that States would have 
influence commensurate with their economic 
interests on the decision-making process. 
The economic zone 
At the conference there was continued broad 
support for a 12-mile territorial sea, a transit 
passage regime in straits used for international 
navigation and a 200-mile economic zone. It was 
also felt that there should be a guaranteed 
freedom of shipping, including supply ships, 
guaranteed basic maritime research and a 
preservation of fishing interests. 
However, countries with extensive coastlines 
are in opposition to this and are demanding 
exclusive rights - in some cases to the extent 
of complete sovereignty. Fishing rights of other 
nations will be respected only within the terms 
of bilateral agreements. With regard to maritime 
environmental conservation, these countries are 
seeking complete legal competence and rights of 
control. They also want permission for research 
activities to be the prerogative of the coastal 
State. 
The United States and the European 
countries are of the opinion that the high sea 
status of the economic zone should be continued. 
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No solution has yet boon found regarding 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 
200 miles ; the question here is who will share 
in the benefits from these resources. In view of 
all these controversial issues, a compulsory 
dispute settlement procedure should be set up. 
The economic zone is an area of mixed inter-
national and coastal State rights. 
Committee Two is also studying the need 
for a resolution on issues concerning the interests 
of landlocked countries and geographically dis-
advantaged States. 
The most difficult problem the committee 
has to deal with is the high sea status of the 
economic zone. The interests of the international 
community require that the high sea freedoms 
remain reserved to that community and that the 
rights of coastal States over the economic 
resources of these zones should not touch on the 
interests of the international community in 
crucial matters such as navigation. 
Marine pollution and scientific research 
In Committee Three - which deals with 
marine pollution and scientific research - the 
industrialised countries want freedom of basic 
marine exploration within the economic zone and 
the continental shelf. The group of seventy-
seven wants all research activities to be subject 
to approval by the coastal States. 
In respect of maritime environmental con-
servation, the industrialised countries are of the 
opinion that maritime nations should be permit-
ted to establish marine conservation norms for 
coastal waters and economic zones for the 
application of internationally-agreed regulations 
lOO 
APPENDIX 
and internationally-agreed standards for ship 
construction only and that the right of control 
and implementation by coastal States be sub-
sidiary and limited in scope. In order to achieve 
this, it has been proposed that a distinction be 
made between resources related research, for 
which the coastal State would have to give its 
consent, and other research for which open 
access would be guaranteed with the provision 
of sharing information and plans with the 
coastal States. Only by open scientific research 
and the wide dissemination of its results 
throughout the world can the global community 
continue to probe the mysteries of our planet. 
The treaty should therefore incorporate a 
balance of rights and responsibilities, guarantee 
the freedom of basic scientific research and the 
participation of coastal States in resources 
related research. 
Conclusion of the conference 
On 17th September, the current session of 
the law of the sea negotiations was concluded 
in New York. Decisions still have to be taken 
in a number of key areas such as : 
- rules for mining deep seabed minerals ; 
- the nature of the economic zone ; 
- the provisions for marine scientific 
research in the economic zone ; 
- the articles dealing with the exploitation 
of resources in the continental shelf 
beyond 200 miles ; 
- the rights of landlocked and geographi-
cally disadvantaged States in the eco-
nomic zone. 
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The Assembly, 
24th November 1976 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 284 to 290 
RECOMMENDATION 284 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 2 
Welcoming the continued prompt action by the Council which enabled the twenty-first annual report 
to be communicated by 4th March ; 
Believing that when the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively 
incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy, only 
then will the time have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the treaty; 
Again congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried 
out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too-limited tasks assigned to it by the Council; 
Welcoming the Council's replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the 
assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry 
in the member countries, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNoiL 
I. Apply each year the Secretary-General's new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual 
report; 
2. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the mutual defence under-
takings are effectively incorporated in a treaty of European union, and meanwhile that it : 
(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British 
forces on the continent at 31st December, a statement of the level ofBritish forces on the main-
land on that date, established in accordance with the Council's definition of the approved level ; 
(ii) Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ; 
(iii) Include in the conclusion of the arms control chapter of the annual report a. full and clear state-
ment of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not 
fully applied as it did in earlier years ; 
(iv) Continue to press for the entry into force of the convention for the due process of law signed 
on 14th December 1957 ; 
3. Report to the Assembly on the r<>le it envisages for the independent programme group. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty.Second Ordinary Session 
(2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 700). 
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to Recommendation 284 
I. The Council endorse the Assembly's satisfaction with the new procedure for the preparation 
and communication of the annual report and will continue to follow this procedure. 
2. The information given in this report about the total level of British forces on the continent 
is supplied at the Assembly's request and in accordance with the undertaking given in the Council's 
reply to the Assembly's Recommendation 213. As was explained in the Council's reply to Written 
Question 170 the United Kingdom's commitment (under Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified 
Brussels Treaty) to maintain a certain level of forces on the mainland of Europe relates not to the 
total level of United Kingdom forces on the mainland (which includes personnel in Berlin and 
Gibraltar), but only to those which are assigned to SACEUR. For the purpose of this commitment 
the level approved by the Council is still 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. 
3. As was also explained in the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, because of the wide 
circulation of the annual report the Council are of the opinion that information about the number 
of inspections carried out by the Armaments Control Agency ought not to be included in the report. 
The Council have however in the past provided this information in confidence to the Rapporteur of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to assist him in compiling his report on the 
Council's annual report. The Council would be willing to continue this practice. 
4. Chapter Ill, B, 2 outlines the fields in which the Agency is not authorised to exercise its 
mandate. As explained in this section of the report the situation described in previous reports re-
garding certain armaments remains unchanged and the Council doubt whether any useful purpose 
would be served by repeating in full what has been said in the previous reports. 
5. The convention on the due process of law has not yet been ratified by all member nations. 
This is not therefore a subject on which the Council can take effective action. 
6. The Council have been pleased to note the formation of the independent European Programme 
Group. The group is not however an organ of Western European Union and it would not be appro-
priate for the Council to assign a rl>le to a group for which they have no responsibility. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 1976. 
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on the political activities of the Council 
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Noting the twenty-first annual report of the Council; 
Recalling Resolutions 55 and 59 ; 
DOCUMENT 723 
Noting with satisfaction that the Council "makes no distinction between the Council of Western 
European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Repre-
sentatives" ; 
Recalling that the Council " is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in 
the treaty" as long as these rights and duties have not been transferred by treaty to another institution; 
Deploring that the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives makes only excep-
tional use of its prerogatives ; 
Noting however that circumstances continue to make it essential to maintain procedure for consul-
tation between the Western European countries on matters affecting their security; 
Noting that the Council's refusal to reply to Written Questions 158, 159 and 160 and to hold a joint 
meeting with the General Affairs Committee in 1975 shows that the Council is shirking its responsibilities in 
respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Recalling that the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty commits its signatories to "preserve 
the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the 
rule of law, which are their common heritage"; 
Recalling finally Recommendation 266 to which the Council gave only a very incomplete reply, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by ; 
(a) examining in which framework each question concerning European security should be discussed 
by the Seven ; 
(b) dealing effectively with the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty even when it meets at the level of Permanent Representatives ; 
(c) examining attentively the means whereby it may complement possible action by the Nine in 
defence matters, particularly in emergencies ; 
(d) illustrating how the Council's activities reflect the constantly-repeated statement by the Council 
and by the member countries that they attach the greatest importance to the full application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. Give the Assembly a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266; 
1. Adopted by the .ABsembly on 15th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
(2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: See the Report tabled by Mr. Peridier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 702). 
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3. Report without hesitation in its communications to the Assembly on any differences between the 
positions adopted by its members, as it did in its reply to Recommendation 283 ; 
4. Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations 
between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it 
is undertaking on "the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the stan-
dardisation of armaments in Europe", the activities of the European programme group ; 
5. Should not invoke the possibility of members using national procedure in order to avoid replying 
to recommendations and written questions. 
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I. (a) The Council have, on several previous occasions, stressed the importance which they attach 
to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. They now wish to reaffirm, as they did in their reply 
to Assembly Recommendation 266, that member governments are determined to fulfil their obligations 
under the treaty. They feel, therefore, that it hardly corresponds to the facts to say, as the Assembly 
does, that the Council are "shirking their responsibilities" in respect of the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
(b) Since the Brussels Treaty makes no distinction between the Council meeting at ministerial 
level and the same Council meeting at the level of permanent representatives, the latter are fully empowered 
to discuss all problems arising in connection with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. As 
the Assembly is aware, such problems frequently appear on the Council's agenda. Finally, a detailed 
account of the Council's activities is given in the annual report to the Assembly. 
(c) No realistic approach can be made to the question of a European defence policy until 
substantial progress has been ma.de towards political union. On the other hand it is quite obvious that 
the development of a common foreign policy of the Nine cannot stop short of common security issues. 
At present it appears premature to consider what means would be available to the Council to complement 
hypothetical action by the Nine. If, at some future date, consideration is given in the European union 
to the possibility of a common defence policy, careful thought will, of course, have to be given to the 
problem of harmonising the areas of competence of the Seven and the Nine. In this connection, the 
Council have noted with interest Assembly Resolutions 55 and 59 and the report of the General Affairs 
Committee to the Presidential Committee on European union and WEU. 
(d) The only way in which the Council can illustrate how their concern to ensure the full application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty is reflected is to remind the Assembly of all their activities as described 
in the annual report and to refer to the very carefully drafted replies sent to the Assembly's recommen-
dations and written questions. 
In the Council's view, the presence of Ministers from the governments of four WEU member 
countries at the first part of the Assembly's twenty-second session and the reaffirmation, through them, 
of the Council's concern for the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, offers clear and recent proof 
of the importance which every member of WEU attaches to the observance of the treaty. 
11. In response to the Assembly's reference to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266, the Council 
would recall the terms of the reply sent to the Assembly on 24th July 1975. They feel that there is no 
justification for "drawing up a list of problems connected with the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty over which the governments of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be 
considered at ministerial level or that attention may be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or 
in the European Council". In their view, this would have no positive effect for the application of the 
treaty because the Council are not the only international body empowered to deal with the questions 
covered by Article VIII of the treaty. 
The Assembly is of course aware that the member States of WEU are also members of the 
European Community, the North Atlantic Council and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, which also have authority to discuss these problems. 
As regards their own responsibilities, the Council wish to remind the Assembly of the efforts 
which they have ma.de in recent months to reactivate the Standing Armaments Committee. As stated 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1976. 
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in their replies to Assembly Recommendation 281 and Written Question 167, they have instructed the 
Standing Armaments Committee, as a task for the immediate future, to produce a detailed outline 
programme for a study which, in the form of a descriptive analysis of the armaments industries in 
member countries, would help to give a clearer insight into the industrial and economic implications of 
the standardisation of armaments, and at the same time make it possible to offer a diagnosis. 
Ill. The Council wish to reiterate that they try to answer the Assembly's recommendations and 
written questions as fully and substantially as possible. In accordance with the principles governing the 
Council's work these replies normally reflect the common view of the seven member countries and it is 
only in most exceptional circumstances that it may be necessary to indicate that members' positions 
differ as, for example, when those positions are a logical consequence of the differing relations which 
member States have with a particular outside organisation (for example, reply to Recommendation 283). 
IV. In view of the specific functions assigned to them by the modified Brussels Treaty and of the 
current terms of the texts governing the European Communities, the Council could not, as such, follow 
the political consultations between the Nine. In this connection, they recall that the foreign ministers 
of the Seven participate in political co-operation between the Nine and are, therefore, fully informed. 
Nor can it be considered part of the Council's duty to follow closely the activities of the inde-
pendent European programme group. However, WEU member governments are doing all in their power 
to avoid any risk of duplication between the Standing Armaments Committee and the independent 
European programme group. 
V. The rule followed by the Council in drafting replies to Assembly recommendations and written 
questions is that of unanimity and they spare no efforts in seeking to achieve this objective. 
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Appreciating the Council's interest in promoting technological collaboration in a European frame-
work; 
Regretting the absence of a medium- and long-term policy to encourage advanced technology pro-
grammes, although such a policy is necessary if Western European industry is to maintain a valid civil 
and military capability, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNcn.. 
Include in its twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European 
policy in sectors of advanced technology such as space, aeronautics, aviation, nuclear reactors, computers 
and electronics, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective 
decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
(2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 705). 
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The Council note with interest Recommendation 286 on scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions. They share the view expressed in the recommendation that the promotion of technological co-
operation in a. European framework continues to be of great importance. They note with satisfaction that 
progress towards a common medium- and long-term policy has already been achieved in several sectors. 
With regard to space applications, the European Space Agency has been entrusted with the elaboration and 
implementation of a long-term European space programme. In the field of research, the European Commu-
nities continue to carry out medium-term programmes, with special emphasis on energy and environmental 
protection. The Council agree with the view that the effort to co-ordinate and harmonise national medium-
and long-term programmes should be encouraged. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th October 1976. 
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RECOMMENDATION 287 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff 2 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ; 
Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ; 
Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated 
organisations ; 
Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before 
introducing new procedure ; 
Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
I. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions 
being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of 
pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973; 
2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based inter alia on joint management 
for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 
and 265; 
3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break 
in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension ; 
4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ; 
5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ; 
6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communi-
ties and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to 
their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted; 
7. Make provision for a reinstallation allowance for officials terminating their service and who were 
granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ; 
II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study 
on conditions for seconding national officials. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty.Second Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration (Document 701). 
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I. I. The Council are in a position to inform the Assembly that, at their meeting of 23rd November 1976, 
they approved the 127th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts which 
contained at annex the rules implementing the pension scheme set up in the 94th report. This scheme, 
which for WEU staff is now in force, takes effect from 1st July 1974. 
2. The Council believe that guarantees are provided by Article 40, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the draft 
pension scheme rules. The question of a joint management is currently under study in the Co-ordinating 
Committee. 
3. Neither the WEU nor .Assembly Staff Rules stipulate that payment of a staff member's salary 
should terminate on the day of his death. In practice, these emoluments have been paid by the Secretariat-
General up to the end of the month in which the official died. 
4. A proOOdure for salary reviews broadly comparable to that followed in the European Communities 
is at present under study by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations. It is expected that the new 
procedure will be approved by Councils before the end of this year. 
5. Consideration is at present being given to the reform of co-ordinating procedures. However, the 
Assembly will be aware of the difficulties in achieving this when in addition to the seven members of 
WEU, the interests of some eighteen other governments are involved within the co-ordinated framework. 
6.-7. The present system of indemnities for loss of job has been in force since 1972. At that time, it 
represented a substantial improvement on the previous system. No proposals for improving the indemnities 
for loss of job, or for introducing a reinstallation allowance have, at the moment, been submitted to the 
governments of member countries. 
II. The survey carried out by the Public Administration Committee at the Council's request, on the 
implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment 
of national officials to international organisations, has now been completed. The relevant documents have 
been transmitted by the Secretariat-General to the Clerk of the Assembly. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th November 1976. 
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RECOMMENDATION 288 1 
on security in the Mediterranean 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power presents the Soviet 
Government with new options for extending its influence ; 
(ii) Aware that the many political uncertainties and local disputes and conflicts that a:Olict both allied 
and non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean area present an ever-present danger of major conflict 
arising through miscalculation or escalation ; 
(iii) Calling for the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance based on parliamentary democracy 
and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis; 
(iv) Welcoming the advent of a freely-elected parliament in Portugal and the signs of democratic 
developments in Spain ; 
(v) Recalling and reaffirming its earlier recommendations for the correct application of the Montreux 
Convention to prohibit the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits ; for the provision of 
diplomatic advice from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders; and for the NATO Gibraltar 
command to be transferred to the IBERLANT command, 
I. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus 
foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member 
countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin, 
ll. RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND REQUESTS THAT THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
1. Call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance: 
(a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession 
of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate r&le for the Spanish armed 
forces; 
(b) by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic Treaty, should a Maltese Government 
so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy ; 
(c) by recognising the value of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the 
Mediterranean area ; 
(d) by more publicly identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO 
defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area ; 
(e) by providing military assistance to modernise the armed forces of Portugal to enable them to 
play a new and more vital r&le in allied defence plans ; 
(/) by advising the Secretary-General to assign political advisers from his Political Affairs Division 
to all significant NATO military headquarters; 
(g) by transferring the Gibraltar Mediterranean Command from the Command of Allied Naval 
Forces Southern Europe to that of the Iberian Atlantic area ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Reports tabled by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Documents 708 and 712). 
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2. (a) Join with the other governments of the Alliance in making clear to the Soviet Union and to 
the country concerned the serious disadvantages for norma] relations and detente of any installation of 
new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area ; 
(b) Call on the North Atlantic Council to have full political and military contingency plans prepared 
to meet any of the foregoing eventualities, with no more secrecy than that required for their success ; 
3. Propose that NATO issue an annual defence white paper incorporating a joint assessment of the 
threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on national defence programmes. 
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1. The Council observe that the concern expressed by the Assembly regarding the state of security 
in the Mediterranean is focused on aspects which were discussed in detail at the North Atlantic Council 
held in Oslo on 20th and 21st May 1976, and at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in 
Brussels on 22nd May, by the countries of WEU who are members of that body. 
The North Atlantic Council consider that the policy of detente should be pursued and that any 
development which might lead to confrontation should be avoided. 
They have also voiced their concern at the growing military power of the Warsaw Pact, beyond 
levels apparently justified for the defensive purposes of the countries of that organisation; they have 
also stressed the determination of the member States to take the measures necessary to maintain and 
improve the efficiency of their forces as an essential safeguard for their security. In this context, the 
Defence Ministers of the member countries of the integrated military organisation have approved, in Brussels, 
the force goals proposed for 1977-82. 
Having regard to the objectives laid down by the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in the 
field of international peace and security, the WEU Council, like the Assembly, are aware of the links 
between the security of the continent of Europe and that of the Mediterranean and therefore of the role 
which the WEU member States might have to play in the Mediterranean basin. 
2. Those parts of the Assembly's recommendation which are addressed to the North Atlantic Council 
have been forwarded to them. 
APPENDIX 
Letter from the acting Secretary-General of WEU to 
the President of the Assembly dated 20th December 1976 
As indicated in point 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 288 on security in the Mediter-
ranean, the Council communicated to the North Atlantic Council the part of the recommendation which 
concerned it. 
I have the honour to bring to your notice the enclosed copy of the reply from Mr. Luns, Secretary-
General of NATO, dated 6th December 1976. 
Letter from the Secretary-General of NATO to the acting Secretary-General of WEU 
dated 6th December 1976 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 24th November 1976 for which I thank 
you. I have taken note with interest of the enclosed recommendation on security in the Mediterranean. 
I can assure you that this matter and problems connected with the southern flank of the Alliance 
are followed with the greatest attention by the Council, by my colleagues in the international secretariat 
and by myself. I shall always be pleased to receive recommendations from Western European Union on 
matters relating to the interests of the Alliance. 
I have had copies of the documents which you sent me distributed to all the national delegations. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd November 1976. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 289 1 
on European aeronautical policy 
guidelines emerging from the colloquy 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 2 
Acknowledging the conclusions of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy held in Toulouse 
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 under the aegis of its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions ; 
Aware of the difficulties in the aeronautical industry, which employs 400,000 persons, and the air-
lines, and the threats to the very existence of these sectors which may have serious consequences for Europe's 
security and well-being ; 
Convinced that without an affirmation of political determination the governments concerned will 
be unable to take joint action to safeguard tJ.is industry ; 
Regretting that governments have not yet adopted a position on the action programme for the Euro-
pean aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 1st October 1975; 
Reiterating its regret that there is a risk of Eurocontrol being dismantled; 
Aware that the problems cannot be solved through protectionism and the creation of a closed Euro-
pean market; 
Advocating on the contrary an investigation of world markets and of possibilities of co-operation 
with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not as subcontractors, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNciL 
I. Promote the creation in each member country concerned of a national aeronautical council associat-
ing, for instance, representatives of parliaments, ministries, manufacturers, airlines and trades unions under 
the chairma.nsHp of the appropriate government representative ; 
2. Invite the national aeronautical councils to form a European aeronautical council to ; 
(a) develop together with the Commission of the European Communities a European aeronautical 
manufacturing programme with a view to developing, producing and marketing large civil air-
craft; 
(b) arrange for joint financing for marketing these aircraft and study the possibilities of a European 
Import-Export Bank ; 
(c) ensure that Concorde remains in production and that Europe is able to benefit from the technical 
lead thus acquired; 
(d) establish a civil aviation agency for Western Europe responsible for European airworthiness cer-
tification ; 
(e) develop in concert with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) a joint policy for air 
transport and examine the possibilities of adopting a joint European position in negotiations 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty.Second Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 704). 
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between Western Europe and the rest of the world on problems such as landing rights and 
recognition of European airspace ; 
3. Create a study group to determine the military aircraft requirements of member countries in liai-
son with the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
FuRTHER REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Urge the member States of Eurocontrol : 
4. To set themselves as along-term aim in the future Eurocontrol convention, which will be applied as 
from 1983, the establishment of a. joint agency for the control of air traffic networks, including major ter-
minal areas ; 
5. To standardise equipment and systems to the maximum for the sake of efficiency and economy and 
in particular make a joint study in the Eurocontrol agency of new systems to be brought into service as 
from 1985; 
6. To draw up a common industrial policy for applied electronics in these fields, giving priority, when 
calling for tenders, to industries in the member States of the Eurocontrol community, and maintain a joint 
investment budget in the future agency with a view to procuring the said equipment through the agency ; 
7. To make the maximum use of the Eurocontrol agency in the field of research and development and 
draw up a joint research and development programme to avoid duplication wherever possible. 
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1. The uncertainties which hang over the future of Europe's aeronautical industry and airlines both 
as regards maintenance of their production, marketing and operating capacity and as regards research 
and advanced techniques, are a matter of concern to the Council, who recognise the need for closer 
co-operation between the national aeronautical industries. 
As the Assembly is aware, the introduction of a concerted European policy designed to safeguard 
these industries, and to limit competition and encourage co-operation between them is today the subject 
of detailed bilateral and multilateral discussions between member countries of the Community and at 
Community level. In particular, the ideas put forward in the action programme for the European 
aeronautical industry, proposed by the Commission of the Communities on 1st October 1975, are being 
studied, together with the conclusions of the colloquy organised at Toulouse by the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU. 
Any such policy should aim not at creating a protected European market but at ensuring the 
continued activity of this major sector of industry and, therefore, at expanding its international markets. 
The Council consider that the creation of a national aeronautical council in each of the member 
countries concerned might help to initiate concerted action at national level by the various interests 
concerned with aeronautical questions. At the same time such national councils might duplicate the 
work of other institutions and their establishment does not seem to be essential as a first step. 
2. From this standpoint, the idea of setting up a special European institution to promote the policy 
of concerted action referred to above has its merits. However, in the present state of the aeronautical 
industry in Europe, its problems are unlikely to be resolved by such an institution. Moreover, its 
establishment seems out of the question until major progress has been made towards European union. 
Consequently, while taking note of the Assembly's recommendation on this point, the Council 
feel that it is too soon to consider setting up a European aeronautical council, based on national aeronautical 
councils. Such institutions would at present simply be superimposed on existing administrations without, 
it would appear, substantially improving the situation of the European aircraft industries. 
(a) The development of new aeronautical manufacturing programmes and the marketing of large 
civil aircraft would involve finding a market wider than that available in Europe. 
(b) As regards setting up European machinery for financing exports, the Assembly will appreciate 
that any such move would appear to be at least premature in Europe, in view of the frequently divergent 
interests of the members of the Community and the differences which are particularly evident at the 
moment between their economic and monetary situations. 
The Council therefore feel that it would be better at present to limit action to the encouragement 
of joint activities on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements for the production and marketing 
of particular items of equipment. 
(c) On the special problem of Concorde, the Council share the Assembly's interest in this example 
of European co-operation in aircraft production, but can only observe that, in current circumstances, 
the continuation of this programme beyond the commitments entered into by the French and British 
partners cannot be guaranteed. A final decision on this subject should however be possible when full 
data on the operation of the supersonic aircraft are available, and the routes on which it can fly have 
been decided. Furthermore, a clearer indication of the sales prospects for the aircraft should be awaited. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1976. 
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(d) The Council nevertheless favour any move to harmonise national aeronautical policies. They 
believe that a pragmatic approach should be adopted in the matter. For exa.mple, there may well be 
scope for the creation of a Western European agency responsible for airworthiness, and this might in 
due course assume other functions in connection with air safety. As a first step, national rules for 
airworthiness should be harmonised. 
(e) In present circumstances however they feel it would be unrealistic to consider formulating a joint 
European air transport policy or adopting a joint European position in negotiations with the rest of the 
world. 
3. The Council recognise the need for member countries to determine their military aircraft require-
ments and study the question jointly. On the other hand, as the independent European programme 
group is already in existence, with tasks which include military aircraft problems, they feel that there 
is no need to promote the creation of a special study group in WEU. 
4. Finally, the aims which the Assembly suggests for inclusion in the future Eurocontrol convention, 
which is at present under re-examination, should not be overlooked as a means of strengthening 
co-operation between member States in the matter of equipment, techniques and research. Here again, 
however, it would appear too soon to consider concerted action between partners who do not share the 
same interests within the convention. 
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RECOMMENDATION 290 1 
on reserve forces 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow: 
(a) a. considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies ; 
(b) European defence to be based to a. substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobi-
lisation of the people's energies in the event of attack ; 
(ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a. 
modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a. people's deterrent, expressing the will of the 
peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies ; 
(iii) Aware of the importance of the rOle which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the 
European peoples a.nd their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the import-
ance of defence problems ; 
(iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent 
active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even 
diminish a.nd when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces a.re continuously increasing 
to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes ; 
(v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in 
Europe, in the framework of a. common strategy for all the Western European States, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. (a) Together with the member States of the Atlantic Alliance which a.re not members of WEU, 
specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system : nuclear 
forces, combat forces, internal defence forces ; 
(b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces a.nd combat forces with 
a. view to harmonising the concepts of European States in this field ; 
2. To this end, set up a. group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely 
to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory a.nd inter alia consider 
the possibility of : 
(a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly 
where there is no system of conscription ; 
(b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity 
and robustness, a.nd ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1976 during the First Part of the Twenty.Second Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 707). 
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(c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal 
defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and 
on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks ; 
(d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence 
and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number 
of training periods at regular intervals ; 
(e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of 
national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence ; 
(f) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate ; 
3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces 
and inter alia seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their 
mobilisation ; 
(b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and 
immediate use of reserve units in the field forces ; 
4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and 
reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern 
the use of reserves in Europe. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 290 
Those member countries of WEU which participate in the integrated command structure of NATO 
consider that existing contacts within that framework with regard to the nature of the tasks assigned to 
the various components of the European defence system meet the concern expressed by the Assembly. 
The reserve requirements of the internal defence forces and of the combat forces are dependent 
upon the size of the forces and the form of peacetime military service. Since the systems necessarily vary 
from one country to another, it is questionable whether harmonisation would be possible or even useful in 
this field. 
In view of the above, the setting-up of a group of experts, as proposed by the Assembly, does not 
appear to fulfil an actual need. The Council therefore regret that they cannot agree with the Assembly on 
this point. 
The Council consider that the establishment of a European Defence College, where the experience of 
reserve officers and those responsible for defence would be compared, is not in line with present require-
ments as understood by the competent authorities of the member countries. 
1. Communicated to the .Assembly on 25th October 1976. 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. This report is presented in a different man-
ner from previous reports in the hope that it will 
prove more interesting reading. 
2. The terms of reference of the Committee 
- which was only a working party until 1968 -
are that it should submit a twice-yearly report on 
its activities and on action taken in the parlia-
ments of member States and other relevant 
institutions on the basis of the work of the WEU 
Assembly and its texts and another report on 
European activities in parliaments. 
3. Since then, the Committee has submitted to 
the Assembly studies on parliamentary methods 
and activities and in particular on parliamentary 
activities and powers at European level, for 
instance in the series of reports submitted by 
Mr. Peronnet (Documents 555, 570 and 585) on 
regional parliaments and a further series (Docu-
ments 600 and 614) on members of national, 
European and regional parliaments. 
4. Your Rapporteur now wishes to outline the 
position of parliamentarians vis-a-vis infor-
mation available in parliaments, the first chapter 
being entitled "Members of parliament and 
defence". The second chapter will deal with 
parliamentary action on texts adopted by the 
WEU Assembly. The following recommendations 
were selected by the Committee for transmission 
to the presidents of the chambers of member 
countries: 
- 285 on the political activities of the 
Council; 
- 288 on security in the Mediterranean ; 
- 289 on European aeronautical policy ; 
- 290 on reserve forces. 
5. Moreover, before the June 1976 session, the 
Committee had already agreed that questions 
should be put on Resolution 59 on European 
union and WEU and Recommendation 287 on 
improving the status of WEU staff. 
I. Members of parliament and defence 
6. An assembly such as that of WEU is a 
privileged forum to which parliamentarians from 
122 
member States can bring valuable, concrete 
information on the state of defence in their own 
countries from which the broad lines of a Euro-
pean defence policy can be worked out for sub-
mission to national executives. 
7. Your Rapporteur therefore considered it 
useful and necessary to study the role of parlia-
mentarians in the defence policy of each member 
country and ascertain the means available to 
him for fulfilling this rOle. From that basis, it 
would perhaps be possible to decide how a 
national parliamentarian can handle defence 
matters at European level and what contribution 
he should make to plans for European security. 
8. Many members of the WEU Assembly have 
been enthusiastically dealing with defence mat-
ters for years. With various means, but above all 
with faith and enthusiasm, they have been 
tackling all these matters from the most 
pragmatic angle, which is no doubt an element 
of the realism shown in the Assembly's studies 
and recommendations. The aim of the study now 
before the Assembly is not to "theorise" about 
this realism but on the contrary to make it more 
effective by making us aware of the contri-
butions we can make to Europe and also 
exchange. 
9. The time available to your Rapporteur was 
too short for him to expand and develop these 
considerations in full. He therefore proposes 
to submit a plan for study and research which 
he intends to complete with the assistance of 
fellow members. 
10. The next report will give the results of this 
enquiry and seek to set out a few guidelines for 
improving our work. Proper co-ordination of 
defence problems must be based on co-ordinated 
democratic action by representatives of the 
nations of Europe which are members of WEU. 
(i) The member of parliament's scope in defence 
matters 
11. At first sight, defence does not appear to 
be any different from other legislative or 
political subjects and therefore seems to come 
within the general scope of members of parlia-
ment. Closer study shows that in almost all 
political systems defence occupies a specific place 
in the constitutional order. 
12. It is thus possible, by examining the various 
traditional duties of members of parliament, to 
see what place they occupy in national security 
matters in each country. 
13. Parliamentary powers definitely form a 
whole and it is arbitrary - although traditional 
- to divide them up. Nevertheless it is a fairly 
practical approach to take each aspect separately. 
14. It is customary to distinguish three parlia-
mentary functions : legislation, supervision, 
information. For each country, therefore, the 
extent and importance of the role of members 
of parliament in the exercise of these functions 
in the very specific sector of defence will be 
assessed. 
(ii) Legislation 
15. In most European countries, defence is con-
sidered an essential prerogative of government in 
view of its continuing nature, speed of imple-
mentation and magnitude of the means involved. 
Most constitutions, written or unwritten, make 
the Head of State or of Government responsible 
for defence with supreme command over the 
armed forces. This is the case in France, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and Italy, and also 
in the United States. 
16. However, the development of parliamentary 
democracy in the last 150 years has led to the 
powers of the executive being limited to the 
strict field of defining and setting in motion 
the military means of defence. Because defence 
involves the use of force, places at stake the 
very life of the nation and constraints upon the 
population, it must be made subject to rules 
which guarantee its effectiveness without it 
becoming a threat to democratic institutions. 
17. The role now incumbent on parliaments, and 
thus their members, has therefore developed in 
three legislative respects : 
( i) prior authorisation to the government 
to set in motion the military aspect 
of defence; 
( ii) definition of conditions in which the 
population may be called upon to 
defend their country ; 
( iii) the status, rights and duties of regular 
servicemen. 
18. Preliminary information obtained by your 
Rapporteur on these three points shows that 
solutions, and thus the role of members of par-
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liament, differ widely from one country to 
another. They will be studied in detail in the 
next report. Parliamentary authorisation for 
declaration of war, for instance, varies con-
siderably and has been affected radically by the 
formation of nuclear deterrent forces. 
19. As regards the defence obligations of the 
population, the prescribed responsibilities of 
members of parliament vary from country to 
country, as also for the status of servicemen. 
Here too, where fundamental freedoms are con-
cerned, a comparative study may prove interest-
ing. 
(iii) Supervision 
20. Insofar as action on defence matters is 
essentially a matter for the government, parlia-
ments have given priority to supervision. This 
is where members of parliament individually or 
collectively have important duties. 
21. There are two aspects to supervision: poli-
tical, linked with supervision of government 
action as a whole, and administrative, to verify 
the efficiency and realism of defence activities. 
22. Here too procedure in the various western 
countries, although there are many points in 
common, involves original solutions which should 
be studied in greater detail. 
23. The scope of members of parliament is both 
varied and important, ranging from the apparent 
absence of any organised means in the United 
Kingdom to the role played by the parliamentary 
commissioner for the armed forces in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, not to speak of the special 
powers of the defence committees in States such 
as France, Italy, Belgium, the Federal Republic, 
etc. Interesting lessons may certainly be drawn 
at European level for improving the conditions 
in which the action of members of parliament 
is exercised in defence matters. 
(iv) Information 
24. Finally, although there is little provision for 
this in constitutional texts, the information role 
of members of parliament in a modern democracy 
is on the increase. 
25. Your Rapporteur sees three fundamental 
aspects: 
(a) At national level, members of parlia-
ment are a privileged contact with 
defence policy whose various aspects 
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and technical organisation are not well-
known to the public that often bears 
the heaviest burden. Defence, or the 
need for defence, is almost always the 
subject of a general consensus, and 
members of parliament with sovereign 
power must maintain this consensus 
throughout the nation. 
How can this be done ? Here again the 
solutions adopted by each WEU State 
deserve consideration at European level. 
(b) Still at national level, members of par-
liament also have the privilege of con-
veying the nation's feelings on defence 
matters to the executive. 
The defence apparatus is inherently 
cumbersome and difficult to change. 
In expressing the desires and feelings 
of the people, members of parliament 
must urge the executive to keep a perma-
nent watch on its thinking and the 
means of implementing its policies. 
To take only France as an example 
today, the action taken before the war 
by President Paul Reynaud in favour 
of an armoured force may be recalled 
or more recently that of a large number 
of members of parliament from all 
parties for adapting the conditions of 
national service to the present state 
of society. Changes in rules governing 
military discipline, improved conditions 
of military service, the revalorisation 
of regular servicemen's careers and the 
introduction of the status of conscien-
tious objector - all these measures 
adopted in recent years originated in 
demands by members of parliament 
voicing the changing public attitude 
towards the operation of the machinery 
of defence. Each country has had to face 
these problems of adaptation and it 
seems appropriate to study the role 
of members of parliament in this adap-
tation. 
(c) Finally, information plays a primordial 
role at European level. In the WEU 
countries, there are two apparently 
contradictory aspects to defence. It 
must be national in order to set its 
roots in the deepest community feelings 
of the population and remain a true 
expression of independence and free-
dom. It must also be European to be 
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fully effective in face of the crushing 
strength of the possible threat. 
Who can better ensure a link and co-
ordination between these two aspects 
than the parliamentarians who have 
been apointed by their respective par-
liaments to form the WEU Assembly T 
Admittedly, they have been playing this 
role ever since the Assembly came into 
existence and as an example your Rap-
porteur will merely mention the action 
pursued for years by the late Pierre 
de Montesquiou with a view to establish-
ing a co-ordinated European aircraft 
and space industry. 
26. The role of members of parliament at the 
European level of defence could probably gain 
in breadth and effectiveness if account were 
taken of their role at national level. 
27. This will be your Rapporteur's final aim 
at the conclusion of his proposed study. 
28. A study of the role of members of parlia-
ment in defence should take us back to the 
fundamental principles on which WEU is based, 
i.e. democracy, which implies freedom, national 
independence and European solidarity. 
U. Action taken on texts adopted 
29. Reports on the activities of WEU- whether 
emanating from governments or prepared by 
delegations - have continued to appear fairly 
regularly in France 1 and Germany 2 • It should 
be noted that as requested by the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments the document pre-
pared by the German Delegation now lists at 
the beginning the texts selected for transmission 
to member countries and gives the full text in 
German. Moreover, the annual report on Euro-
pean activities prepared by the Parliamentary 
Committee for European Affairs in Italy 8, 
included a report on the activities of WEU in 
1975. 
30. The Committee secretariat has recorded 
interventions on seven recommendations : 
- 264 on the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons; 
- 268 on the European Space Agency ; 
1. National Assembly Document 2470, Senate Docu-
ment 358, National Assembly Bulletin and Senate Bulletin. 
2. Documents 7/4985 and 7 /5564. 
3. Document 4-4 bis A. 
- 275 on United States-European co-
operation in advanced technology ; 
- 285 on the political activities of the 
Council of WEU ; 
- 287 on improving the status of WEU 
staff; 
- 289 on European aeronautical policy ; 
- 290 on reserve forces ; 
and on Resolution 59 on European union and 
WEU. 
31. All these interventions were given in full 
in Collected Texts 24 1 • 
32. During the same period, the Committee 
recorded interventions in plenary debates as 
follows: 
(i) House of Lords (United Kingdom) 
33. On 29th April 1976, Baroness Vickers 
referred to WEU during a speech on the defence 
estimates. 
34. On 12th May, a debate was held on WEU 
and the Council of Europe. This debate, in 
which four speakers and a member of the govern-
ment took part, dealt with the situation, problems 
and activities of these European organisations. 
Only the passages on WEU are given in Col-
lected Texts 24. 
(ii) National Assembly (France) 
35. On 20th May 1976, Mr. Riviere spoke during 
the debate on the military programme for 1977-
82, but unfortunately without eliciting a response 
from the government. 
36. On 25th May, the President of the WEU 
Assembly, Mr. Nessler, and your Rapporteur 
spoke at length in the same debate and received 
a reply from Mr. Yvon Bourges, Minister of 
Defence. 
37. On 9th June, Mr. Riviere spoke again on 
French defence policy and the Minister gave 
his opinion. 
(iii) Senate (France) 
38. On 4th June 1976, Mr. Peridier asked why 
France did not take part in the conference on 
limiting nuclear weapons and Mr. Destremau, 
1. So as not to overburden this report, your Rapporteur 
thought it preferable not to give a complete list of inter· 
ventions as in his earlier report. Furthermore, a number 
of replies have not yet reached the Office of the Clerk. 
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then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
replied. 
39. On 15th June, Mr. Grangier raised the 
question of WEU and the Tindemans report. 
* 
** 
40. All these interventions are given in Collected 
Texts 24 but your Rapporteur wished to under-
line them since they represent a major effort 
by members of the Assembly to make WEU 
known during debates which are given wider 
publicity than written questions, to which 
answers are given in writing and consequently 
pass unnoticed by parliamentarians who are not 
members of the WEU Assembly. 
41. The Committee is gratified that these ins-
tances have been recorded and urges the various 
delegations to take advantage of debates on 
defence, foreign policy, budgets, etc., to have 
their members speak on matters dealt with by 
the WEU Assembly. 
42. Finally, your Rapporteur is happy to 
announce that the total number of interventions 
was the same as in the first six months (fifty-
six). The total for the year is therefore over a 
hundred and Appendix I to this report shows 
that the drop recorded in 1970-74 has been 
followed by a return to the more normal situation 
of previous years. 
m. Activities of the Committee 
43. The Committee visited the Belgian Parlia-
ment on 25th and 26th November 1976. It made 
a wide-ranging review of regional and cultural 
problems, with the participation of MM. Hulpiau, 
J anssens and Lepaffe, Chairmen of the Flemish, 
W alloon and Brussels Councils respectively, and 
was received in Hasselt by Mr. Leynen of the 
newspaper Het Belang van Limburg and by the 
Burgomaster, Professor Paul A. J. Meyers, 
former Minister and former Chairman of the 
Committee. The text of the addresses by 
MM. Hulpiau, Janssens and Lepaffe is given at 
Appendix III (b). 
Conclusions 
44. However dynamic the Committee may be, 
it cannot be forgotten that WEU's handicap is 
not attributable to its Assembly but to the fact 
that member governments make scant use of the 
possibilities afforded by the treaty. In its recom-
mendations, the Assembly is constantly drawing 
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the Council's attention to the need to exercise 
its responsibilities in ensuring Europe's security. 
But these recommendations are not followed up 
since in most cases the governments are not 
prepared to pursue joint action in foreign policy 
and defence matters where the Assembly con-
siders such action necessary. 
45. It is therefore felt that the greatest reward 
for the Committee's action would be to make the 
governments realise that WEU constitutes the 
future shape of a European union with respon-
sibilities in foreign policy and defence matters. 
It is the duty of parliamentarians to bring 
pressure to bear in this sense during debates on 
foreign policy or defence in the respective par-
liaments. 
46. The Assembly must instruct all its com-
mittees, and particularly the Defence Committee, 
to remind governments continually that WEU 
provides the institutional framework for consul-
tations on Europe's security in every field -
military, political or industrial - where its 
security may be threatened. 
4 7. It is obviously not possible to forget the 
existence of other groups with similar responsi-
bilities, but this is no reason to neglect the task 
incumbent on the WEU Council and its subsi-
diary bodies, particularly the Standing Arma-
ments Committee. 
48. Once the committees have completed their 
work and the Assembly has voted, the work of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
begins. 
49. The Committee must first ensure that new 
members of delegations are fully informed. This 
is an immediate problem. The Italian Delegation 
was appointed in October 1976. Only four of 
its thirty-six members were already members of 
the Assembly. A new German Delegation will 
be appointed at the beginning of 1977. The new 
members must be prepared for their future 
tasks. 
50. It is customary to send new members an 
information booklet on the WEU Assembly pre-
pared by the Press Counsellor and other docu-
ments. This documentation might be completed 
and more easily absorbed if the chairman of 
the delegation concerned were to organise a 
meeting with the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments shortly after the formation of a new 
delegation. Thus new members would be 
acquainted with the positions adopted by the 
WEU Assembly and would have an oportunity 
of asking detailed questions about the Assembly's 
methods of work. 
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51. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments must extend its action beyond parlia-
mentary circles by helping to keep the press in 
member countries informed about Western Euro-
pean Union and the problems it tackles. It might 
therefore encourage national delegations, perhaps 
in liaison with the Press Counsellor, to organise 
conferences with the participation of Rappor-
teurs who are members of the delegation con-
cerned. Such conferences would probably have 
greater significance if they were held either 
after the adoption of reports by the committees, 
but before the debate in plenary sitting, or 
immediately after sessions in order to draw 
attention to the positions adopted by members of 
the delegation during the debates. 
52. If the ideas expressed by the WEU Assem-
bly are to gain a foothold in the parliaments of 
member countries, the people must know what 
they are and ask their members of parliament 
to introduce them into national legislation. But 
this cannot be done unless the Committee and 
the Press Counsellor have made the facts known 
to them. 
53. The Press Counsellor might transmit to the 
appropriate press media interventions or ques-
tions concerning the activities of the Assembly 
(he should be given the list of newspapers con-
cerned). Such action would not automatically 
lead to publication, particularly in view of the 
probable time-lag, but it would make the work 
of members known in their constituencies. 
54. These are merely suggestions which would 
require the active assistance of secretariats of 
national delegations, but some might perhaps 
be considered. 
55. Resolutions 45 and 49 and Orders 35 and 
44 in 1970, 1971 and 1974 urged that procedure 
for hearings - of Assembly Rapporteurs, for 
instance - be introduced in foreign and Euro-
pean affairs committees and that relations with 
parliaments be pursued, intensified and, if pos-
sible, extended to other interested institutions 1 • 
56. Your Rapporteur feels that one task of 
national delegations might be to arrange such 
hearings and another to promote relations 
between the Assembly and parliaments. The Com-
mittee proposes that its Chairman - and perhaps 
the Rapporteur - accompanied by the Secretary 
take part in a meeting of each delegation in 
order to establish such procedure. 
1. See also Document 506, pages 4 and 5, 15th April 
1970. 
APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
~ 
Recommendations lf ~ ~ adopted in ~ al a Cl ~ 0 :§> ~ 1 1l e~ ... ...::: al ~ ~ ~ ~ ... al 
'i's ...:l z 
~ 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4 14 9 11 1 5 
1965 0 11 12 24 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 8 19 3 11 
1976 4 27 9 6 0 3 
Total 65 178 185 243 16 87 
Annual average 3.17 8.68 9.02 11.90 0.78 4.24 
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~ 
Sh 
~ Total 
"0 
CIJ ;<;: 
1:1 p 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 57 
197 971 
9.61 6.77 
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APPENDIX II 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on te.xfs adopted since June 1914 
-~ .s .s a .cl ~ "0~ ~~ r 1 .g :i ~ ~ ~ ~ l bll ~-~ ~ .s ~ 0 i ~ l .si -~ ]f ]l ! 1 1:: J ~ ~~ 1-4 ll "0 ~ li l1.l lXI ] ~ ~ z ... ·a ~p.. f':4 p 
---
--
260 -
261 -
262 2 2 4 8 
263 2 2 
264 2 2 
265 -
June 266 X 4 2 6 28 
1975 267 
-
268 2 2 
269 X 2 2 4 
270 X 2 2 
271 -
272 X 2 2 
273 X 2 1 3 6 
274 X 2 2 1 5 
275 4 4 
276 X 2 1 3 
277 -
278 
-
Dec. 279 
-
1975 280 
-
281 
- 54 
282 
-
283 
-
Res. 55 2 1 3 2 8 
Res. 56 
-Res. 57 
-
Res. 58 
-
Other action 2 17 4 1 1 2 1 28 
Res. 59 2 4 2 8 
284 
-
285 X 3 2 1 6 
June 286 
-
1976 287 2 2 1 1 2 8 57 
288 X 
-
289 X 1 2 2 5 
290 X 2 1 3 
Other action 2 15 3 1 6 27 
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APPENDIX Ill 
(a) Visits by the Committee for Relatio'tlll with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 
lOth October 1963 
11th-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-1st November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th March 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd Ma.y 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28th Oct.ober 1975 
11th-12th 11a.y 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
Berlin (Regional parliament of La.nd Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Ha.gue 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Helier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
Pa.lermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
(b) Statements on regionalisation in Belgium 
The Presidents of the three regional coun-
cils each addressed the Committee on a specific 
aspect of regionalisation : 
(i) Statement by Mr. Hulpiaa, President of the 
Flemish Regional Council 
I shall try to explain to you how regionali-
sation in Belgium has reached its present stage 
and how its various institutions work. Mr. Hulpiau, President of the Flemish Regional Council, described the background to 
regionalisation in Belgium ; 
Mr. Janssens, President of the Walloon 
Regional Council, explained the organisation 
and functioning of the regional councils ; 
Mr. Lepaffe, President of the Brussels 
Regional Council, spoke about future prospects 
for regionalisation in Belgium. 
5 - Ill 
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I shall start with three preliminary remarks: 
First, regionalisation in Belgium has a long 
history behind it and I do not think it is useful 
for our colleagues to hear the full background 
to the present situation. Second, please bear in 
mind that regionalisation is not complete. It is 
at an intermediary stage on the way to other 
solutions, i.e. we are now in a developing situa-
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tion. Third, it is also important to note that 
regionalisation in Belgium is only part of a much 
wider problem which we call State reform and 
it is therefore only one chapter in a much vaster 
undertaking. 
I will start with the aim of this State reform 
but, as I said, I will not go into its history 
because it has been in preparation for years and 
years : basically, it is a redistribution of political 
power, a new, a different breakdown. So far, we 
have lived in a State which has been and still 
is called a unified one, with considerable powers 
centralised with the central authority. 
When we speak about redistributing political 
power, we mean two directions in particular : 
on the one hand towards the cultural com-
munities, of which there are three in Belgium : 
Flemish, French and German, and on the other 
towards the regions, of which there are also 
three : Flemish (in the north), W alloon (south) 
and Brussels (centre). The redistribution of 
political power is thus being directed either 
towards the communities or towards the regions. 
The subject of these reforms was laid down 
in the constitutional revision held in Belgium in 
1970. Here, it is essential to remember that : 
First, redistribution of political power in 
favour of the cultural communities is a closed 
chapter in that we have cultural councils which 
have the necessary powers to legislate. 
This is not so for the redistribution of politi-
cal powers in favour of the regions in that this is 
governed by Article 107 quater of the Consti-
tution. This new constitutional article makes 
provision first for the establishment of three 
regions in Belgium : Flemish, W alloon and Brus-
sels area ; second, for the composition of these 
bodies it lays down only that they shall be 
composed of elected representatives. Reference 
is also made without further details to the bodies 
which must be set up for the purposes of 
regionalisation and, in the same article, to the 
responsibilities of these regional bodies ratione 
materiae. It stipulates that these regional coun-
cils may settle - this is vague - a number of 
matters, but excluding linguistic and cultural 
problems which are the responsibility of the 
cultural councils. 
Article 107 quater also makes provision -
and this is important if you are to understand 
what follows - for procedure for the practical 
application or completion of the general idea of 
the special majority in parliament for voting the 
laws of implementation referred to in Article 
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107 quater. These laws must be passed and 
require a special majority in parliament. 
After the constitutional revision, there were 
difficulties and periods of crisis at govern-
mental level and at a certain moment we 
managed to start up again with a government 
which, on the one hand, had the task of pursuing 
regionalisation and on the other hand had to take 
account of this special majority. But on the basis 
of the parties supporting the government the 
majority is not sufficient to meet procedural 
requirements, i.e. the present majority does not 
have the quorum needed to ensure this special 
majority. So, in view of the fact that regionali-
sation had to be pursued but not having the 
special majority, a successful search was made 
for procedure which is not further to or in 
application of Article 107 quater - this being 
impossible because the special majority did not 
exist - i.e. not final or full regionalisation but 
provisional and limited regionalisation. Provi-
sional regionalisation could be voted by an 
ordinary majority. 
So you can see the difficulty facing us : to 
continue with regionalisation but realising that 
we were not able implement it in the form 
provided for in Article 107 quater. An attempt 
was then made to move in a provisional, limited 
way towards regionalisation. The law of 1st 
August 1974 established the present form of 
regionalisation by ordinary majority. 
This law first provides for three regions in 
Belgium and, as organs of regionalisation, 
regional councils and ministerial committees. 
Regional councils are composed hie et nunc 
exclusively of senators from the Flemish or 
W alloon region for the Flemish or W alloon 
Councils. The Brussels Regional Council is com-
posed of senators from the Brussels region and 
councillors from the Brussels Urban Council. 
Two features of these councils are their pro-
visional nature and their exclusively consultative 
powers. 
At present, therefore, regional councils may 
not legislate or take statutory or normative 
measures. All they can do is give opinions. 
I personally consider this at one and the 
same time a little and a lot. A little in that we 
can only give opinions - and if you want to 
know what an opinion is worth I can tell you 
that that depends on what happens to it 
afterwards - but at the same time a lot because 
of the subjects on which regional councils may 
express opinions either on their own initiative 
or at the request of the government. The law even 
provides for cases when it is compulsory to 
ask for the council's opinion. 
The list of subjects contained in the law of 
1st August 1974 is very long. What is important 
is that the regional councils can express opinions 
- I repeat, on their own initiative or at the 
request of the government - wherever a dif-
ferentiated policy is wholly or partly justified 
according to region : for instance housing 
family and demographic policy, wate; problems: 
industrial and energy policy problems, com-
munal structural problems, etc. 
All these are listed, and I must say that 
the field is a vast one. For all these subjects we 
can take the initiative as soon as we see there 
is a reason to pursue a differentiated policy in 
Flanders, Brussels or Wallonia. 
The other regionalisation organs are the 
ministerial committees. There are three, one for 
each region, and their responsibilities too are 
laid down by law. These ministerial commit-
tees are in a way the executive power for all 
matters on which regional councils express 
opinions in that they may table royal decrees or 
where appropriate take action in parliament by 
transforming the councils' opinions into bills. 
A peculiarity of our country is therefore that 
in order to settle matters specific to the regions 
there is always an independent ministerial com-
mittee. 
Third, the same law also has a very 
important financial chapter because, when 
dealing with regional policy, provision must also 
be made for the necessary resources. Each year 
the government makes provision for what I will 
call overall appropriations made available to the 
regional councils for pursuing a regional policy. 
In the general State budget there is therefore 
an overall amount allocated for financing all 
action and projects in one region or another. 
The overall amount is divided between the 
three regions on the basis of three criteria : the 
population of each region ; the size of each 
region ; sums received from income tax, each 
criterion representing exactly one-third. 
When these sums are handed over to the 
different regions, the ministerial committee 
decides on how they shall be allocated and what 
use shall be made of them within the regional 
budgets. In the framework of the general State 
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budget, there are therefore three elements which 
are intended for the exclusive use of one region 
or another. 
The regional councils also give their opinion 
on the use of these amounts in that, when 
proposals are made by the ministerial com-
mittee, the regional council may suggest 
changes. 
I think that, without going into details, I 
have described the main aspects of the origins 
and position reached in regionalisation in Bel-
gium. 
(ii) Statement by Mr. Janssens, President of the 
Walloon Regional Council 
Mr. Hulpiau has just described to you the 
background and contents of the law of 1st August 
197 4 setting up regional institutions prior to the 
application of Article 107 quater of the Consti-
tution. We shall now deal with the implemen-
tation of this law. 
The legislator left regional councillors much 
latitude for the organisation and functioning 
of the assemblies. The question of the date and 
place for convening, opening and closing ses-
sions of the assemblies was dealt with by the 
ministerial committee on institutional reforms. 
The discussions revealed the tendencies and main 
lines which guided the various ministers, parti-
cularly ~he Ministers for Institutional Reforms, 
Mr. Perm and Mr. Vandekerckhove. 
Mr. Perin's cabinet proposed the text of a 
royal decree defining only the provisions neces-
sary for setting up the W alloon Regional Coun-
cil. This text was submitted to the State Council 
for its opinion. Its view was that "this insti-
tution was not an organ of the administration 
whose organisation and procedure the King 
would have the power to settle as head of the 
executive". 
Mr. Vandekerckhove's cabinet drafted a 
more elaborate royal decree containing the same 
provisions for the organisation and procedure of 
the Flemish Regional Council. This text also 
provided that the staff of the Cultuurraad 
(Cultural Council of the Flemish Community) 
would take on the same tasks as the Flemish 
Regional Council. Here there is a fundamental 
difference compared with the proposed royal 
decree on the W alloon Regional Council, which 
makes no provision in this sense. 
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The text prepared by Mr. Vanden Boey-
nants' cabinet for the Brussels Regional Council 
contained the same provisions on procedure as 
the other two as regards the opening sitting, i.e. 
it would be presided by the oldest member, 
assisted by the two youngest members of the 
assembly, and a bureau composed of a president, 
vice-president and secretaries would be elected by 
the assembly. 
At the end of October 1974, the cabinet 
of the Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, tabled in 
the Council of Ministers a motion for a royal 
decree common to the three regional councils ; it 
was dated 12th November 1974 and settled 
problems affecting the functioning of future 
assemblies and council meetings, the opening and 
closing of sessions, the qualifications of members 
of the council and the presence of the executive. 
This royal decree was followed by three 
others convening the assemblies for their· opening 
sittings. It was decided to hold these sittings on 
26th November 1974, the Brussels Regional 
Council meeting in Brussels, the Flemish 
Regional Council in Malines and the W alloon 
Regional Council in Namur. The composition of 
the regional councils was described in the pre-
vious address. 
The Walloon Regional Council is composed 
of sixty-two senators resident in Wallonia. Since 
yesterday, the original political breakdown has 
been changed and the council is now composed 
of twenty-five Socialists, fourteen Social Chris-
tians, seventeen Liberals, five Walloon Unionists 
and one Independent (UDP). 
The Flemish Regional Council is composed 
of ninety-two senators resident in Flanders of 
whom forty-seven belong to the Christian Social 
Party, twenty-two to the Belgian Socialist Party, 
fourteen to the People's Union Party and 
fourteen to the Freedom and Progress Party. 
The composition of the Brussels Regional 
Council is rather different, since it includes 
twenty-one senators resident in the Brussels 
administrative district and forty-two members 
of the Brussels Urban Council, appointed for 
each linguistic group in proportion to its political 
representation in the Urban Council. 
In application of the law on preparatory 
regionalisation, the opening sittings of the 
regional councils were held on 26th November 
1974, when the leaders of the socialist groups 
in each council expressed in various terms their 
refusal to take part in preparatory regionali-
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sation. The socialist groups then left the sittings, 
their leaders declaring that the establishment of 
regional councils was merely intended to give 
the impression that regionalisation was under 
way. The other political groups nevertheless 
decided to put preparatory regionalisation to the 
test. 
Each council then elected its bureau and 
appointed working groups to draw up the inter-
nal regulations for each regional council. 
The second body set up by the law of 
1st August 1974 is the ministerial committee for 
regional affairs, the executive organ of each 
region during the preparatory regionalisation 
stage. Article 9 of that law provides that the 
three ministerial committees for regional affairs 
shall be set up by royal decree discussed in the 
Council of Ministers. This provision stipulates 
that the Ministerial Committee for Brussels 
Affairs shall include secretaries of State, one of 
whom must belong to a different linguistic group 
from the presiding minister. 
The implementation of this article neces-
sitated a change in the structure of Mr. Tinde-
mans' government which had been formed before 
the vote on preparatory regionalisation. This 
change was made on 4th October 1974. 
Certain ministers and secretaries of State 
were made responsible for questions where a 
differentiated regional policy is wholly or partly 
justified. J!'or this purpose, they were attached 
to their minister for regional affairs. 
The composition of the three ministerial 
committees is laid down in the royal decree of 
8th October 1974. The structure of the Walloon 
and Flemish Ministerial Committees is as fol-
lows : a minister for regional affairs, who chairs 
the committee; two ministers (education and 
institutional reforms) ; secretaries of State, 
deputies to the ministers for regional affairs. 
The structure of the Brussels Ministerial Com-
mittee is different : a minister for regional 
affairs assisted by two secretaries of State. 
The law of 1st August stipulates that each 
ministerial committee shall be chaired by the 
minister for regional affairs. Moreover, the law 
also lays down that deliberations in these com-
mittees are collegiate and in the event of dis-
agreement the matter shall be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers. 
A royal decree of 19th November 1974 
organises the ministerial committees for regional 
affairs by defining the role of the chairman, 
procedure for considering different matters and 
liaison with the government. 
The royal decree of 20th November 197 4 
defined the responsibilities of the ministers for 
regional affairs and the regional secretaries of 
State. 
Each minister for regional affairs has addi-
tional duties to those he already exercises as 
chairman of the regional ministerial committee : 
he must also ensure co-ordination of the policy 
of his ministerial committee for regional affairs 
in regional matters and ensure that the regula-
tions and decisions of the regional secretaries of 
State conform to the government's general 
policy. 
The secretaries of State have statutory 
powers only with the agreement of the ministers 
to whom they are attached. Any motion for a 
statutory decree on regionalised matters is 
submitted by the minister for regional affairs to 
the national minister responsible for this matter 
at national level. 
A series of royal decrees determines which 
areas of ministerial responsibility warrant a dif-
ferentiated regional policy in whole or in part. 
Some matters may be fully regionalised, housing 
for instance. Other matters are regionalised as 
a whole with certain limited exceptions : rural 
regrouping, forestry, fishing and hunting, and 
regional planning. 
For other matters which are partially 
regionalised, royal decrees determine the limits 
of regional action. This is the case for family 
and demographic policy, hygiene, health, 
employment policy, immigrant workers, regional 
economic expansion, industrial and energy 
policy, economic expansion and the promotion of 
the middle classes. 
It should be noted that a royal decree of 
lOth December 1974 changed the composition of 
the Ministerial Committee for W alloon Affairs. 
The Minister for Institutional Reforms left the 
ministerial committee whereas the Secretary of 
State for Water Policy became a member. 
The ministerial committees for regional 
affairs met for the first time in November 1974 
before the regional councils had started work: 
They now meet regularly to consider regional 
matters. 
Mr. Hulpiau spoke to you earlier about the 
breakdown of overall appropriations which is I 
would remind you, as follows : ' 
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( i) one-third according to the population 
of each region ; 
( ii) one-third according to the size of each 
region; 
( iii) one-third according to the sums 
received from income tax in each 
region. 
Each year, the percentage for each region 
varies since the calculation is based on the latest 
figures laid down by royal decree determined 
in the Council of Ministers. After this break-
down, each committee for regional affairs 
proposes the allocation of budgetary estimates 
to cover expenditure on the regional policy it 
will pursue. After obtaining the opinion of the 
relevant regional council, each draft regional 
budget is submitted to the bureaux of the 
chambers. This procedure allows appropriate 
action to be implemented in each region in the 
light of the course to be followed, more or less 
importance being attached to certain estimates 
in relation to the share which each region 
previously received from the national budget. 
The last problem to be tackled in imple-
menting preparatory regionalisation is the 
regionalisation of administration. 
The government had a choice between 
keeping the officials responsible for regional 
affairs within existing departments or setting 
up three regional ministerial departments. 
At a meeting of the Council of Ministers 
on 5th November 1976, the government decided 
to give ministers with regional responsibilities 
their own administrative services. This measure 
concerns more than two thousand officials. The 
idea of setting up simple regional administrative 
cells within existing administrations has been 
abandoned. The case of the future Brussels 
administration will be submitted to the Council 
of State, which will have to decide whether 
these services should be considered as national 
or regional. 
(iii) Statement by Mr. Lepaffe, President of the 
Brussels Regional Council 
You have heard about the background and 
organisation of regionalisation and I will now 
review results. They are obviously recent since 
our regional councils have been meeting regu-
larly only since November 1974. As you have 
been told, our new Constitution and the 1974 
law establishing regional institutions on a 
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provisional basis have been applied and our 
critics say that they have at least the merit 
of having been applied at no great expense and 
to have cost far less than a normal ministerial 
cabinet. 
But I will not embark on such an imper-
tinent course. What is interesting is to note that 
the three councils have expressed opinions and 
made proposals in fields where a differentiated 
regional policy was justifiable. 
The annual consideration of regional 
budgets has allowed an analysis to be made of 
the opinions of regional representatives on 
regional planning, economic expansion, employ-
ment, housing, demography, hygiene, health, 
communal organisation, regionalisation of the 
administration and sometimes also on the sim-
plification of our institutions, which had an 
annoying tendency to become increasingly com-
plicated, to which there were obviously reactions. 
By the tabling of motions, i.e. through 
spontaneous action by members of the council, 
the councils have dealt more particularly with 
industrial policy, public works, small and 
medium-sized firms, unemployment, communal 
finances, hospital policy, housing, the five-year 
economic plan and urban development. 
Some councils have been more interested in 
some questions than others. Consideration of 
these questions after two years brings out an 
important fact : the birth or revelation of a 
regional conscience. It has been noticed that 
although in some fields our councils have had 
identical reactions in others the three regional 
councils proposed solutions which differed from 
one region to another. 
'Vork has shown the situation was not the 
same in Flanders, Brussels and W allonia but 
also that mentalities sometimes differed and 
that even as universal a subject as housing, for 
instance, is solved differently from one region 
to another. 
Something else which we have noticed and 
which will be interesting when final regionali-
sation is discussed, since that is our aim, is the 
necessary identity of views which there must 
be between a regional council and the executive 
and ministerial committee about which Mr. Hul-
piau spoke. If the regional council does not have 
the same political majority as the appropriate 
ministerial committee, I do not need to explain 
at length why this slows down rather than speeds 
up regionalisation plans. 
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What have we been seeking since the 1970 
reform now that we have one State, two cultural 
communities and three regions ? It is for this 
single State which we are anxious to retain 
and whose existence we do not wish to jeopardise 
that we are trying to find a balance through the 
regions. It is obvious that there is no question of 
any form of separatism ; more dynamic formulae 
must be found for the State as a whole. 
Moreover, in 1970 more than 90 % of the votes 
were in favour of regional reforms, and this is 
obviously an important element. 
As we are about to embark on the com-
munity dialogue, which is a major and important 
aspect of this reform, it now seems important to 
determine the points of convergence between 
the various projects being pursued on both sides 
of our linguistic frontier and in the three 
regions. They must not be considered as text-
book theories, for there would be no interest in 
this ; they must be viewed rather as a catalyser 
of future political reactions. Moreover, since a 
first attempt at a community dialogue in 1974, 
a working approach emerged in all the parties 
-the Christian Social Party, the Walloon Union 
and the People's Union Party. Sometimes 
important documents have been made available 
for everyone to study ways of promoting our 
community relations. 
In these various documents, certain trends 
emerge clearly, some of which are shared, which 
is important. It seems to be an accepted fact that 
each region must have an assembly composed of 
representatives elected by ballot for that pur-
pose alone. This is not yet the case. You were 
told earlier that for the Brussels Regional Coun-
cil there are senators, i.e. who have not been 
elected as regional councillors, and members of 
the Urban Council who have been elected as 
urban councillors but not as members of the 
regional council, and the other regional coun-
cillors at present are senators who are appointed 
automatically. 
An agreement also seems to be taking shape 
for granting these assemblies the right in future 
to issue ordinances on regional affairs, i.e. they 
are acquiring power which is no longer con· 
sultative but legislative and just as our cultural 
councils have now acquired the right to issue 
decrees regional councils might issue ordinances 
and the hierarchy between a law and an 
ordinances and the hierarchy between a law and 
an ordinance would be similar to that existing 
between the law and the decree confirming the 
cultural autonomy which we now enjoy. 
Furthermore, there is also a move towards 
appointing regional executives separate from the 
national executive and elected by the regional 
assembly, which would obviously avoid the 
paradox to which I referred earlier, where an 
executive may be different from the regional 
assembly. 
Consideration is also being given to the 
cultural assemblies hearing ministers who are 
responsible to them in certain fields such as 
education, culture or scientific research. An 
important problem then arises, i.e. the transfer 
of fiscal power to these regional assemblies. 
Fiscal powers are at present entirely in the 
hands of the State. It must be recognised that 
the share now transferred, the appropriations 
I referred to earlier, is still very small compared 
to the State budget, and this does not facilitate 
decentralisation or deconcentration, which is 
what we are trying to achieve. 
There is of course disagreement, but the 
main thing is the dynamic nature of the evolu-
tion now under way. First, simplification and 
rationalisation are important matters. Second, 
any solution which jeopardised or failed to take 
account of a region's real wishes would con-
sequently harm the overall balance and each 
region thus has to give reasonable consideration 
to the concessions it might make to ensure that 
the balance is maintained, which is obviously 
an important element. 
Because there are different institutions, the 
responsibilities of each must be very clearly 
defined. This raises a problem : should or should 
not a jurisdictional body be set up to define the 
limits of responsibilities and above all arbitrate 
in the event of infringements ? We - or at least 
I personally - consider this to be more impor-
tant than a political body because I feel that in 
the event of arbitration political arbitration is 
subject to majorities which are sometimes tempo-
rary ; there is obviously less risk of this in 
jurisdictional arbitration. 
As I have said, the present resources of the 
regional institutions are very limited. The regions 
share practically 9 % of the national budget and 
4 % of its staff, but you have heard the reassur-
ing news that since the beginning of the month 
consideration has been given to giving them a 
slightly stronger administration. Fortunately, 
because we, like many others in Europe, are 
passing through a period of budgetary restric-
tions and it is to be feared that our resources 
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will increase less easily than in a period of 
prosperity. 
But here the problem of fiscal power crops 
up again. We consider this to be an essential 
condition for regional autonomy : without fin-
ancial independence - partial, of course, since 
many matters obviously remain national - the 
regions cannot be truly autonomous. This reform 
must include fiscal reform to give the regions 
the right to introduce, levy and administrate 
regional taxes, which should terminate the dispro-
portion which sometimes exists between State 
resources and those of local authorities in general, 
whether regions or communes, because it is not 
possible at one and the same time to extend 
local responsibilities and increase the resources 
needed by local authorities. 
From this point of view, it might be con-
sidered that a much larger proportion of the 
State's financial resources should be allocated 
to the regions than is the case at present. 
There are two essential principles : it is not 
because fiscal powers are regionalised that total 
fiscal pressure has to be increased. In other 
words, new taxes must not be introduced, there 
must just be transfers, because otherwise the 
ridiculous result would be to impose such a 
heavy burden on citizens that they would see 
only the negative aspects of decentralisation and 
not the rest. 
What therefore is the conclusion Y In Bel-
gium, we feel that the State is now at an impor-
tant turningpoint in its history. At every level, 
the community problem which has arisen involves 
consequences which regional-type solutions seem 
capable of solving in the near future. But what 
is important, and essential for us, is that during 
this period new habits and attitudes are emerging. 
The regions perhaps have new respect for each 
other in view of the similar problems arising. 
Positive conditions for contacts between the 
various regions are being established again, and 
this is extremely important because in the end 
they form an original synthesis of the words 
which have sometimes become rather too banal, 
that is the right of peoples or regions to self-
determination, cultural autonomy and regional 
claims. We believe that with the move towards 
final regionalisation these words will be given 
tangible meaning which will in fact be a feeling 
of harmony throughout the State. 
Someone has said that to give life to a 
region is to make it a responsible entity, capable 
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of taking risks, making sacrifices - we have to 
think of this sometimes after all - showing 
regional spirit and concentrating local forces. 
We feel this to be of importance for the good 
of all. 
Finally, regionalisation raises the problem 
of the structure of our political institutions, 
which must represent the regions without jeo-
pardising national unity. On the twenty-fifth 
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anniversary of his accession to the throne, the 
King, in a speech to the Chamber of Represen-
tatives, said : "To federate is to unite while 
accepting differences, not to split up in opposi-
tion." 
With this in mind, we all sincerely hope that 
commonsense and moderation will preside over 
all these negotiations which should lead to final 
regionalisation. 
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29th Novemmber 1976 
.Anti-submarine weapons platforms in service with allied countrieR 
1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 1 with 3 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Gritchley (Chairman) ; 
MM. Klepsch (Substitute : Alber), Dankerl (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Beauguitte, Bizet, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boulloche, Buck 
(Substitute: Sir Harwood Harriaon), Fosson, Haase, 
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Hardy, Konen, de Koster (Substitute: de Niet), Lemmrich, 
Maggioni (Substitute : Galamandrei), Mena.rd, Pawelczyk, 
Peechioli, Richter, Riviere, Roberti, Roper (Substitute : 
Lord Duncan-Sandya), Scholten, Schugena, Tanghe, Urwin. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in 
the vote are printed in italics. 
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Abbreviations employed in current reports of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Anti-ballistic missile 
Allied Command Europe 
Allied Forces Central Europe 
Allied Forces Northern Europe 
Allied Forces Southern Europe 
Anti-submarine warfare 
Conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
Intercontinental ballistic missile 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Magnetic anomaly detection 
Mutual and balanced force reductions 
Multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
Strategic arms limitation talks 
Sonar surveillance system 
Surveillance towed array sensor system 
United States 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Western European Union 
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Draft Recommendation 
on anti-submarine warfare 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the large numbers of modern attack submarines in service with the Soviet navy pose 
a serious threat to allied communications, both across the Atlantic and between the different parts of 
Western Europe ; 
Aware that a significant part of the Soviet nuclear threat arises from the Soviet strategic submarines; 
Believing that the European NATO countries must be able to provide an effective ASW capability 
from their limited resources, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
I. To ensure that their anti-submarine warfare forces are fully interoperable, and in appropriate 
cases to increase the standardisation of these forces ; 
2. To call on the independent European programme group or on Eurogroup to undertake an evaluation 
of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to coastal waters and the use 
of maritime patrol aircraft ; 
3. To increase their support for the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia 
through closer liaison with national centres and improved facilities for national research staff to spend 
time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The submarine developed in the first half 
of the twentieth century as an anti-surface ship 
weapon proved itself highly effective in two 
world wars, both against merchant shipping and 
naval forces. The German U-boat campaign in 
the first world war employed a total of 373 
submarines, of which 199 were lost ; for those 
casualties 5,708 merchant ships were sunk total-
ling over 11,000,000 tons - an average of 28 
merchant ships and 57,000 tons for every sub-
marine lost. In the second world war, the German 
campaign employed a total of 1,162 submarines, 
of which 785 were lost. They succeeded in sink-
ing 2,828 merchant ships totalling nearly 
15,000,000 tons - an average of 3.6 ships, or 
18,700 tons for each submarine lost. The United 
States campaign againt Japan from 1942-45 
employed a total of 288 submarines, of which 
52 were lost. They sank 1,178 Japanese transports 
totalling nearly 5,000,000 tons - an average of 
23 ships and 93,500 tons for every submarine 
lost. 
2. Losses of naval surface forces to the sub-
marines were also extensive. The German first 
world war U-boat campaign sank 10 battleships, 
18 cruisers and 21 destroyers ; the second world 
war campaign sunk 2 battleships, 5 aircraft 
carriers, 8 cruisers and 36 destroyers. The 
American campaign against Japan sank 1 
battleship, 8 aircraft carriers, 11 cruisers and 
39 destroyers. 
3. The 1950s saw the emergence of the nuclear-
propelled submarine which dramatically trans-
formed the capabilities from a relatively slow-
moving vessel with short range when submerged, 
to a vessel of virtually indefinite underwater 
endurance with a speed comparable to or exceed-
ing that of surface vessels. 
4. The world's first nuclear-propelled sub-
marine, the United States Nautilus, was com-
missioned in September 1954. Only five years 
later, the first nuclear-propelled ballistic missile 
submarine, the George Washington, was commis-
sioned, carrying sixteen ballistic missiles which 
could engage at strategic surface targets at a 
range of well over 1,000 n.m. The carrying of 
ballistic missiles was an entirely new role for a 
submarine, imposing the quite different tactics 
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of getting lost instead of having to seek out a 
surface ship target. The requirements of anti-
submarine warfare to deal with the second use 
of the submarine are similarly changed, and 
complicated by an order of magnitude. The 
importance attached by the United States to the 
advantages of nuclear-propulsion in a submarine 
is illustrated by the fact that of a fleet of 120 
conventionally-propelled submarines in service 
in the United States in 1960, only nine have been 
retained in service today ; no new construction 
of conventionally-propelled submarines has been 
undertaken by the United States since 1956. 
5. Anti-submarine warfare involves, first, 
devices to detect the presence of a submarine ; 
to locate it sufficiently accurately for it to be 
attacked and to discriminate it from possible 
friendly submarines; secondly, specialised 
weapons for destroying, which may be torpedoes, 
depth charges or mines. Both methods of detec-
tion and attack are carried in the whole range 
of weapons platforms used in naval warfare 
from fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters which 
can be combined with aircraft carriers or surface 
vessels with special landing platforms, to surface 
escorts of the destroyer and frigate type. Detec-
tion devices may also be static, mounted on the 
seabed and connected to the shore by cable. 
6. Because the strategic-missile-carrying sub-
marine is concerned primarily with hiding itself 
in the oceans provided only that it remains within 
range of its target - which at present may be 
some 2,500 nautical miles away - the problem 
of locating and destroying it in the huge ocean 
areas available to it is very much more com-
plicated than the problem of defending the use 
of the sea by friendly surface vessels, since 
defence in the second case can be concentrated 
in the much smaller areas of sea in the neigh-
bourhood of friendly ports and vessels at sea. 
A distinction has thus been drawn between 
"strategic anti-submarine warfare" and "tactical 
anti-submarine warfare". In practice, however, 
the second aim of ASW - defending the use 
of the sea - can also be based on a policy of 
denying the ocean to attack submarines- seek-
ing them out and destroying them wherever they 
may be, in transit to their targets or near their 
home ports - and the types of operations 
involved in this case are not different in nature 
from those involved in the destruction of strategic 
missile submarines. These tactics are unlikely 
to be able to discriminate between an adversary's 
attack submarines on the one hand and his 
strategic submarines on the other, and can be 
expected to destroy a proportion of both. 
7. The primary concern of the European mem-
bers of NATO will be ASW in coastal waters, 
both for the protection of reinforcement convoys 
from the United States in the approaches to 
European ports, and for the maintenance of 
European trade on which Europe is dependent 
for its food. Coastal ASW is of further interest 
in situations short of general war in which a 
threat could be posed to fishing rights or off-
shore mineral extraction. This report therefore 
will pay particular attention to the problems of 
coastal ASW. The United States concentrates 
a large part of its ASW effort on deep-sea 
capability, both to counter the Soviet submarine-
borne missile threat and to maintain the invul-
nerability of its own strategic forces, but the 
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necessary resources are not within the reach of 
many of the other members of the North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
U. Soviet capabilities 
(a) The Soviet submarine threat 
8. The Soviet navy has traditionally had a 
strong submarine force. Surprisingly, in num-
bers, it was the largest in the world, even at the 
outbreak of the second world war when it had 
165 submarines, compared with 57 in service with 
the German navy at that time. 
9. The Soviet submarine force today is still 
numerically the largest in the world with 309 
submarines of all types compared with 116 in 
service with the United States navy. But the 
age and capability of the Soviet submarines 
need to be borne in mind. The information is 
presented in tabular form : 
( i) Soviet Union - Strategic submarines 
Missiles 
Year first Last year 
No. Class COm· of Displacement No. Propulsion missioned 
construction dived tons Range 
or reported per Type 
submarine n.m. 
4 D-II Nov. 1973 - 16,000 16 SSN 8 4,200 Nuclear 
13 D-I 1972 - 10,000 12 SSN 8 4,200 Nuclear 
34 y 1968 ? 9,000 16 SSN 6 1,600 Nuclear 
7 H 1958 1962 5,150 3 SSN 5 700 Nuclear 
20 G 1958 1961-62 2,800 3 SSN 4 (45) 300 Diesel electric 
---
78 Totals 845 
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( ii) Soviet Union - Cruise missile submarines 
Missiles 
Year first 
com-
Last year Displacement No. Class 
missioned of dived tons No. Range 
Propulsion 
or reported construction per Type 
submarine n.m. 
I p I972 - 5,IOO 8 1 SSN 7 30 Nuclear 
I4 c I968 - 5,IOO 8 SSN 7 30 Nuclear 
29 E-ll I963 I967 5,600 8 SSN 3 400 Nuclear 
I6 J I962 I967 3,600 4 SSN 3 400 Diesel electric 
5 w I9601 I963 I,800 4 SSN 3 400 Diesel electric 
65 Totals 436 
1. Modified from W-class attack submarine first built 1951. 
(iii) Soviet Union - Attack submarines 
Year first Last year Speed Range 
com- Displacement n.m. 
No. Class missioned of dived tons surfaced Propulsion 
or reported construction Surface Dived cruising 
2 A I970 - 4,500 1 1 Nuclear1 
I V-II I974 - 6,000 1 1 Nuclear 
I9 V I967 - 5,IOO 26 30+ Nuclear 
I3 N I958 I963 4,800 20 25 Nuclear 
5 E-I I960 I9621 5,000 20 Nuclear 
3 T I973 - 2,500 1 Diesel electric 
60 F I958 I967 2,300 20 I5 20,000 Diesel electric 
9 R I958 I96I I,600 17 14 Diesel electric 
10 z 1951 I955 2,200 18 15 20,000 Diesel electric 
40 w 1951 1957 1,350 17 15 13,000 Diesel electric 
4 B 1968 - 2,800 1 1 Diesel electric 
166 Total 
1. Converted to attack submarine from cruise missile submarine 1973-74. 
Sourcu: ITSS Military Balance 1976-77; "The Soviet Navy Today", Captain J. E. Moore, Ma.cdona.ld and Ja.mes, 
1975; US /Soviet Military Balance, Library of Congress, 1976. 
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10. Summarising recent construction trends in 
the Soviet navy, it can be said that submarines 
less than 10 years old now in service amount to 
50 strategic submarines, 15 cruise-missile sub-
marines, 22 nuclear-propelled attack submarines 
and about 10 diesel attack submarines. 
(b) Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability 
11. Despite the lesson of 1937, when Soviet 
merchant ships delivering war supplies to the 
Republican forces in the Spanish civil war were 
sunk by Italian submarines, the Soviet anti-
submarine capabilities and effort during the 
second world war were limited to defensive 
measures close to the coast in reaction to sub-
marine attacks. The Soviet effort has been 
criticised by the then allies of the Soviet Union 
as being inadequate to deal with U-boats lying 
in wait for British convoys in the Kola inlet. 
12. Despite its own large submarine forces, the 
modern Soviet navy which can be said to have 
begun with the appointment of Admiral 
Gorshkov as chief of naval staff in 1956, does 
not seem initially to have laid great emphasis on 
anti-submarine warfare. The major naval threat 
to the Soviet Union was felt to lie in the nuclear-
strike aircraft on United States aircraft carriers, 
in response to which the Soviet Union developed 
naval surface-to-surface missiles of considerable 
range. 
13. When the Polaris submarine first became 
operational in 1961, with the 1,500 nautical mile 
range A-1 missile, its area of patrol was neces-
sarily limited to the Norwegian Sea and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, and the Soviet Union 
has operational today a significant ASW capa-
bility, which may have been designed in an 
attempt to counter Polaris. With the increased 
2,500 nautical mile range of the A-3 and Poseidon 
missile, the Polaris submarine can now patrol in 
a much larger area covering virtually the whole 
of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. The 
Soviet ASW capability now in service is not 
believed to offer any significant threat to Polaris 
in these circumstances, but it is not possible to 
know whether the Soviet Union is developing 
:further forces with a view to countering the 
Polaris threat, or whether it has concluded that 
the vulnerability of the submarine is so low that 
the size of the effort that will be required to 
counter it would be beyond the resources of the 
Soviet Union. The Trident submarines planned 
to come into service from late 1978, and equipped 
with missiles with a range of over 4,000 n.m., 
will be more difficult to counter. 
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14. The Soviet ASW capability now in service 
comprises bottom-mounted sensors in coastal 
areas, maritime patrol aircraft, surface vessels 
of various types including the two Moskva class 
ASW helicopter carriers, and the attack sub-
marines 1 • The principal platforms and weapon 
systems concerned are as follows : 
Maritime patrol aircraft 
55 Il-38 "May" aircraft with MAD, sono-
buoys, radar ; 
60 Tu-95 "Bear" D + F long-range bomber 
fitted for ASW ; 
100 Be-12 "Mail" flying boat. 
Chief ASW surface vessels 
2 Moskva ASW helicopter carriers with 
ASW torpedoes, SUW-N-1 launchers, 
RBU 2500-A rocket launchers, and ASW 
helicopters ; VD sonar ; 
17 Kashin ASW destroyers with RBU 2500 
and 4500 rocket launchers and ASW 
torpedoes ; VD sonar ; 
8 Kresta II ASW cruisers with RBU 2500 
and 4500 rocket launchers, ASW tor-
pedoes and ASW helicopter. 
ASW submarines 
The attack submarines listed earlier must be 
assumed to have ASW homing torpedoes. 
It is also reported that some Y-class sub-
marines may be fitted with the SSN X 13 
ASW missile. 
ASW weapons 
RBU 2500 rocket launcher - propels depth 
charges to 2500 metres range ; 
RBU 4500 rocket launcher - heavier, 
shorter-range SUW-N-1 surface-to-under-
water naval missile reported capable of 
launching either FRAS rocket with nuclear 
depth charge range 16 n.m. - or SSN 14 
missile 20 n.m. range carrying homing ASW 
torpedo; 
SSN X 13 submarine launched missile 400 
n.m. range, carrying homing ASW torpedo. 
1. The aircraft carrier Kiev now operational and its 
two sister·ships now being built probably have an ASW 
role as well. 
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"Wing-in-Ground" 
"WIG or "EKRANOPLAN". The Soviet 
Union is said to be developing a "Wing-in-
Ground" surface skimmer machine -
essentially a very low-flying aircraft, mak-
ing use of the extra lift which conventional 
airfoils experience close to the ground. It 
is variously reported to have a 650 metre 
wing-span, capable of flying up to half a 
wing-span above ground or ocean at 350 
n.m.p.h. and weighing up to 1,000 tons. 
Fitted with MAD or even laser detectors it 
could be a useful ASW platform in "ground 
effect" flight. A Soviet article has referred 
to a laser capable of detecting submarines 
down to a depth of 140 m. 
m. Western vulnerability 
(a) The vulnerable sea-lanes 
15. The European NATO countries depend on 
seaborne traffic, both for military supplies and 
reinforcements which would flow across the 
Atlantic in the event of hostilities, as well as for 
intra-European trade and transatlantic trade for 
normal civilian supplies. 
16. Speaking in Copenhagen on 3rd September 
1976, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, 
Atlantic, Vice-Admiral Jungius, pointed out that 
the 31,000,000 square miles of the Atlantic was 
the most active ocean in the world and that the 
total goods traffic in both directions between 
Europe and America amounted to 1.6 billion 
tons each year. On any day, some 7,000 merchant 
ships could be found in the North Atlantic or 
in the ports of the riparian NATO countries. 
Even in a period of rationing and austerity, the 
Admiral estimated, half of the goods and raw 
materials would still have to be transported, 
amounting to some 70 million tons each month. 
Moreover, reinforcements for SACEUR in the 
event of hostilities would amount to more than 
1 million men in the first month, including 
equipment weighing 1 million tons. Ammunition 
would add a further 4.5 million tons and initial 
supplies yet another 4.5 million tons. Fuel supply 
to the forces would amount to 600,000 barrels a 
day. Although most of the men and their light 
equipment could be transported by air, there 
would still remain 1,000 cargoes of ammunition, 
supplies and fuel and later 500 cargoes a month 
of supplies to sustain the forces. Military plan-
ners would hope that in the first month of a 
conflict, transport priority would be given to 
military requirements while civilian consump-
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tion was met from existing stocks in Europe. 
Subsequently, however, civilian requirements 
would inevitably increase to perhaps 70 million 
tons of civilian supplies a month which might 
require as many as 5,000 merchant ships to 
sustain. 
17. According to the German While Paper on 
Defence, 1975-76, oil supplies transiting the 
Atlantic Ocean in 1974 amounted to 651 million 
tons of which 512 million came from the Middle 
East and Persian Gulf by the Indian Ocean and 
South Atlantic. A further 140 million of oil 
crossed the Mediterranean from North Africa. 
18. Other more conservative assessments of 
civilian maritime transport requirements in a 
period of hostilities suggest that Western Europe 
as a whole can be regarded as self-contained 
in food, iron and steel, provided that the coastal 
waters are kept free for intra-European trade ; 
even this conservative assessment shows that oil 
and cobalt would have to be imported from 
further afield. A policy of stockpiling for 
civilian requirements in the first month of hosti-
lities to free surface transport for military 
purposes would be valuable. Oil and cobalt are 
particularly indicated for longer-term stockpil-
ing. 
19. Admiral Jungius in the speech quoted above 
did not express undue concern about the ability 
of Soviet surface forces to interrupt supplies on 
the sea-lanes, unless considerable Soviet air forces 
were deployed in the Atlantic for reconnaissance 
and missile guidance against shipping, in which 
case NATO would require a higher level of air 
defence in the Atlantic than had hitherto been 
considered. 
20. The Soviet submarine threat however was 
infinitely more serious : of the 320 operational 
attack submarines, it was estimated that 100 
would be deployed in the Atlantic at the begin-
ning of hostilities. Furthermore, the powerful 
Soviet nayY offered other more attractive choices 
to the Soviet Union than launching a general 
war in Europe. The "NATO area" is limited 
by the treaty to the area north of the Tropic 
of Cancer. Outside that area, as Admiral 
Gorshkov had not failed to note, there were 
other areas of equal importance to the NATO 
countries and the increasing size of the Soviet 
nuclear-propelled submarine fleet gave it the 
possibility of attacking and sinking ships in the 
South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean and still 
further afield. Without undertaking any military 
operations within the NATO area, which alone 
could be a cause for automatically invoking the 
North Atlantic Treaty, the Soviet Union could 
drastically reduce oil supplies to the NATO 
countries. No NATO commander had any 
authority to act or to deploy forces outside the 
NATO area, and all that SACLANT could do 
at the present time was to develop contingency 
plans for the protection of shipping in the South 
Atlantic and Indian Ocean. SACLANT could 
not of course apply any such plan or deploy 
forces without specific authorisation from the 
Defence Planning Council. 
21. In conclusion, Admiral Jungius pointed out 
that although fifteen years ago the NATO coun-
tries had 1,300 warships, the same countries now 
possessed only half that number, although they 
were more modern and better equipped. The 
reduced number of ships, however, would mean 
that NATO might have to order its priorities 
for larger-scale naval operations, as no ship 
could be in two places at once. If, for example, 
air strikes were to be launched from carriers 
in support of SACEUR in a particular area, it 
might not be possible to maintain a maximum 
level of civilian seaborne supplies until the 
strike operation had been concluded. 
22. Soviet naval activities in the Atlantic in 
peacetime increased significantly after 1969, 
involving twice-yearly rotation of submarines 
in the Mediterranean from the Soviet northern 
fleet, the establishment of Y-class strategic sub-
marine patrols in the central Atlantic. From a 
peak in 1972, the level of Soviet deployment 
in the Atlantic fell only slightly the following 
year and now appears to have levelled off. 
Although it has been estimated that if the Soviet 
Union were to maintain one-third of its general 
purpose naval forces at sea, as the United States 
attempts to do, it could from its northern and 
Baltic fleets have maintained some 42,800 combat 
ship days in the Atlantic in 197 4, whereas in 
practice, the total for both combat and auxiliaries 
was only 14,600 ship days, suggesting that the 
Soviet navy spends most of its time in port in 
home waters. However, if the forces operating 
in the Atlantic on a typical day are taken, 
which can be assumed to constitute the core 
forces of a steady state forward deployment, it 
will be found that there are usually 3-5 Soviet 
strategic submarines and from 1-3 attack cruise 
missile submarines present 1• Compared with 
1. In a forthcoming book : The State and Future of 
the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic, Robert G. 
Weinland, the Brookings Institution. 
6 - Ill 
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Admiral Jungius' estimate of 100 Soviet sub-
marines in the Atlantic at the outbreak of 
hostilities, it is clear that some warning time 
might be expected from such a very large 
increase - some at least of the 90 or so addi-
tional submarines would very likely be detected 
on passage to the North Atlantic. 
(b) Strategic vulnerability 
23. The three member countries of NATO which 
possess nuclear weapons rely heavily on the 
strategic submarine as the basis of their deterrent 
forces. The United States Poseidon missile has 
ten independently targetable re-entry vehicles, 
and with its deployment in 31 Polaris sub-
marines, the United States now has a total of 
5,120 independently targetable re-entry vehicles 
deployed in strategic submarines compared with 
2,154 independent vehicles deployed on land-
based strategic missiles - on this basis, the 
United States can be said to be keeping 70% 
of its strategic missile strike power in its sub-
marines. When the fourth French strategic sub-
marine becomes operational at the end of 1976, 
France will have 64 warheads in its submarine 
force compared with 18 in its land-based mis-
siles, representing an 80 % reliance on sub-
marines. The United Kingdom reliance on sub-
marines is total with 64 missiles. 
24. While the shorter ranges of the missiles 
fitted to the first three French submarines 
presumably limit their possible area of patrol 
to the Arctic Ocean and parts of the Norwegian 
and North Seas\ the remaining submarines of 
the NATO countries have a possible operating 
area extending from the southern tip of Green-
land, through the North-Eastern Atlantic down 
to Gibraltar and embracing the whole of the 
Mediterranean. United States submarines pre-
sumably patrol in the Pacific Ocean as well. 
The huge extent and range of depth of this 
ocean area make it highly unlikely that with 
present technology the Soviet Union will be able 
to deploy anti-submarine resources capable of 
destroying even a small proportion of allied 
strategic submarines. One possible tactic which 
has been proposed, that of active tailing of all 
strategic submarines on patrol by Soviet nuclear-
1. Assuming the target to be Moscow. The Adriatic 
and the Eastern Mediterranean would also be within 
range but the transit time from the base in Brest to 
these areas would be twice as long. 
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propelled attack submarines, would require a 
force of such submarines considerably larger, 
perhaps several times larger, than the numbers 
of allied strategic submarines. With only about 
32 suitable attack submarines operational at the 
moment compared with 49 allied strategic sub-
marines, the Soviet Union is not assumed to 
possess such a "tailing" capability. Nevertheless, 
much of the modern .ABW capability now pos-
sessed by the Soviet Union is generally con-
sidered to have been developed initially to 
counter the Polaris threat when the possible 
area of patrol was much closer to Soviet home 
waters, and the Soviet Union is known from 
published accounts to have deployed bottom-
mounted sonars off its coast in the Arctic Ocean 
which may well provide significant submarine 
location capability in that area and will do so 
increasingly with the introduction of the Trident 
submarines. 
(c) The geographical balance 
25. The navies of all the maritime NATO coun-
tries enjoy direct access to the open seas from 
their home ports, without having to pass near 
any territory belonging to Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. The Warsaw Pact navies are in a very 
different position. There is little doubt that 
passage through the Black Sea and Baltic exits 
could be denied for submarines and surface 
vessels alike during a period of hostilities, as 
long as the contiguous NATO territory remained 
in allied hands. Thus the Soviet Baltic and 
Black Sea fleets which had not reached the 
open seas prior to hostilities could be kept off 
the ocean. The Soviet northern fleet operating 
from the ice-free Kola Peninsula still has to 
pass through gaps between territory of NATO 
countries before it can reach the Atlantic 
Ocean. The Spitzbergen-Bear Island and Bear 
Island-North Cape passages are 110 and 230 
nautical miles wide respectively. At the exits 
from the Norwegian Sea, the passages are 
Greenland-Iceland 150 nautical miles, Iceland-
Faroes 220, Faroes-Shetland 150 and Shetland-
Norway 150. Except for a deeper trench, 10 
miles wide at its narrowest, between the Faroes 
and the Shetlands, the depth nowhere exceeds 
1,000 metres. With the very large bottom-
mounted sonar arrays mentioned later, and the 
use of maritime patrol aircraft from the con-
tiguous territory of NATO countries, NATO 
.ABW forces possess a significant capability for 
detecting the passage of a substantial proportion 
of Soviet submarines. This does not mean how-
ever that they can be followed at sea once 
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they have reached the Atlantic Ocean. Only the 
Soviet Pacific fleet enjoys access to the oceans 
comparable to that of the NATO navies. 
IV. AlUed anti-submarine capabiUty 
(a) The SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research 
centre 
26. The SACLANT anti-submarine warfare 
research centre in La Spezia, Italy, was ori-
ginally established in 1959 to support SACLANT 
by providing research results that could lead 
to equipment development. Twelve NATO coun-
tries - all those with navies except France -
now participate in the centre, sharing the cost 
and contributing scientists to its staff. Although 
France, which was originally a full participant, 
technically withdrew from the centre ten years 
ago, your Rapporteur understands that the 
country can be considered a participant in prac-
tice, but it contributes only a proportionate 
share of certain projects undertaken by the 
centre which receive specific French approval. 
French scientists attached to the centre work 
as full members of the staff and may be 
assigned to any project whether selected by 
France or not. 
27. The centre's annual budget of $6.5 million 
represents some three-quarters of the total 
SACLANT international budget. The staff 
include fifty scientists, for the most part 
seconded from national anti-submarine research 
centres for periods of three to five years, toge-
ther with a few naval officers from the parti-
cipating countries who act as service advisers. 
28. The work of the centre is under the general 
direction of SACLANT. A scientific committee 
of national representatives advises SACLANT 
on the best use of the centre. The centre can 
undertake projects at the request of a member 
nation provided its main mission in support 
of SACLANT permits. It endeavours to work 
in as close association as possible with national 
research centres. 
29. Anti-submarine warfare research is nor-
mally a highly classified subject, and much 
national research is probably too sensitive for 
details to be communicated to the centre. At the 
same time, the growing cost of such research 
is making it impossible for the smaller NATO 
countries to pursue significant work on a natio-
nal basis ; they tend to rely more heavily on 
the centre than do the larger countries. Despite 
these security difficulties, which are declining 
in importance as the cost of research increases, 
the centre is making a very useful contribution 
to anti-submarine work. Half of its reports, 
which are unclassified, can be published, and 
only a few receive high security gradings. 
30. The activities of the centre are divided 
among three principal divisions - underwater 
research ; systems research ; and operational 
research. The underwater research division, the 
largest, studies the behaviour of the ocean, 
especially the propagation of acoustic waves in 
it. It operates the centre's oceanographic research 
ship. The systems research division has been set 
up to provide a link between underwater 
research, operational research and the needs of 
the customer- i.e. SACLANT. It studies new 
conceptual systems - acoustic and other - to 
the point at which those found suitable may be 
offered to NATO for possible development. The 
operational research group, the smallest, studies 
operational implications of ASW research and 
the capabilities required of operators ; it pro-
vides a mathematical approach to ASW. 
31. Although based in the Mediterranean, the 
centre is not primarily concerned with research 
work in that sea. Having spent some time 
working on conditions in the North Atlantic in 
general, it is at present concentrating more 
on coastal waters where it is felt that there is 
an increasing submarine threat. Your Rappor-
teur believes that there could be a case for 
moving the centre to a country with a strong 
national ASW research centre with which the 
SACLANT centre could collaborate more 
closely. 
32. In 1972 another ocean acoustics project was 
established independently of the centre. The 
Azores fixed acoustics range (AFAR) has been 
constructed and financed independently by 
France, Germany, Portugal, the United King-
dom and the United States, but with NATO 
backing. Equipped with towers and transducers 
the facility is intended primarily to study the 
acoustic properties of the ocean as a communica-
tion medium ; it is essentially experimental 
rather than operational. 
(b) Submarine detection systems 
Sonar 
33. The ocean being virtually opaque to radio 
waves or light \ the detection of submerged sub-
I. Light from lasers may perhaps be used for submarine 
detection, but ranges of only a few hundred metres are 
reported. 
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marines at any distance depends almost entirely 
on the propagation of acoustic waves. While 
active sonar systems have been in service since 
the second world war - depending on the emis-
sion of acoustic pulses, detection of the echo 
after reflection from a submarine target, and 
measurement of the time interval between the 
two to give an estimate of range - the inherent 
capabilities of this system are much less than 
that of the analogous radar which uses radio 
instead of acoustic waves in a similar manner. 
In general, acoustic waves may not be trans-
mitted in straight lines in water - the path 
will curve because the speed of sound changes 
with temperature, pressure and salinity. Sound 
is reflected or scattered from the surface and 
bottom ; the sea itself and its biological content 
also scatter sound; attenuation in any case is 
far more rapid than that of radio waves in air. 
34. In general, the effectiveness of sonars of 
all types may be improved by locating them at 
an optimum depth in the ocean, which for 
certain applications may be very great - i.e. 
1-2,000 metres where the "reliable acoustic path" 
is reached. Depths of several hundred metres 
may be required to penetrate the "shadow zone" 
- the volume of water into which sound emitted 
near the surface ~ not reach because of the 
curved acoustic path. 
35. Since the second world war, greater atten-
tion has been paid to the development of pas-
sive sonar systems which do not emit acoustic 
waves, but depend solely on listening to sounds 
generated by a submarine target, analysing 
their frequency components and determining 
their direction. One of the most effective passive 
submarine detection systems is the bottom-
mounted SOSUS or sonar surveillance system 
initially deployed by the United States in the 
early 1960s. This system employs large arrays 
of bottom-mounted hydrophones which may be 
many miles apart, linked to the shore by cable 
where the received signals are analysed by 
computer systems. The maximum range of this 
elaborate system is reported to be as much as 
1,000 nautical miles. A total of 21 SOSUS 
stations were reported to be operational in 1971, 
deployed in an number of integrated installations 
code-named Caesar, Colossus, Barrier and 
Bronco. The last two are reported to be on the 
territory of allied countries, and Canada is 
known to have taken over the operation of one 
SOSUS station from the United States. SOSUS 
is believed to be an effective system capable 
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of identifying and locating strategic submarines 
at long ranges except for remote shallow water 
areas. The United States 1977 Defence Depart-
ment report says that SOSUS has been under 
"improvement development" since 1972 to provide 
completely new sensors to improve its effec-
tiveness. At the same time, a surveillance towed 
array sensor system SURT ASS is in advanced 
development - it represents a mobile version 
of SOSUS. The effectiveness of all passive 
systems will decrease if improvements can be 
made in quietening submarines. 
36. The inherent capabilities of sonar fall off 
somewhat when systems have to be mounted 
on moving platforms, because the optimum size 
for transducers - the electro-mechanical device 
placed in the water which is the interface 
between acoustic waves and electronic circuitry 
- may be thirty metres or more. The most 
powerful "bottom-bounce" sonors are suitable 
only for major war vessels of 5,000 tons or more, 
and not many ships of this size are in service 
with the NATO navies. There are less powerful 
sonars that are deployed in the majority of 
anti-submarine surface vessels - both hull-
mounted and variable depth sonar (VDS) 
whereby the transducer can be lowered on a cable 
to depths which may be several hundred metres 
to reach environmental conditions that will 
provide an acoustic path that will penetrate the 
shadow zone. Submarines for this reason provide 
an ideal platform for a mobile hull-mounted 
sonar, but operational submarines can reach 
depths only one-third of those required to find 
the reliable acoustic path. Fixed-wing aircraft 
can use sonars by dropping expendable sono-
buoys into the ocean which deploy a sonar 
transducer below the surface and transmit data 
acquired to the parent aircraft by radio. Heli-
copters when hovering can employ a dipping 
sonar, the transducer being lowered below the 
surface on the end of a cable. 
37. The detection systems which do not employ 
a.coustic waves are few. Magnetic anomaly detec-
tiOn (MAD) is in service with maritime patrol 
aircraft and can reveal the presence of a sub-
marine to an aircraft in the near vicinity because 
the presence of the steel submarine hull causes 
a slight distortion of the earth's magnetic field. 
This is a short-range localisation system only. 
It is also possible for aircraft to detect fumes 
from diesel submarines when the diesel engines 
are being run, and infra-red devices may detect 
local temperature rises in the ocean surface 
which may be attribuable to the presence of a 
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submarine. Lasers are reported to have some 
short-range applications of a few hundred 
metres. 
(c) Weapons systems 
38. Specialised ordnance for destroying sub-
marines has developed since the simple depth 
charge of the first world war, although they are 
still in use both by surface ships and aircraft. 
In the second world war, depth charge launchers 
or projectors were developed which project 
depth charges to distances of one or two hundred 
metres from the ship. There are now depth 
charge mortars which can fire depth charges up 
to one or two kilometres from a ship, and these 
are in service with most NATO navies and in 
the Soviet Union. 
39. The increasing range of weapons employed 
by submarines, particularly anti-shipping mis-
sile systems, has led to the development of longer 
range anti-submarine ordnance. There is a 
variety of anti-submarine torpedoes in service 
with ranges of from two to as much as thirty 
nautical miles with terminal acoustic guidance 
or with wire guidance from a parent submarine 
- a system originally developed with anti-tank 
missiles. Torpedoes however are relatively slow-
moving. Coupled with a missile system they can 
be brought more rapidly to the immediate vici-
nity of a target and used over much longer 
ranges. Such missile/torpedo systems now in 
service have ranges of from two to fifteen nau-
tical miles. 
40. Anti-submarine mines are also available 
and the United States has developed the Capto; 
anti-submarine mine which contains a Mark 46 
anti-submarine torpedo which is released when 
a submarine is detected by the acoustic sensors 
of the mine - with a reported range of 
1,000 metres - thus vastly increasing the effec-
tiveness. According to the 1977 Defence Depart-
ment report, development of Captor is complete 
and "a procurement objective has been estab-
lished". 
(d) Capabilities of the allied countries 
41. A catalogue of numbers and types of anti-
submarine weapons platforms in service with 
the allied countries is presented at Appendix. 
(e) Tactics and need for interoperability 
42. The big debate in anti-submarine warfare 
appears to your Rapporteur to concern the area 
in which priority should be given by the Euro-
pean members of NATO in determining their 
contribution to anti-submarine operations. Is 
area defence the best approach, with a policy 
of actively seeking out and destroying sub-
marines wherever they may be in the oceans, 
employing long-range platforms and sophisti-
cated detection systems to cover the vast areas 
involved? The alternative tactic is to concen-
trate on local and point defence - the provision 
of local .ASW protection for naval forces and 
possibly certain civilian convoys, and the con-
centration of .ASW activities round the area of 
allied ports. 
43. Protagonists of the second school maintained 
that the large size and relatively high speed of 
modern merchant vessels, whether bulk carriers 
or oil tankers, had made them difficult targets 
for submarines in the mid-ocean areas. The large 
size has considerably reduced the total numbers 
of ships afloat, making it less likely that a 
patrolling submarine will actually encounter 
them, while their higher speed has made them 
much more difficult targets to intercept. The 
coastal waters and particularly the approaches 
to the ports of the NATO countries would be 
much more profitable areas, it is argued, for 
Soviet submarines to hunt civilian shipping, and 
an effective .ASW defence can be concentrated 
in these areas at much lower cost than in the 
remote ocean. 
44. On the other hand, an area defence capa-
bility undoubtedly provides some opportunities 
for destroying strategic missile-carrying sub-
marines which will never operate in the coastal 
waters of the NATO countries. Nuclear-propelled 
attack submarines and very long-range patrol 
aircraft are complementary and effective 
weapon systems for area defence. Smaller .ASW 
surface craft and helicopters can provide good 
coastal defence, while helicopters on carriers or 
through-deck cruisers provide anti-submarine 
capability for naval task forces or convoys, sup-
plementing surface escorts. 
45. For area defence, maritime patrol aircraft 
provide a cheaper capability than nuclear-
propelled attack submarines, but submarines can 
operate in areas where the slow-moving aircraft 
would be vulnerable, in particular the gap off 
the north coast of Norway can probably be most 
effectively patrolled by nuclear-propelled attack 
submarines. 
46. The United States obviously has devoted a 
considerable effort to an .ASW area defence 
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capability comprising elaborate bottom-mounted 
surveillance systems, long-range maritime patrol 
aircraft Orion and 65 nuclear-propelled attack 
submarines. Of the other NATO countries, only 
Britain has a long-range patrol aircraft, the 
Nimrod, and nine nuclear-propelled attack sub-
marines. France has a nuclear-propelled attack 
submarine under construction and, in common 
with several European NATO countries, operates 
the shorter range Breguet .Atlantic patrol air-
craft. 
47. If the NATO countries, other than the 
United States, are to concentrate on coastal.ASW, 
there is a strong case for co-operative tactics 
between the larger and smaller navies. Because 
really effective sonars can be carried only on 
large ships, it has been pointed out that smaller 
passive sonars operated on small ships working 
in conjunction with a powerful active sonar 
on one larger ship can operate in such a way 
that the effective range of detection can be 
increased by over 50%, and because the acoustic 
signals would no longer be reflected at a normal 
incidence, the effect of anechoic coatings on 
submarines would be reduced. "'Clip-on' towed" 
sonar arrays can much more easily be fitted to 
vessels than hull-mounted transducers which 
requires a major refit. 
48. For effective .ASW in the NATO theatre, 
interoperability between the .ASW weapons 
systems of all countries is obviously essential. 
Not only must ship-to-ship communications 
systems be completely standard, but sonar 
systems must be fully interoperable if the multi-
ship type of operation suggested above is to be 
possible. Expendable stores such as sonobuoys 
and anti-submarine ordnance carried by heli-
copters and maritime patrol aircraft, if com-
pletely standardised throughout NATO, could 
provide existing forces with several times the 
operational capability because aircraft on patrol 
could then be re-supplied at any NATO ship 
or maritime patrol airfield. 
V. Conclusion 
49. The Committee believes that considerations 
of cost alone must lead most NATO nations to 
concentrate their .ASW effort on coastal and 
point defence. Such specialisation would not 
of course stop joint operations with Canadian 
and United States .ASW forces - "point 
defence" includes the capability of protecting 
convoys and naval forces. The very large resour-
. ces devoted by the United States to area defence 
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are not believed to have yet provided a capability 
of destroying simultaneously all Soviet strategic 
nuclear submarines. Such an overwhelming capa-
bility could be held to be destabilising in the 
strategic nuclear sense, because it could act as 
an incentive for an aggressor to initiate a pre-
emptive nuclear strike by his strategic sub-
marines before they were destroyed. Neverthe-
less, the Committee feels it essential that active 
research and development must continue in all 
ASW fields, even if only as an insurance policy 
against the possible development of a destabilis-
ing capability by the Soviet Union. 
50. If the European members of NATO must 
necessarily, if only from considerations of cost, 
concentrate on coastal ASW, there should be 
closer co-operation between the allied countries 
and more interoperability in equipment. The 
Committee recommends that Eurogroup or, if 
all the member countries are prepared to parti-
cipate, the independent programme group, 
should undertake an evaluation of the ASW 
requirements and capabilities of the member 
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countries. Lastly, the Committee believes that 
vulnerability to submarine attack can be reduced 
by indirect methods such as the prepositioning 
of equipment and supplies on the central front 
that would otherwise have to be brought from 
across the Atlantic on the outset of hostilities. 
Increased stocks of aviation fuel in particular 
could effect a marked reduction in possible 
submarine targets ; the many tankers now lying 
unused could provide economical storage. 
51. Finally, the Committee draws attention to 
the advantages of closer international liaison 
with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare 
research centre at La Spezia and recommends 
that research staff working in national anti-
submarine research centres should be enabled 
to spend time in the international allied environ-
ment of the SACLANT centre. Full support for 
the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research 
centre at La Spezia offers the most economic 
way for most eountries to have access to ASW 
research and advice on operational prioritieS. 
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APPENDIX 
Anti-submarine weapons platforms in service with allied countries 
Aircraft Surface vessels 
Country Maritime patrol Anti-Helicopters submarine Cruisers Destroyers Frigates Other 
aircraft 
carriers 
Belgium - - - - - 1 -
26 CP-107 32 CH-124 Sea - - 4 16 -
Canada King 
40 Tracker - - - - - -
Denmark - - - - - 6 3 
-
24 Alize 12 Super Frelon 2 2 20 25 22 
France 25 Atlantic 11 HSS-1 - - - - -
10 Neptune 7 Alouette Ill - - - - -
Fed. Rep. of 20 Atlantic 22 Sea. King - - 11 6 6 
Germany 
Greece 8 Albatross - - - 11 4 5 
18 Atlantic 24 SH-3D - 3 9 11 12 
Italy 8 Trackers 28 AB-204B -
-
- - -
12 AB-212 - - - - -
Netherlands 8 Atlantic 6 AB-204B - 1 1 16 11 
15 Neptune 12 Wasp - - - - -
Norway 5 P-3B - - - - 5 2 
Portugal 8 P2 V5 Neptune 34 Alouette Ill 
- - - 11 15 
Turkey 14 S-2E Tracker 3 AB-204A - - 12 2 5 
United 43 Nimrod 30 Sea King 1 12 1 57 -
Kingdom 40 Wasp - - - - -
7 Wessex 3 - - - - -
220 P -3 Orlon 80 SH-3 Sea. 3 27 107 65 -
United States King 
80 S-3 - - - - - -
30 S-2 - - - - - -
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and East- West relations 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as vast improve-
ments in Soviet technology enhance the effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower 
and equipment, and as new strategic nuclear missiles are deployed which threaten Western Europe; 
Believing that a policy of detente ca.n be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close 
consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence 
effort; 
Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw 
Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting detente, and in the progress of other ongoing 
negotiations ; 
Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well 
as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observation by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in 
which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries; 
Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of detente can bring advantages to both 
East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CouNCIL 
That it urge member governments : 
1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful preparation for the meeting to be 
held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act : 
(a) by compiling, on the basis of reports from member States, a full record of the implementation 
by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention to all items in the documents 
on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament", on "co-operation 
in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-operation in other fields ; 
(b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance at the meeting shall be: 
(i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting to be held on 15th June that the meeting at the 
level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ; 
(ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance 
policy; 
(iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far, to seek to streng-
then and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures, and to report 
on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions ; 
2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until 
the Soviet Union is prepared to make acceptable concessions to the NATO position; 
3. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on 
Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate 
East-West arms control forum. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It is some time since the Committee reported 
in any depth on the growing network of nego-
tiations and agreements between East and West 
that have a bearing on European security 1 • 
Meanwhile, the number of bilateral agreements 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
with direct arms control content has steadily 
increased over the last five years. The "agree-
ment on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak 
of nuclear war between the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union" was signed 
in 1971 in the course of the early SALT nego-
tiations, and a second agreement dealt with 
improvements in the "hot line" originally agreed 
in 1963. The original SALT agreement - SALT 
I of 1972 - comprising the treaty on the 
limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and 
the interim agreement on strategic off~nsive 
arms, has been amplified by protocols signed 
~n July 1974 clarifying arrangements for replac-
mg ICBMs and the dismantling of anti-ballistic 
missile systems. In July 1974, the treaty on 
the limitation of underground nuclear weapons 
tests was signed, followed in May 1976 by the 
treaty on underground nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes. 
2. The multilateral agreements to which most 
WEU countries are parties are nearly as 
numerous. The Antarctic treaty of 1959 prohibits 
any military activity and provides inspection 
facilities of the continent. The outer space treaty 
of 1967 and the seabed arms control treaty of 
1971 are similar prophylactic agreements that 
ban military activity before it has begun. The 
partial test-ban treaty banning nuclear weapon 
tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under 
water was signed in 1963 (there are now 114 par-
ties) and the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, signed in 1968, entered into 
force in 1970. The biological weapons convention 
was signed in 1972 and most recently the final 
act of the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 
August 1975. 
1. The Committee reported briefly on these subjects 
in April 1975 (Document 671), May 1974 (Document 635) 
and more fully in November 1973 (Document 623), May 
1973 (Document 604) and November 1972 (Document 
587). It reported on agreements affecting the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons in April 1975 (Document 672). 
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3. Bilateral negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union continue in the 
framework of SALT, held in Geneva, where 
the Standing Consultative Commission, estab-
lished by the two countries under the first SALT 
agreement, also meets. In the second half of 
August 1976, the two countries also consulted 
in Geneva on the possibility of a partial ban 
on chemical weapons. The WEU countries as 
well as the two superpowers are similarly 
involved almost permanently in arms control 
negotiations in several frameworks - the mutual 
and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in 
Vienna ; the conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament in Geneva; and the United Nations 
General Assembly and its First Committee. The 
western positions in all these talks - whether 
bilateral or multilateral - are the subject of 
consultation and concertation in the North 
Atlantic Council and, as far as the multilateral 
talks are concerned, in the political framework 
of the nine countries of the European Com-
munity. 
4. This maze of agreements and negotiations 
requires a careful effort to assess progress and 
achievement, to distinguish the meaningful from 
the merely cosmetic. There are many hopeful 
signs that suggest that the Soviet Union is 
genuinely interested in arms control agreements 
in certain specific areas where they are perceived 
to be advantageous. At the same time, there are 
many disquieting features about Soviet policy 
which lead its critics to cast doubts on the policy 
of detente. Detente certainly cannot be divisible ; 
as the North Atlantic Council communique of 
21st May 1976 points out "the necessary con-
fidence could not be established between East and 
West if crises and tensions were to be avoided 
in Europe only to appear elsewhere". The Soviet-
inspired intervention in Angola, as Mr. Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt, principal adviser to Dr. Kissinger, 
pointed out on 31st August, showed that the 
Soviet Union could not be deterred from carry-
ing out certain activities merely by words. To be 
deterred, the Soviet Union would have to per-
ceive a risk, and western policy would have to 
be backed by a strong defence effort. 
5. 1977 promises to be a year of particularly 
intensive negotiations, and possibly of significant 
agreement, in the area of arms control. Impor-
tant elections have been held in Germany and 
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the United States, removing onP reason for 
delaying decision in the eyes of the Soviet 
Union; on 15th June a preparatory meeting 
is to be held in Belgrade to organise the follow-
up meeting to the CSCE. In October the interim 
SALT agreement is due to expire unless replaced 
by another. The Committee therefore considers 
it appropriate to report now on the application 
of existing agreements, and to make recommen-
dations about the conduct of future negotiations. 
U. The military balance 
6. The main features of the balance of forces 
between East and West, as it affects Europe, 
are shown in the table below : 
Military balance in conventional forces 
(from IISS Military Balance 1976-77) 
Northern and Central Southern Europe 1 Europe 1 
Ground forces available in Warsaw (of which Warsaw (of which peacetime NATO NATO 
(division equivalents) 3 Pact USSR) Pact USSR) 
~oured infantry 11 31 19 6 6 3 
Mechanised and airborne 18 36 21 35 27 7 
Combat and direct support 635 910 620 540 395 155 troops available (000) 
Main battle tanks in oper- 7,000 19,000 11,000 4,000 7,5005 2,7505 ational service in peacetime4 
Tactical aircraft in 
operational service 6 
Light bombers 185 225 200 - 507 507 
Fighter /ground attack 1,250 1,375 950 450 2507 1007 
Interceptors 375 2,050 950 275 700 200 
Reconnaissance 275 550 400 150 lOO 50 
I. Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which AFCENT and AFNORTH commanders have responsibility. 
France is not included, nor are any a.llied ground forces in Portugal or Britain. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes 
the command for which the Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania; certain Soviet units stationed in the Western USSR and such troops as might be committed 
to the Baltic and Norwegian areas of operation have, however, been included. 
2. Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces (including those in Asian Turkey) and 
such American and British units as would be committed to the Mediterranean theatre of operations, and, on the 
Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and such Soviet units normally stationed in 
Hungary and South-Western USSR as might be committed to the Mediterranean theatre. 
3. Divisions, brigades and similar formations, aggregated on the basis of three brigades to a division. 
4. These are tanks with formations, or which are earmarked for the use of dual-based or immediate reinforcing 
formations (some 550). They do not include those in reserve, or small stocks held to replace tanks damaged or destroyed. 
In this latter category NATO has perhaps 2,000 tanks in Europe. There are tanks in reserve in the Warsaw Pact 
area, but the figures are difficult to establish. The total tank holdings are, however, materially higher than the forma-
tion totals in the table. 
5. Soviet tank production is high; some 1,000 T-72 have been built in the last two years. 
6. For Northern and Central Europe the area covered here is slightly wider than for ground troops as described 
in note I. Many aircraft have a long-range capability and in any case can be redeployed very quickly. Accordingly, 
the figures here include the appropriate British and American aircraft in Britain, American aircraft in Spain and Soviet 
aircraft in the Western USSR. They do not, however, include the American dual-based squadrons, which would add 
about 100 fighter-type aircraft to the NATO totals, nor French squadrons with perhaps another 400 fighters. Carrier-
borne aircraft of the United States navy are excluded, but so are the medium bombers in the Soviet air force, which 
could operate in a tactical role. 
7. The latest versions of the MiG-23 Flogger, Su-17/20 Fitter and Su-19 Fencer are reported to have substantia.lly 
improved range, payload, avionics and electronic countermeasures capabilities. This may well be at the expense of 
overa.ll numbers in future, since there has been an increase of some 1,300 tactical aircraft in the Pact in the last 
seven years or so. 
N. B. If French forces were included in the Northern and Central Europe totals, these should be increased by two 
divisions (being reduced by 10,000 men), 325 tanks and 400 fighter aircraft. Outside the command area are a further 
485 tanks and seven divisions, but these forces are being reorganised. 
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7. As far as theatre nuclear weapons are 
concerned, NATO has been said on many occa-
sions to have 7,000 (United States) nuclear 
warheads stockpiled in Europe, as against some 
3,500 for the Warsaw Pact. These include bombs 
for tactical aircraft as well as warheads for 
missiles such as the Lance and Pershing and 
atomic demolition munitions. 
8. The superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces 
in men, numbers of tanks and tactical aircraft 
is unquestioned, although unclassified figures 
are believed to present an over-pessimistic view 
of the situation known to western intelligence 
today. Despite the steady improvement of Soviet 
technology, in particular the increased range 
of much of the Warsaw Pact tactical aviation, 
the quality of equipment in western hands is still 
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judged to be superior. Second-generation anti-
tank missiles such as Tow, Hot and Milan and 
new short-range air defence systems such as 
Roland and Guepard are coming into service 
with the NATO forces. Recently, there have been 
significant improvements in the integration of 
NATO forces to operate as a cohesive whole. 
Air forces on the central front have been reor-
ganised under the new command Allied Air 
Forces Central Europe ; military exercises since 
General Haig became Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe have been co-ordinated to a far 
greater extent, to provide genuine NATO-wide 
manoeuvres. While the press has reported par-
ticular phases, too little attention has been paid 
to the exercise Display Determination held in 
September and October, which ranged over 
Strategic missile balance - 1976-77 
Independent Total number 
Missile Number warheads on independent 
each missile warheads 
-
United States 
Land-based Titan 54 I 54 
Minuteman II 450 I 450 
Minuteman Ill 5504 3 1,650 
Submarine-launched Polaris A-3 2241 I 224 
Poseidon 4321 "' 10 4,320 
Totals 1,710 6,698 
Soviet Union 
Land-based SS-7 1402 I 1402 
8 192 I 192 
9 252 I 252 
ll 900 I 900 
13 60 I 60 
17 20 4 503 
18 36 8 1623 
19 lOO 6 3503 
Submarine-launched SSN-4 27 I 27 
5 54 I 54 
6 544 I 544 
8 220 I 220 
Totals 2,372 2,7803 
1. By early 1978 conversion of four more Polaris submarines to Poseidon will provide 160 Polaris A-3 and 496 
Poseidon missiles. 
2. Being dismantled. 
3. Assuming half of missiles only with MIRV. Press reports of the briefing given to the Nuclear Planning Group on 
17th November 1976 by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Rumsfeld, speak of a total of 175 SS-17 and 
SS-19 with MIRV, but suggest SS-18 had only one warhead. In this case, the present total of 2,780 would become 
about 3,000. If the Soviet Union in time fits MIRV to 1,320 missiles as permitted under the Vladivostok agreement, 
the total might be about 9,000. 
4. A decision to produce a further 60 Minuteman III was announced on 18th November 1976. 
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4,000 kms. from the Atlantic to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, involving two ocean convoys, 
amphibious landings in Sardinia, and air rein-
forcement by ACE Mobile Force in Eastern 
Turkey. Naval and air forces from France, Italy, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States took part. More serious attention is now 
being paid to the problem of standardisation and 
France in this connection is participating fully 
in the NATO study of interoperability to be 
submitted to the North Atlantic Council in 
December. 
9. The strategic missile balance as it affects 
the two superpowers is shown in the table on 
the previous page. To the total numbers of 
warheads shown for the United States can be 
added 82 for the French land- and submarine-
based missile force, and a further 64 for the 
British submarine-based force. 
10. The United States' next generation of stra-
tegic submal'ines- Trident- is now being built 
at the rate of three every two years and should 
begin to be operational towards the end of 1978 
with the Trident I missile. A replacement stra-
tegic bomber B-1 for the elderly B-52 is now 
being flight-tested and a decision to go into 
full engineering development is at present pend-
ing. Research is also under way for a replace-
ment missile for Minuteman, the so-called MX, 
which could be operational in the mid-1980s. A 
decision on full-scale development is not expected 
until 1977. 
11. Also under development in the United States 
is the cruise missile in both air-launched and 
sea-launched versions. The annual Defence 
Department report for financial year 1977 recog-
nises that the cruise missile is an important issue 
in the SALT II negotiations "pending outcome 
of these negotiations we are proceeding with 
the two programmes at a deliberate pace during 
the advanced development phase ... this will allow 
us to accommodate SALT developments and 
still maintain an orderly development effort" 
until the cruise missile concept has been satis-
factorily demonstrated. A decision on full-scale 
engineering development is to be made in early 
1977. Various writers 1 have drawn attention to 
the possible destabilising effects of these cruise 
missiles if they are developed to an operational 
I.. Richard Burt : "The cruise missile and anns control", 
SUl"VlvaJ, January /February 1976; Alexander R. Vershbow: 
"The cruise missile: The end of anns control?", Foreign 
Affairs, October 1976. 
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stage. They are basically pilotless aircraft fitted 
with the new high efficiency type of fan jet 
engine which will permit relatively small mis-
siles to have ranges comparable to those of 
existing ballistic missiles, but with far greater 
accuracy based on terrain-matching techniques. 
The expected accuracy of these systems when 
fully developed would give them a counter-
force capability - the ability to destroy Soviet 
missiles in their silos. It is claimed that these 
cruise missiles would be versatile as to range ; 
medium-range or intercontinental-range missiles 
would be indistinguishable. Some 53 ems. in 
diameter and 6 metres in length, they can be 
fired from standard submarine torpedo tubes. 
12. Of particular concern to Europe are the 600 
medium- and intermediate-range Soviet missiles 
which are not included in the foregoing table. 
In June 1976, the United States released infor-
mation about the replacement missile SSX-20 
fitted with MIRV which is being introduced to 
replace some of the 600 missiles. It is pointed 
out that such weapons systems are not included 
in any of the ongoing talks - either MBFR 
or SALT - and the Soviet Union is securing 
a unilateral advantage with this new missile. 
At the end of October, the United States Defence 
Department announced that a second wing of 
F-111 nuclear capable bombers would be moved 
to Britain to supplement the existing wing which 
has been based there since 1970. 
13. Nuclear systems belonging to the United 
States and the Soviet Union which can be 
assumed to be targeted within the broad Euro-
pean area are shown in the table on the following 
page. 
14. Despite the unquestioned Soviet superiority 
in numbers of men, tanks and tactical aircraft, 
views are divided about the overall military 
balance at the present time. As Dr. Kissinger 
recently pointed out 1 : 
"We have always had to face Soviet ground 
forces larger than our own - partly because 
of the Soviet Union's definition of its needs 
as a power in the heart of the Eurasian 
land mass, with perceived threats on both 
flanks. Its naval power, while a growing 
and serious problem, is far weaker than 
combined allied naval strength in terms of 
tonnage, fire power, range, access to the 
sea, experience and seamanship ... United 
I. Ala.stair Bucha.n memorial lecture, London, 25th 
June 1976. 
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United States and Soviet nuclear systems assigned to European targets 
United States Soviet Union 
Systems based in 
United States and USSR 
Medium-range /intermediate-range 0 Approx. 600 (SS-4, SS-5) ; 
ballistic missiles (SSX-20 under development) 
(more than 600 miles) 
Medium bombers 60 Approx. 600 
(FB-llls) (Badger, Blinder) 
Systems based in 
Central Europe 
Combat aircraft 1 Approx. 200 Approx. 1,000 
[Tactical missiles] 2 
Naval aircraft (Approx. 200 deployed on Approx. 400 (land-based) 
5 carriers at any given time) 
Source: US ACDA 1976. 
1. All nuclear.capable fighters, light bombers, and attack aircraft (excluding reconnaissance variants) whether or not 
they have primary nuclear roles ; armed helicopters and naval aircraft not included. 
2. [Reminder] There are also surface-to.surface missile launchers based in Central Europe on both sides - Lance, 
Pershing (United States); Frog, Scud (Soviet) - of less than 600 miles range. 
States strategic forces are superior in 
accuracy, diversity, reliability, survivability, 
and numbers of separately targetable 
nuclear warheads. We have a commanding 
lead in strategic bombers. In addition, there 
are American deployments overseas and the 
nuclear forces of two Atlantic allies. Even 
with our different priorities, the economic 
and technological base which underlies 
western military strength remains overwhelm-
ingly superior in size and capacity for inno-
vation. The Soviet Union suffers endemic 
weakness in its industry and agriculture ; 
recent studies indicate that this chronic 
inefficiency extends even into the military 
sector to a much greater extent than realised 
before... Therefore let us not paralyse our-
selves by a rhetoric of weakness ... The fact 
is that nowhere has the West been defeated 
for lack of strength. Our setbacks have 
been self-inflicted, either because leaders 
chose objectives that were beyond our psy-
chological capabilities or because our legisla-
tures refused to support what the executive 
branch believed was essential." 
15. The real problem facing the West as far as 
the defence effort is concerned is that of main-
taining the effort at the present level despite 
the severe economic recession, and despite the 
relaxed atmosphere inevitably generated by a 
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policy of detente. Military forces and hardware 
in being at any time reflect decisions taken ten 
years previously. While the West in the past 
had overwhelming strategic superiority, the 
present equality leaves no margin for error in 
forward defence planning. Today's mistaken 
decisions would be reflected in forces only in 
the late 1980s by which time it would be too late 
to rectify them. 
m. Strategic arms limitation talks 
16. The SALT delegations of the United States 
and the Soviet Union have been meeting in 
regular sessions since the first SALT agreement 
of 1972 to prepare a successor to the present 
interim agreement which more or less froze 
strategic missiles at the 1972 United States levels, 
and which expires in October 1977. The 1972 
ABM treaty has been supplemented by a pro-
tocol of July 1974 which entered into force in 
May 1976, reducing the number of ABM sites 
of each party from two to one. The present 
round of talks opened in Geneva on 21st Sep-
tember 1976. 
17. The outline of the future agreement was 
sketched by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev 
at the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974. 
It is planned to have a ten-year life, to limit 
each side to 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles 
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(missiles and heavy bombers) of which up to 
1,320 may be fitted with multiple independent 
warheads (MIRVs). It is reported that drafting 
of the future agreement is well advanced, but 
there is disagreement over the need to include 
either the new Soviet bomber Backfire or the 
United States cruise missiles which have been 
referred to above. This issue is now being handled 
directly at high level between the two capitals, 
having being removed from the domain of the 
two SALT delegations in Geneva. 
18. When the strategic arms limitation talks 
were first proposed by the United States during 
the Johnson administration, the arms control 
community believed it would be possible to reach 
agreement on a strategic balance with the then-
existing roughly equal numbers of missiles, 
without the expense and uncertainties involved 
in the production and deployment of the MIRV 
system. By the time the SALT negotiations 
began, flight testing of MIRV by the United 
States had been completed and its deployment 
was inevitable. The Vladivostok understanding 
now permits each party to deploy equal numbers 
of missiles fitted with MIRV. The cruise missile 
is now in the early stage of development that 
the MIRV system had reached a decade ago. 
An agreement in SALT 11 to ban the further 
development by either party will not jeopardise 
western security. Experience shows that the 
only possible alternative in the longer run would 
be the full deployment of cruise missiles by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, with 
greatly increased uncertainties in the nuclear 
equation. 
19. The United States reports from time to time 
on the progress of the SALT talks to its allies 
in NATO, and there is no reason to suppose that 
the United States would ever accept an agree-
ment that fixed its own strategic nuclear forces 
at levels lower than those necessary to maintain 
a balance with the Soviet Union. On 18th Nov-
ember 1976, the Pentagon announced that a 
further 60 Minuteman Ill ICBMs would be 
produced because of the slowness of the SALT 
negotiations. 
20. European interests however are more 
directly involved in other ways. The 1972 ABM 
agreement included a clause prohibiting the 
transfer of ABM technology to other countries. 
It is important that no such prohibition should 
appear in any strategic arms agreement, and 
that the United States should remain free to 
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co-operate with its allies in the production of 
nuclear weapons where such co-operation is 
mutually desired. British nuclear warheads since 
the 1958 agreement have been developed on the 
basis of an exchange of technology and fissile 
material with the United States, while the Polaris 
A-3 missile in British submarines has been pro-
cured from the United States under the 1963 
agreement. The French nuclear forces have been 
developed independently, but United States 
assistance in two fields has enabled them to be 
operational sooner than would otherwise have 
been possible. The prototype nuclear propulsion 
reactor for the French strategic submarine -
the so-called prototype a terre - PAT - was 
supplied with United States enriched uranium, 
and the French Mirage IV nuclear bomber force 
depends on tanker aircraft supplied by the United 
States for the inflight refuelling necessary for 
the force to reach its objectives. The Committee 
stresses that it would not be in the interest of 
the Alliance for the necessary nuclear co-opera-
tion between the United States and its allies to 
be limited in any way in a future arms control 
agreement. 
21. The second issue of concern to European 
members of NATO is the possible effect of SALT 
agreements on the level of the French and 
British nuclear forces, and vice versa. The Soviet 
Union sought to include a reference to these 
forces in the SALT I interim agreement ; this 
demand was of course rejected by the United 
States. In the event the Soviet Union made a 
unilateral statement included in the record to the 
effect that it would be free to increase the level 
of its own forces above those permitted by the 
agreement, in the event of the strategic nuclear 
forces of allies of the United States being 
increased beyond the programmed levels. It is 
clearly important that the level of nuclear forces 
of NATO countries should not be limited by 
agreements to which the countries concerned are 
not parties. 
22. The last area of direct concern to European 
NATO countries is that of the strategic nuclear 
weapons systems which are at present excluded 
from any East-West negotiations. These are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
23. The objectives of SALT have been cogently 
stated by Dr. Kissinger 1 : 
1. Alastair Buchan memorial lecture, London, 25th 
June 1976. 
"A continuing build-up of strategic arms, 
therefore, only leads to fresh balances - but 
at higher levels of expenditure and uncer-
tainties ... Moreover, a continuing race diverts 
resources from other needed areas, such as 
forces for regional defence, where imbal-
ances can have serious geopolitical conse-
quences. All these factors have made arms 
limitation a practical interest of both sides, 
as well as a factor for stability in the world." 
24. 1977 is very likely to prove a year of decision 
for SALT II. The 1972 interim agreement 
expires in October, and the uncertainties which 
the Soviet Union always sees in United States 
presidential elections have been removed. 
IV. Euro-strategic weapons 
25. Attention has been drawn above to the 
introduction by the Soviet Union of a mobile 
medium-range missile SSX-20, fitted with mul-
tiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles 
(MIRVs), in place of some of the 600 medium-
range missiles targeted on Europe. At the meet-
ing of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group held 
in London on 17th and 18th November 1976, 
the United States Secretary of Defence, 
Mr. Rumsfeld, is reported to have said that he 
had no proof that the SSX-20 had been deployed, 
but he expected it would be at any time. After 
the meeting the NATO Secretary-General, 
Mr. Luns, said it had been agreed that NATO 
experts would study plans for deploying in 
Europe cruise missiles to counter the increase 
in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and United States 
electronic surveillance equipment to locate 
mobile missile-launching sites. 
26. These weapons systems are two of a number 
of nuclear weapons systems of strategic 
capability which are not included in the SALT 
talks. Of major interest to the Soviet Union is 
the United States F-111 aircraft referred to 
above; one nuclear strike wing of the F-111E 
version has been based in the United Kingdom 
since 1970 ; the intention to move a second wing, 
this time of the longer-range F-111F version, to 
the United Kingdom was announced at the end 
of October, a few months after attention had 
been drawn to the Soviet SSX-20 capability. 
27. Weapons systems such as these remained 
outside the scope of the SALT talks, because 
those talks were to be limited to weapons systems 
based on the territory of one party, having 
enough range for them to reach the territory 
of the other. These systems are similarly outside 
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the scope of the MBFR talks because they are 
based outside the so-called guidelines area within 
which reductions are to be negotiated - Ger-
many and the Benelux countries ; East Germany, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
28. The Committee recommends that a new nego-
tiating forum be established to seek acceptable 
arms control agreements of Euro-strategic 
nuclear weapons systems. One possibility would 
be to establish within the framework of the exist-
ing bilateral strategic arms limitation talks a 
Euro-strategic sub-committee. The United States 
Delegation could continue to be the negotiator 
as far as the United States weapons systems 
were concerned, provided that its position was 
concerted within NATO as closely as the western 
position on MBFRs is concerted at present. An 
advisory mission of representatives of certain 
European NATO countries could be established 
in Geneva to maintain close liaison with the 
United States Delegation, and would then be 
in a position to meet the Soviet negotiating team 
informally. Such an advisory mission might be 
supplied by Britain and France as nuclear 
powers, and by Germany as a country whose 
territory is most exposed to the Soviet weapons 
systems. There would then be a case for includ-
ing British and French strategic nuclear forces 
in multilateral negotiations in which the Soviet 
and United States SALT Delegations would 
participate, together with three European delega-
tions from the advisory mission. 
29. The problems of what are now called Euro-
strategic weapons are now being discussed very 
seriously in the NATO framework. The Commit-
tee believes that there is a strong case for includ-
ing in some such negotiating framework as is 
suggested above all weapons systems such as the 
600 Soviet intermediate- and medium-range bal-
listic missiles, including the new SSX-20, the 
new F-111 and Backfire bombers, and also the 
British and French strategic nuclear forces. If a 
ban on the further development of cruise mis-
siles can be included in a bilateral SALT II 
agreement, a similar parallel ban should also be 
included in any EUROSALT agreement. 
V. Mutual and balanced force reductions 
30. Since 30th October 1973, negotiations hav€ 
been proceeding in Vienna on what NATO calls 
mutual and balanced force reductions, but which 
in the agreed communique of the preparatory 
consultations are known as "Mutual reduction 
of forces and armaments and associated measures 
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in Central Europe". The geographical area 
within which reductions are envisaged (the 
NATO guidelines area, or the reductions area) 
is comprised by the territories of Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany and Poland on the one hand and 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands on the other. The direct participants from 
the NATO countries are Belgium, Canada, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States and from the 
Warsaw Pact Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland 
and the Soviet Union - on the grounds that 
these are the countries having forces in the area. 
Special status participants are Denmark, Greece, 
Italy and Norway on the one hand and Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania on the other - countries 
not having forces in the reduction area. The 
NATO participants have reserved the right to 
review the status of Hungary, considering that 
the four Soviet first category divisions stationed 
there with 1,100 tanks and 55,000 men, together 
with 90,000 men and 1,500 tanks in the 
Hungarian army, immediately contiguous to the 
reductions area, are directly relevant to the 
problem. France has declined to participate in 
the negotiations. 
31. The NATO countries have claimed that 
within the reduction area, the Warsaw Pact 
maintains 925,000 ground forces and 16,000 
battle tanks against NATO's 777,000 and 6,000 
operational main battle tanks. As the Warsaw 
Pact countries were not prepared to reveal figures 
for their estimates of forces in the early stages, no 
definition of the NATO figures has been given 
but they no doubt include French forces in Ger-
many and count only tanks in operational units, 
excluding those held in reserve. In addition to 
stressing the disparity of conventional forces, the 
NATO countries have also stressed the geo-
graphical disparity that the United States, a 
chief source of reinforcements for the central 
front, is 6,000 kms from the demarcation line in 
Central Europe, compared with 650 kms from 
the Soviet Union which has a common frontier 
with the reductions area. 
32. The initial Warsaw Pact proposal of Nov-
ember 1973 called first for a reduction of 20,000 
ground and air force personnel on each side, 
comprising both indigenous and foreign-stationed 
forces, followed by a further 5 % reduction in 
1976 and another 10 % in 1977 - proposals 
which would leave NATO ground forces in the 
area at 644,000 compared with 775,000 for the 
Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact proposal would 
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further freeze the remammg forces and arma-
ments of each country within the area. 
33. The NATO countries, which have neces-
sarily insisted on balanced reductions aimed at 
achieving eventual parity in forces, initially 
proposed reductions in two phases, to lead to a 
common ceiling of 700,000 men in the ground 
forces on either side. In the first phase 29,000 
United States ground forces would be withdrawn 
and 68,000 Russians, including a tank army with 
all its equipment - amounting to a reduction 
of 1,700 tanks. In the second phase, other forces 
would be reduced to reach the common ceiling 
but there would be no limit on armaments or 
nuclear weapons. The overall level of military 
personnel on both sides in the reduction area, 
including air force personnel, would not be 
increased between the phases. 
34. While the Warsaw Pact proposals were not 
seen by NATO as calling for drastic and 
destabilising reductions in United States forces 
in Europe, they were unacceptable in that they 
would severely limit the right of Western Euro-
pean countries to organise their own defence in 
the future, to compensate for example for any 
later withdrawal of United States forces, or to 
modernise their weapons systems. 
35. In December 1975, the NATO countries 
introduced the so-called "Option 3" proposing the 
withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear 
warheads from the reduction area, together with 
certain delivery systems - 54 F-4 combat air-
craft and 36 Pershing missiles. In return, the 
'V arsaw Pact countries would have to accept 
asymmetrical reductions to the common collective 
ceiling of 700,000 ground force personnel on each 
side, and the Soviet Union would have to with-
draw a complete tank army including 1,700 main 
battle tanks, against the withdrawal of 29,000 
United States ground forces. The offer further 
included a 900,000 man ceiling for combined 
ground and air forces on each side - implying 
that air force personnel could thereafter be 
increased only if ground forces were reduced 
below the 700,000 ceiling. 
36. The Assembly in Recommendation 269, 
adopted on 28th May 1975 on the report of the 
Committee, suggested that reductions agreed in 
the MBFR negotiations might include theatre 
nuclear weapons. The Committee therefore wel-
comes the latest NATO proposals which constitute 
a realistic offer to lead the Soviet Union to 
reduce its unnecessary superiority in tanks, in 
exchange for a reduction in NATO's superiority 
in tactical nuclear weapons- the NATO stock-
pile figure of 7,000 dates from an earlier strategy 
than that of flexible response. 
37. In the course of the first half of 1976, the 
Warsaw Pact countries have moved in two direc-
tions. In February, supplementary proposals to 
the November 1973 draft agreement were made, 
calling for equal percentage reductions of 2 to 
3 % of the total personnel (ground and air 
forces) of the United States and Soviet Union 
in the reduction area. The reductions would 
include 300 tanks, 54 nuclear capable aircraft 
and 36 nuclear missiles on each side as well as 
unspecified numbers of surface-to-air missiles. 
38. This is not of course an acceptable proposal 
from the NATO point of view for various 
reasons, chiefly because equal percentage reduc-
tions are proposed instead of asymmetric reduc-
tions leading to common ceilings ; because the 
disadvantages of the original proposals - freez-
ing European forces in the area in the future-
would remain and because the proposed reduc-
tions in aircraft would greatly advantage the 
Soviet Union because of the superior perform-
ance and smaller numbers of the F-4 aircraft in 
the area. The proposed tank reductions would 
do nothing to reduce the overwhelming superi-
ority of the Warsaw Pact countries. 
39. In June, for the first time, the Warsaw 
Pact countries put forward figures which they 
claimed to be the present levels of their ground 
and air forces in the reductions area -
reportedly a total of 965,000 men for ground 
and air forces, including 805,000 ground forces. 
While at first sight the ground forces appear 
to be 100,000 men fewer than NATO estimates, 
until agreed definitions of figures have been 
discussed between the two sides it will not be 
possible to make a proper assessment of the 
discrepancies. 
40. The Vienna negotiations reopened after the 
summer break on 28th September. Although 
there is a wide divergence between the positions 
of the two sides, the Warsaw Pact countries 
may be said to have shifted very slightly towards 
the NATO position. The cumbersome Soviet 
decision-making machine is notorious for taking 
only one decision at a time and it is generally 
believed that an agreement on SALT II will 
precede any serious Soviet approach to the 
MBFR negotiations. 
41. The Committee believes therefore that the 
NATO countries, which initially had linked their 
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agreement to a conference on security and co-
operation in Europe with parallel progress on 
MBFRs must insist on making a full report on 
' . the lack of progress to the Belgrade meetmg 
which is to be held in 1977 to review progress 
under the CSCE final act. The NATO countries 
are in a stronger negotiating position at Vienna 
than they were at the outset of the talks. Pres-
sure for unilateral reductions in United States 
forces in Europe - the Mansfield amendments 
- are now in the past, and the cohesion of the 
Alliance works well in the talks, the western 
position being closely concerted in NATO at all 
times. The NATO countries concerned must con-
tinue to persevere with determination in the 
Vienna negotiations for as long as is necessary 
to reach acceptable agreement which will fix 
common ceilings for both sides in the reduc-
tions area - the only basis for lasting security 
in Europe. 'Vhatever the domestic pressures, 
calls for unilateral reductions in NATO forces 
must more than ever be resisted because they 
can only jeopardise progress in the MBFR talks. 
The Committee continues to regret the absence 
of France from these and other important nego-
tiations, and notes that the withdrawal of 10,000 
French forces from Germany, although part 
of general reorganisation which may increase the 
eapability of the French ground forces, may 
appear to weaken the western negotiating posi-
tion in Vienna. At the same time, the full parti-
cipation of France in joint arms production 
talks in the Rome group has undoubtedly streng-
thened the cohesion of the Alliance. 
VI. Conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe 
42. The final act of the conference, signed in 
Helsinki on 1st August 1975 after more than two 
years of continuous discussions between special 
delegations of the 35 participating States, is 
more of a declaration of intent - or rather 
several declarations of intent - than a binding 
international agreement. Specifically, it is not 
registered with the United Nations under Article 
102 of the Charter as a treaty would be, and 
cannot therefore be invoked before any organ 
of the United Nations. The three baskets of the 
negotiations appear as distinct declarations on 
"Questions relating to security in Europe", 
"Co-operation in the field of economics, of 
science and technology and of the environment", 
and lastly, "Co-operation in humanitarian and 
other fields". The texts inevitably are a detailed 
and careful compromise between the starting 
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positions of the Warsaw Pact countries on the 
one hand and the NATO countries on the other, 
with the non-aligned European countries very 
largely supporting the views of the NATO coun-
tries, especially on the important third basket 
on humanitarian co-operation. 
43. When the final act is compared with the 
initial position of the Soviet Union before nego-
tiations began, the text can be regarded as a 
satisfactory compromise from the western point 
of view. The Soviet Union sought in the con-
ference a means of imposing permanently the 
division of Europe into two halves, and the 
postwar frontiers imposed by the Soviet Union 
in Eastern Europe. In the event, the western 
countries have secured the full participation of 
the United States and Canada in the conference, 
the insertion in basket one of the statement that 
"frontiers can be changed in accordance with 
international law by peaceful means and by 
agreement", the inclusion in basket one of a 
section on "confidence-building measures and 
certain aspects of security and disarmament" ; 
and the whole of the third basket on co-operation 
in humanitarian and other fields containing 
detailed provisions for the freer contact of 
peoples and flow of information across frontiers. 
While the "\Vest was reluctant to agree to the 
Soviet Union's demand for permanent machinery 
to supervise the application of the final act, it 
now appears that the West will have more to 
gain in publicising the performance of all coun-
tries in implementing all three baskets when the 
meeting of representatives of foreign ministers 
is convened in Belgrade next year ; Soviet 
spokesmen are already adopting defensive 
attitudes to the meeting. 
44. While the Committee recognises that per-
formance under all three baskets of the final 
act, especially the third, is important to the 
security of Europe and a continuance of the 
policy of detente, the terms of reference of the 
present report, devoted to European security, 
make it desirable to pay particular attention to 
action taken under the confidence-building 
measures. These are discussed here under the 
headings of the confidence-building measures 
document. 
Prior notification of major military manoeuvres 
45. The final act declares that the participating 
States "will notify their major military 
manoeuvres to all other participating States". 
These are defined as manoeuvres exceeding a 
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total of 25,000 troops, taking place on the terri-
tory in Europe of any participating State or the 
adjoining sea and air space. But participating 
States whose territory extends beyond Europe 
need notify only manoeuvres within an area of 
250 kms from its frontier facing or shared with 
other European participants, and need not give 
notification if the area is also contiguous to a 
frontier facing or shared with a non-European 
non-participating State. Notification will be 
given 21 days or more in advance, or at the 
earliest possible opportunity if manoeuvres are 
arranged at short notice. 
46. Since the signature of the final act, NATO 
countries appear to have been involved in six 
major military manoeuvres employing more than 
25,000 men, and all have been notified to CSCE 
participants. A further seven smaller exercises 
have also been notified. 
47. No notification of exercises was received 
from the Soviet Union until January 1976 when 
it gave notice of manoeuvres in the Caucasus, 
followed by a second notification of manoeuvres 
in the Baltic in May. A smaller exercise by 
Hungary in April, with 10,000 men, was brought 
to the notice of military attaches, but less than 
21 days beforehand. Poland notified parti-
cipating countries of the exercise Shield 76 
involving some 35,000 troops from East 
Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union which 
was held in Poland from 9th to 16th September. 
Prior notification of other military manoeuvres 
48. The final act says that participating States 
"may also notify smaller-scale military manoeu-
vres to other participating States, with special 
regard for those near the area of such manoeu-
vres". As noted above, the NATO countries 
appear to have notified seven manoeuvres of 
less than 25,000 men, whereas there has been 
only one comparable notification by a Warsaw 
Pact country - that of Hungary given infor-
mally with less than 21 days' notice. 
Exchange of observers 
49. The final act provides that "the partici-
pating States will invite other participating 
States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis ... to 
send observers to attend military manoeuvres. 
The inviting State will determine in each case 
the number of observers, the procedures and the 
conditions of their participation, and give other 
information which it may consider useful. It will 
provide appropriate facilities and hospitality. 
The invitation will be given as far ahead as is 
cQllveniently possible ... " 
50. NATO countries sent invitations to all CSCE 
participants to observe the Certain Trek exercise 
in 1975 as well as Grosser Biir - land and sea 
exercises involving some 50,000 troops from 
Britain, the Netherlands, the United States and 
Germany held in North Germany from 6th to 
lOth September 1976, Lares Team - involving 
44,000 troops from Germany, the United States 
and Canada which was held from 13th to 17th 
September 1976, and Gordian Shield - an 
exercise involving 30,000 men from the United 
States, Belgium and Germany in land and sea 
manoeuvres in the South of Germany from 7th 
to 11th September 1976. The Soviet Union and 
other Warsaw Pact countries were invited to 
send observers to exercise Teamwork 76 - the 
largest naval exercise held from lOth to 23rd 
September 1976 in Central Norway and Den-
mark, involving over 80,000 men from land, sea 
and air forces of Belgium, Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Britain and 
the United States. 
51. All Warsaw Pact countries refused invita-
tions to these exercises - in 1975 no reply to 
the invitations was sent ; in 1976 the Soviet 
Union gave as the reason for refusing an invi-
tation to Grosser Biir, the absence of a Soviet 
military attache in Bonn. An article in Izvestia 
of 9th September complained that "the invi-
tation extended to diplomatic representatives 
of the Soviet Embassy in the Federal Republic 
of Germany to attend the exercises as observers 
reflects a rather formal approach on the part 
of the West German Government... These 
representatives are not competent in the military 
field and would not be able to perform the 
function of observers". This excuse could not be 
valid in the case of exercise Teamwork, as the 
Soviet Union has a military attache in Oslo. The 
same Izvestia article contained a strong attack 
on NATO exercises which it claimed were 
hostile "to the Soviet Union and the other Euro-
pean socialist countries". Although the Helsinki 
final act imposes no limitations on manoeuvres, 
an article in Krasnaya Zvezda similarly con-
demned the manoeuvres, claiming that they 
showed that the "leadership of the North 
Atlantic bloc does not intend to take the accords 
reached at the European conference at Helsinki 
seriously into consideration". Despite its refusal 
to send official observers to exercise Teamwork, 
the Soviet Union as usual was careful to observe 
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it from a distance with two Kresta-class cruisers 
and intelligence-gathering ships, and a number 
of overflights by long-range Bear aircraft. 
52. The Soviet Union invited observers from 
neighbouring CSCE participants - Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia- to 
observe the exercise Caucasus held in that region 
in February 1976. It invited observers from 
Norway, Finland and Sweden as well as East 
Germany and Poland to attend exercise Sever 
held from 14th to 18th June in the Baltic area 
of the Soviet Union. Poland invited observers 
from Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
to attend exercise Shield 76 held in the Baltic 
area of Poland from 9th to 16th September 
involving some 35,000 men from land and air 
forces of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union. Two Danish military 
attaches duly attended Shield 76, and reported 
that although they spent five days in the area 
of the manoeuvres, they were able to see them 
only three times, from rather distant fixed posi-
tions - too distant to observe the military 
equipment employed. They appear, however, to 
have been given precisely the same facilities as 
other observers, and were well-received by their 
hosts, having the opportunity to meet and 
discuss with the defence ministers of the 
Warsaw Pact countries participating in the 
manoeuvres. These impressions appear to have 
been somewhat better than those of NATO coun-
try observers attending the Soviet exercises 
Sever and Caucasus. 
Prior notification of major military movements 
53. The final act states that participating States 
"recognise that they may, at their own discre-
tion ... notify their major military movements". 
Further consideration is to be given to the 
matter. Major military movements do not appear 
to have been notified by either NATO or Warsaw 
Pact countries. 
Other items 
54. The confidence-building document of the 
final act refers to other measures, including 
exchanges of military personnel and visits by 
military delegations. Under the heading "dis-
armament", "the participating States recognise 
the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at 
lessening military confrontation and promoting 
disarmament which are designed to complement 
political detente in Europe and to strengthen 
their security". Among the "essential conside-
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rations" listed is "the complementary nature of 
the political and military aspects of security". 
Basket Ill 
55. As far as "co-operation in humanitarian and 
other fields is concerned", the Committee notes 
in passing a generally unsatisfactory perform-
ance by Warsaw Pact countries, although there 
appears in general to have been some improve-
ment in bilateral arrangements for the reuniting 
of families1 • If there has been a slight increase 
in the numbers of western publications imported 
into the Warsaw Pact countries, western 
newspapers are still not generally available 
outside a few specialist points such as the inter-
national hotels. Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and 
the Soviet Union co-operated readily during the 
European Architectural Heritage Year of 1975, 
and some East European countries, including the 
Soviet Union, supplied material for the Europa 
Nostra film. 
Follow-up to the conference 
56. Under the follow-up procedure, the final 
act provides for a meeting at the level of 
representatives of foreign ministers to be held 
in Belgrade in 1977, and stipulates that a 
preparatory meeting to organise it will be held in 
that town on 15th June 1977. The Committee 
recommends that the allied countries make every 
effort to ensure that the meeting at the level 
of representatives of foreign ministers is held 
promptly, and used to give full publicity to the 
performance of all countries under the final act, 
which recognises that military measures must 
accompany political measures to ensure detente. 
In this connection, a full report should be made 
at the meeting of the progress of the MBFR 
negotiations. 
57. The meeting should be used to strengthen 
and extend the confidence-building measures 
by lowering the ceilings on the notification of 
manoeuvres, by making invitations to observers 
mandatory and improving the conditions for the 
observation of manoeuvres, and by making 
r?porting of troop movements of any signi-
fiCance equally mandatory. At the same time, 
care must be taken to resist any Soviet attempts 
to change the nature of the Helsinki document 
by introducing extraneous propaganda items 
1. Except in the case of Romania, the harshest of 
the Warsaw Pact regimes in this respect. 
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such as the Soviet proposal in the United Nations 
General Assembly to ban the use of force, or 
any declaration to ban the first use of nuclear 
weapons. 
VII. Other arms control measures 
58. The Committee draws attention to certain 
other arms control measures recently agreed or 
in the process of agreement, which indicate the 
interest of the Soviet Union in these areas. Most 
significant perhaps are the bilateral agreements 
with the United States- the threshold test-ban 
treaty signed in Moscow in July 1974 and the 
associated peaceful nuclear explosions treaty 
signed in May 1976. These two agreements were 
submitted to Congress for ratification on 29th 
July. The threshold treaty places a ceiling of 
150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapon 
tests carried out by either party. As both are also 
bound by the 1963 limited test ban which 
prohibits all nuclear testing in all other environ-
ments, the United States and the Soviet Union 
have thus effectively given up the testing of 
any nuclear device in excess of 150 kilotons. 
Provision is made for the exchange of extensive 
technical data to improve verification of these 
tests by national means, i.e. seismic and other 
external evidence, but without on-site inspection. 
The peaceful nuclear explosions treaty on the 
other hand, which also limits individual explo-
sions to a ceiling of 150 kilotons, provides that 
each party shall have access to sites of explosions 
conducted by the other party where groups of 
explosions having an aggregate yield in excess 
of 150 kilotons are involved. As the Soviet Union 
has been insisting for some time that it has a 
requirement for peaceful nuclear explosions for 
major engineering projects, it is likely that it 
f?resees a genuine requirement for group explo-
siOns, and is prepared to accept on-site inspec-
tion of such events. 
59. In the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament in Geneva on 21st August 1975 the 
United States and the Soviet Union introduced 
identical texts of a draft convention on the 
prohibition of military or any other hostile use 
of environmental modification techniques. This 
convention is now before the United Nations 
General Assembly and can be expected to be 
open for signature shortly. The Committee con-
siders that it represents a useful measure of 
arms control, although apparently not related 
to any present applications of military techno-
logy. 
60. Another significant but totally unpublicised 
area of Soviet collaboration with the West on 
arms control measures is the so-called London 
Club. Without public announcement, delegations 
from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States met first in London in April 1975 
to discuss guidelines for the export of civilian 
nuclear technology and plants, with a view to 
preventing such exports facilitating in any way 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At a fourth 
meeting in London on 2nd June 1976 the 
original seven were joined by representatives 
from East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. At a fifth meeting in London on 11th 
and 12th November the club became fourteen 
with the addition of Belgium, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, with a fifteenth, Switzerland, also 
present as an observer. No public announcement 
has ever been made about these meetings ; at the 
fourth meeting the participants agreed merely 
on a laconic press line to be given in answer to 
any questions : "Officials from a number of 
governments have met in London to exchange 
views on the problems of nuclear proliferation. 
The content of their discussions is confidential." 
VDI. Conclusions 
61. The Committee's conclusions are set forth 
in the draft recommendation. The essential 
points are made in the second paragraph of the 
preamble : a policy of detente can be safely 
pursued only on the basis of an adequate and 
sustained defence effort, and close cohesion in 
the Atlantic Alliance to ensure that only a con-
certed allied position is put forward in East-
West negotiations ; there must be no privileged 
interlocutor among allied countries. As Dr. Kis-
singer has said 1 : 
"We should not allow the Soviet Union to 
apply detente selectively within the Alliance. 
Competition among us in our diplomatic 
or economic policies toward the East risks 
dissipating western advantages and opening 
up Soviet opportunities. We must resist 
division and maintain the closest co-ordi-
nation." 
Operative text 
Paragraph 1 
62. The records of the Warsaw Pact and NATO 
countries in implementing some of the confidence-
1. Alastair Buchan memorial lecture, London, 25th 
June 1976. 
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building measures of the Helsinki final act are 
described in paragraphs 45 to 55 above. The 
objects to be pursued at the Belgrade meeting 
are described in paragraphs 56 and 57. 
Paragraph 2 
63. The limited progress of the MBFR nego-
tiations has been described in Chapter V. 
Paragraph 3 
64. The disturbing aspects of the introduction 
of the SSX-20 missile by the Soviet Union, with 
independent warheads targeted against Western 
Europe, have been described in Chapter IV. In 
paragraphs 28 and 29, proposals are made for 
a suitable forum for East-West negotiations on 
Euro-strategic missiles. 
Opinion of the minority 
65. The report as a whole was adopted in Com-
mittee by twelve votes to two with five absten-
tions. In the second paragraph of the preamble, 
a minority of the Committee would have added 
the words "Western European Union and the 
European Economic Community" after the 
words "in the Alliance", on the grounds that the 
policy of detente, to be effective, should be 
concerted also in a body with defence compe-
tences which brings together the principal 
Western European States. Aspects such as 
economic co-operation with eastern countries 
or traditional links between certain countries are 
of specific concern to Europe ; European secu-
rity and East-West relations concern the Euro-
peans more directly than the Americans, and 
should be dealt with in WEU, and doubtless the 
EEC, as well as in the North Atlantic Council. 
66. At the end of the fifth paragraph, the 
minority would have added "and in permitting 
the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be 
attenuated," on the grounds that a reason for 
detente deeper than economic is the need to make 
the hegemonies which weigh on the continent 
withdraw in the long term, and that the Hel-
sinki agreements can foster moves towards 
independence by certain eastern countries. 
Europe would no longer need to defer to the 
protection of the United States for its big deci-
sions - detente should be sought for the 
increased sovereignty and independence of 
nations and the decline of blocs. 
67. At the beginning of the operative text, the 
minority would have replaced the words "Recom-
mends to the Council that it urge member 
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governments : 1. To ensure that the North 
Atlantic Council" with the words "Recommends 
that the Council: 1. Make careful preparation ... " 
on the grounds that the recommendation should 
not be addressed to the North Atlantic Council 
but only to the Council of WEU which could 
juridically resume the exercise of the military 
competences transferred to NATO, which 
transfer does not correspond to reality since 
France left the integrated military structure of 
NATO. 
68. For similar reasons, the minority, in para-
graph 1 (b) of the operative text, would have 
replaced "Alliance" by "WEU", and in para-
graph 1 (b) (ii) would have replaced "Alliance 
policy" with the words "jointly-defined policy". 
69. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii), the minority would 
have deleted the words "and to report on the 
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progress or lack of progress of the negotiations 
on mutual and balanced force reductions". It 
would have also deleted paragraph 2, for the 
reasons for which France has not participated 
in the 1\IBFR negotiations, because they weaken 
the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance by 
leading the European countries to give up a real 
defence effort, leaving the two big powers to 
dominate strategy in Central Europe. Force 
reductions should be only a consequence of 
agreements on all points aimed at in the Helsinki 
conference. 
70. Finally, the minority would have deleted 
paragraph 3 on the grounds that it would ask 
France to sacrifice its nuclear force for hypo-
thetical Soviet concessions, and that force is a 
guarantee of national security and one guarantee 
of the defence of Europe. 
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Amendment No. 1 
European security and East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Riviere 
1st December 1976 
1. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Atlantic Alliance" 
insert "Western European Union and the European Economic Community,". 
2. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the Alliance" and insert "WEU". 
In paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Alliance" and insert "jointly-
defined". 
Signed : Riviere 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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Amendment No. 2 
European security and East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Riviere 
1st Deeember 1976 
1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert: 
"and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated," 
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: 
"and to report on the progreBB or lack of progreBB of the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions ;" 
3. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
Signed : Riviere 
I. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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Amendment No. 3 
European security and East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. La Combe 
1st December 1976 
In the draft recommendation proper, after the words "RECOMMENDS TO THE CouNCIL" leave out 
"that it urge member governments: l. To ensure that the North Atlantic Council make careful prepara-
tion" and insert "l. To make careful preparation". 
Signed : La Oombe 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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Amendment No. 4 
European security and East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Scholten 
I. In paragraph I (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "full". 
1st December 1976 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "make acceptable concessions to 
the NATO position" and insert "bridge the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO proposals". 
Signed : SchoUen 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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Amendment No. 5 
European security and East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Dankert 
1st December 1976 
1. At the end of the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert : 
"and in permitting the division of Europe in antagonistic blocs to be attenuated," 
2. In paragraph 1 (b) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: 
"and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions;" 
Signed : Dankerl 
1. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment referred back to the Committee). 
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Document 721 30th November 1976 
Designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU ~mbly 
The Assembly, 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr. Burckel and others 
with a request for urgent prodecure 
Considering the defence of the Eastern Mediterra.nea.n to be a.n essentia.l pa.rt of Europea.n security ; 
Welcoming the r6le pla.yed by Greek a.nd Turkish pa.rliamenta.ry observers in its work during recent 
sessions; 
Considering tha.t under the modified Brussels Trea.ty the WEU Assembly is the only Europea.n 
a.ssembly with responsibilities in defence matters ; 
Considering tha.t under the sa.me trea.ty the WEU Assembly is composed of the representatives of 
the signatory countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ; 
Reca.lling tha.t Greece a.nd Turkey a.re members of the Council of Europe ; 
Considering it essential for representatives of the Greek a.nd Turkish pa.rlia.ments to be continuously 
a.ssocia.ted with exa.mina.tion of ma.tters affecting Europea.n security ; 
Considering that the regula.r participation of Greek and Turkish pa.rliamenta.ria.ns in its work ca.n 
but strengthen the contribution of Greece and Turkey to the Atla.ntic Alliance ; 
Welcoming the opening of negotiations for the ea.rly accession of Greece to the EEC; 
Welcoming the fa.ct tha.t the agreement of a.ssocia.tion between Turkey and the EEC provides for 
the a.cceBBion of Turkey after a. period of ada.pta.tion, 
INVITES THE GREEK CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
To be represented at ea.ch session of the WEU Assembly by its delegation to the Pa.rlia.mentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose members would ha.ve observer status; 
INVITES THE TuRKISH NATIONAL AssEMBLY AND SENATE 
To be represented at ea.ch session of the WEU Assembly by its delegation to the Pa.rlia.mentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose members would ha.ve observer status. 
Signed: Burckel, Radius, Treu, VaUeix, Amrekn, Tangke, Lewis, McNamara, Sckwencke, Merule 
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Document 728 30th November 1976 
Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
inviting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to follow attentively the 
implementation of the mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee 
tabled by Mr. Delorme and others 
The Assembly, 
Recalling the interest shown by the governments of member countries in co-operating closely for 
the production of armaments ; 
Recalling that in its Order 45 it agreed to organise a symposium on a European armaments policy 
in order to work out proposals likely to foster increased co-operation between WEU member States on the 
production and procurement of military equipment ; 
Gratified that on 31st May 1976 the WEU Council of Ministers gave the Standing Armaments 
Committee a new mandate in this field ; 
Emphasising that the problem of reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee is central to 
the responsibilities granted to WEU and its Assembly under the modified Brussels Treaty, 
INVITES THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS 
To follow attentively the implementation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
Signed: Delorme, de Bruyne, Tanghe, Radius, Burckel, Grieve, Valleix, Kliesing, Amrehn, Treu 
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Amendment No. 1 
Mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Delorme 
2nd December 1976 
After the words "INviTEs THE CoMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QuESTIONS AND .AmriAMENTs" insert "AND 
THE GENERAL AFFAIRs CoMMITTEE, each within its own sphere of responsibilities". 
Signed : Delorme 
I. See 12th Sitting, 2nd December 1976 (Amendment negatived). 
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